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ABSTRACT
This Article frames the history of the Anglo-American bankruptcy
tradition as a search for solutions to the basic problem that has from
the first underlain the bankruptcy process: how to obtain the
assistance of a debtor in his financial dismantling. The pivotal
moment in this story came in the years 1705 and 1706, when the
English Parliament drafted a bill making the bankrupt’s refusal to
cooperate with the commissioners running his bankruptcy a capital
crime. Almost as an afterthought, they also introduced discharge of
debt. Incentivizing cooperation with discharge would have a fruitful
future. Coercing the debtor to be honest, however, proved a failure.
Fraud flourished, and few perpetrators were executed, in part because
creditors and jurors found putting bankrupts to death a bit excessive.
And yet, despite the failure of the English experiment with harsh
penalties, the desire to punish debtors has remained a part of the
culture of bankruptcy to this day.
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INTRODUCTION
Around eight o’clock in the morning on Wednesday, November
11, 1761, the condemned prisoner, John Perrott, was taken from his
1
cell in London’s Newgate Prison. He spent some time praying with
the prison chaplain and receiving the Sacrament; then his leg shackles
were knocked off and his hands bound. At a quarter after ten, he
2
appeared “pale and trembling” in the prison yard. According to a
newspaper account, standing in the yard awaiting his fate, “his
behaviour there was so decent and so Christian, that it greatly
3
affected every person present.” A few minutes later the under sheriff
came to transport Perrott to his execution. He was loaded onto a cart
and carried the short distance to the scaffold erected at the ancient
hanging place in West Smithfield. Once there, Perrott looked about
4
anxiously, concerned to see his hearse. Reassured of its presence, he

1. LLOYD’S EVENING POST (London), Nov. 9, 1761, at 463; LLOYD’S EVENING POST,
Nov. 13, 1761, at 478; PUB. LEDGER (London), Nov. 12, 1761, at 1082.
2. 2 ANDREW KNAPP & WILLIAM BALDWIN, THE NEWGATE CALENDAR 325 (London, J.
Robins & Co. 1825).
3. LLOYD’S EVENING POST, Nov. 9, 1761, at 463.
4. 4 WILLIAM JACKSON, THE NEW AND COMPLETE NEWGATE CALENDAR 211–12
(London, Alex Hogg 1795).
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prayed fervently and at around eleven o’clock was “launched into
5
eternity.”
Hanging was a spectator sport in eighteenth-century England,
and the accounts of Perrott’s execution suggest that the usual crowd
6
turned out to watch him swing. They came to see off not a murderer,
rapist, or highwayman, but rather a bankrupt, albeit a quite
7
spectacular and long remembered one. Perrott was one of likely only
four Englishmen hanged for the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy
8
between 1706 and 1820, and he was later occasionally—though
9
mistakenly—believed to have been the last bankrupt hanged.
Made a capital offense in 1706 by the Act of 4 & 5 Anne, the
crime of fraudulent bankruptcy was statutorily defined as a debtor’s
failure to cooperate fully with his creditors by appearing before the
bankruptcy commissioners and disclosing all of his assets after
10
becoming a bankrupt. The death penalty was abolished for such post
bankruptcy crime in 1820, and the offense and the men who were
executed under it have become something of a curiosity, relegated to
11
offhand dismissal in current historical scholarship. By contrast,

5. 4 THE BLOODY REGISTER: A SELECT AND JUDICIOUS COLLECTION OF THE MOST
REMARKABLE TRIALS 275 (London 1764); PUB. LEDGER, Nov. 12, 1761, at 1082.
6. See PUB. LEDGER, Nov. 12, 1761, at 1082 (detailing the reaction of observers to
Perrott’s behavior in the prison yard and his “exhort[ing]” the crowd before his execution); see
also V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE, 1770–
1868, at 56 (1994) (describing the practice of crowds watching executions).
7. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, AND OF
THE OPERATION THEREOF, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1818, H.C. 127, at 21 (testimony of Basil
Montagu) (calling Perrott’s case “well known”); ALFRED MARKS, TYBURN TREE: ITS HISTORY
AND ANNALS 227 (1908) (referring to “[t]he most remarkable case . . . of John Perrott”); LEEDS
MERCURY, Apr. 10, 1813, at 3 (“Only one instance has occurred, we believe, within the memory
of man of any bankrupt, before John Senior, suffering capital punishment for the concealment
of his effects, and that individual was John Perrott . . . who suffered in the year 1761. Perrott’s
case, it is said, made a considerable sensation at the time . . . .”).
8. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
9. For example, an editor’s note to a nineteenth-century edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries called Perrott the last bankrupt hanged. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS: ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT
STATE OF THE LAW BY ROBERT MALCOLM KERR *482 n.a (London, John Murray 3d ed. 1862).
In fact, the last bankrupt was hanged in York in 1813. See infra text accompanying notes 228–32.
10. 4 & 5 Ann., c. 17, §§ 1, 18 (1705 [1706 n.s.]); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *156 (defining fraudulent bankruptcy).
11. See 1 Geo. IV, c. 115 (1820) (abolishing the death penalty for fraudulent bankruptcy);
Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Development of
Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153, 156–57 (1982) (discussing 4 & 5 Anne but not
mentioning the capital felony provision); John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most Important
Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 167 (1996) (giving little attention
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discharge of debt, which was also introduced in the 1706 Act of Anne,
12
is recognized as a crucial pivot point in the history of bankruptcy.
For the first time, the law took the interests of the bankrupt into
13
account, however feebly and perhaps even unintentionally. Since
then, Anglo-American bankruptcy law has paid increasing attention
to the needs of debtors, and discharge remains one of its defining
14
elements.
This Article argues that the role of discharge as an innovation
that changed the nature of bankruptcy cannot be fully appreciated
without taking the capital punishment provision into account. The
two options in the 1706 law—assist the debtor or punish the debtor—
represented parallel solutions to the fundamental contradiction on
which bankruptcy has from the beginning been built, namely that the
15
debtor must assist in his own financial dissolution. In modern
bankruptcy, since the introduction of discharge in the eighteenth
century and of voluntary bankruptcy in the nineteenth, this assistance
has come to be viewed as a tradeoff that the debtor makes to be freed
16
of the burden of unpayable debts. But this balancing of the interests
and duties of debtors and creditors did not exist in early bankruptcy.
Whereas today the debtor who turns over his assets may walk away
with a discharge, prior to 1706, the debtor had to participate in his
to the capital punishment clause in a study of the 1706 Act); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History
of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 11 (1995) (“While
obviously quite dramatic, the importance of the death penalty for fraudulent bankrupts should
not be overstated . . . .”).
12. McCoid, supra note 11, at 164.
13. Some scholarly disagreement exists about the extent to which Parliament viewed
discharge as a concession to debtors versus merely a way to help creditors get repaid. See, e.g.,
id. at 163 & n.4 (collecting sources that characterize discharge as a creditor’s remedy); Ian P.H.
Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571–1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 286 (1980) (discussing
discharge’s underpinnings as a concession to non-fraudulent debtors).
14. The heart of modern American bankruptcy law is the discharge by which the debtor, in
exchange for providing the bankruptcy trustee with information about his or her finances,
turning over his or her assets, and in some instances paying some portion of what he or she
owes, is discharged of most debts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 521, 523(a), 541, 727(a) (2006); see also Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (listing discharge and debtor rehabilitation as
“primary purposes” of American bankruptcy law); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy
in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393, 1394–96 (1985) (describing the modern
discharge process as a “fresh-start policy”).
15. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS,
supra note 7, at 47 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor) (testifying before the House of
Commons committee on bankruptcy reform in 1818 that “[i]t is the co-operation of the
bankrupt, and the assistance that he affords in the settlement of his affairs, that I consider
essential”).
16. See supra note 14.
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complete financial and personal degradation without having the right
to expect anything, except almost certain incarceration in debtors’
prison, in return.
This need for debtor cooperation in the face of solely negative
incentives created a compliance problem that helped make early
17
bankruptcy unpopular and ineffective. Societies have since
discovered that, in bankruptcy, balance matters. In many areas of law,
no balancing of interests is necessary. The law of sales, for example,
functions equally well whether the acceptance of a contract is valid on
dispatch or on receipt, whether a thief in the chain of title does or
does not vitiate ownership by a good faith purchaser, or whether a
valid contract does or does not require consideration. But in
bankruptcy the particular rules are not neutral because societal and
economic factors larger than the mere preferences of private parties
18
are at stake. A credit economy relies on the promise that current
debts will be paid in the future. If such promises are not kept, the
economy falters. But if all promises to pay are fully enforced,
entrepreneurial activities will decline and too many productive
citizens will lose their incentive to earn in the face of perpetually
19
paying past debts with future earnings. The idea behind creating a
17. See, e.g., 1 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1693–1695, at 360 (1900)
(quoting the 1694 draft of a bill commencing, “[w]hereas the laws heretofore made against
bankrupts are defective in many cases, and it is found by experience that few of their creditors,
even after a tedious and oppressive prosecution of Commissions of Bankruptcy recover their
debts or any considerable part thereof”); SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF
THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 50 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly, Member, Select
Comm. Appointed to Consider of the Bankrupt Laws, and of the Operation Thereof) (“The
bankrupt laws appear to me to be in many respects extremely defective, and to require much
alteration.”); DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY UPON PROJECTS 192 (London, Thomas Ballard 2d ed.
1702) (1697) [hereinafter DEFOE, ESSAY] (“This Law . . . tends wholly to the Destruction of the
Debtor, and yet very little to the Advantage of the Creditor.”); 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 245 (2d ed. 1937) (“That neither the Legislature, nor the common
law, nor equity, had succeeded in constructing a satisfactory body of law, is clear from the fact
that the defects pointed out at the beginning of the nineteenth century, are, to a large extent, the
same as those pointed out by Brinklow in the sixteenth century.”).
18. For an early expression of the understanding of the larger societal impact of
bankruptcy, see AN HUMBLE PROPOSAL TO CAUSE BANCRUPTS MAKE BETTER AND MORE
SPEEDIER PAYMENTS OF THEIR DEBTS TO THEIR CREDITORS, THAN, BY LONG EXPERIENCE
HATH BEEN FOUND, THE STATUTES AGAINST BANCRUPTS DO EFFECT (London 1679)
[hereinafter HUMBLE PROPOSAL]. “[I]f Circumstances be so set, as renders private Property a
Public Grievance, in such cases it seems reasonable, that the Public do exercise their Authority
to convert this private Grievance into their Common-weal.” Id. at 7.
19. This phenomenon was not lost on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century advocates for
bankruptcy reform. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE
BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (arguing that
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greater equilibrium between debtors and creditors has long been that
if debtors see an advantage in disclosing their assets to their creditors,
they will be less inclined to try to cheat, and if debtors cheat less,
20
creditors will be repaid more.
It took the English law over a century to begin to understand this
21
truism. The parliaments that passed the earliest statutes believed
that bankruptcy existed to serve creditors alone and thought that all
they had to do to obtain debtor cooperation was threaten
punishment. Only as it became apparent that the success of
bankruptcy as a debt-collection mechanism hinged on maintaining a
greater balance between the needs and duties of both creditors and
debtors did the law begin to seek out ways to provide positive
incentives for debtor participation. The process of trying to solve the
problem of obtaining debtor cooperation—a process that involved
moving from a purely punitive to a modern, increasingly remedial
bankruptcy system—is the focus of this Article.
This development is analyzed through the rise and fall of
England’s century-long but ultimately failed experiment with

permitting recuperation of future earnings “takes from [the bankrupt] . . . all motives for
industry, by subjecting the future fruits of his labours to the demands of his former creditors”);
DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 192 (arguing that English bankruptcy law “encourages no new
Industry, for it makes [the debtor] perfectly uncapable [sic] of any thing but starving”).
20. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS,
FURTHER REPORT OF MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1818, H.C. 277, at 5 (testimony of Thomas
Nowlan) (“[T]he most effectual mode of preventing fraud is to lessen the temptation or
necessity for committing it.” (emphasis omitted)). This is not to say that debtors will not cheat.
That is why there is still a Bankruptcy Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006), that deals with the
exact same crimes that the English penalized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See
generally STEPHANIE WICKOUSKI, BANKRUPTCY CRIMES (3d ed. 2007) (discussing
contemporary American criminal bankruptcy law).
21. For early evidence of an understanding see, for example, a broadside written at the
time discharge was introduced, CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE BILL, TO PREVENT FRAUDS
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, HUMBLY SUBMITTED TO THE HIGH COURT OF
PARLIAMENT; TOGETHER WITH REASONS FOR SOME CLAUSE OR PROVISION THEREIN TO BE
MADE, FOR THE INCOURAGEMENT OF DEBTORS TO DISCOVER AND DELIVER UP THEIR
ESTATES, FOR THE EQUAL BENEFIT OF THEIR CREDITORS (circa 1706) (British Library, Cup.
645.b.11/37*) (“It is consistent with the Policy and Reason of Human Laws, almost in all Parts
of Christendom, that some Power be constituted to make an Equilibrium of Justice between
Debtor and Creditor, suffering neither the one to Cheat, nor the other to Oppress, Bury,
Famish, or Ruin another Subject.”); see also REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE
BILL FOR PREVENTING OF FRAUDS COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS (circa 1719 or 1732)
(Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP 100 no. 5) (stating that creditors “are . . . willing to give such
Encouragement as by Experience they have found to be necessary, to encourage Bankrupts
justly and fairly to conform thereto, in order to render such a Law more effectual for the
Purposes intended”).
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employing the threat—and occasionally the reality—of capital
punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy. Part I outlines the struggles of
early English bankruptcy law in obtaining debtor cooperation during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the statutes paid no
attention to the interests of debtors. Part II treats the pivotal events
of 1705 to 1707, during which an infamous financial scandal catalyzed
Parliament to reform the bankruptcy law and to try yet again to
improve debtor cooperation, first by looking backward to the old
solution of penalties, and second, by looking forward to the recent
idea of discharge. Part III discusses why the threat of death not only
failed to control what was likely to have been widespread bankruptcy
fraud but potentially also permitted fraud to flourish in the discharge
procedure.
Despite the current and historical importance of bankruptcy, its
pre-modern past has barely been investigated. No scholarship has
investigated the history of the punitive side of bankruptcy, even
though the impulse to punish bankrupts is still very much alive and
well, as witnessed by the debates over the extent to which the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
punished debtors for their indebtedness by making bankruptcy more
22
difficult to obtain. And while several articles have discussed the
origin of discharge, they have used only readily available printed
23
sources. This Article goes beyond the usual sources to research the
capital punishment and discharge elements of eighteenth-century
bankruptcy through archival manuscripts, parliamentary committee
testimony, and contemporary broadsides, newspapers, and pamphlets.
This material tells a story that is at once foreign in the severity of the
punishment of debtors and yet surprisingly familiar in the underlying
attitudes toward them.

22. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1856 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(proposing amendments to 11 U.S.C. §707(b)) (“This bill would make it harder for individuals
who can repay their debt to file for bankruptcy under chapter 7.”); id. at S1813–14, S1856–57
(statements of Sens. Frist & Grassley) (explaining that the purpose of the bill is to prevent
abuse yet still help the honest but unfortunate debtor); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s
Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 209 (“If discharge of debts is easy in
bankruptcy, debtors will incur more debt. Conversely, if obtaining bankruptcy relief is difficult,
debtors will be more reluctant to incur debts.”); James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 71 MO.
L. REV. 863, 874 (2006) (arguing that the bankruptcy reform act was merely a cover for trying to
make bankruptcy less desirable).
23. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11 and infra note 26.
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I. THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE IN EARLY BANKRUPTCY (1543–1705)
Bankruptcy began in England as a collection device in which all
power rested with the creditors. For a century or more, the law’s sole
concern was that creditors should be repaid, while the interests of the
24
debtor were ignored. Unfortunately for creditors, collection has
always required at least some debtor participation. Especially in an
age in which the coercive reach of public authorities was limited, as
was the case in early modern England, the creditors could not get
their money if the debtor did not cooperate in turning over or
25
disclosing his assets. Early bankruptcy, however, destroyed the
debtor both financially and personally, giving him little incentive to
assist in the process. The development of English bankruptcy, from its
creation in 1543 to the important juncture of 1706 and beyond,
therefore became a search for ways to force or to encourage debtors
to contribute to their own ruin. Initially, the best solutions to the
problem were found outside the confines of the bankruptcy statutes,
which, officially, remained staunchly pro-creditor. This Part
investigates the factors behind the harshness of the early law and the
forces that attempted to mitigate it by giving some leverage to
bankrupts.
Preliminarily, a word must be said about the dating of
bankruptcy statutes because the dating system has been a common
26
source of confusion in the literature. During the period under
24. Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1940); see also, e.g.,
Worseley v. Slader, (1758) 1 Burr. 467, 476–77, 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 412 (K.B.) (stating that the
two purposes of bankruptcy are “the management of the bankrupt’s estate” and “equal
distribution among his creditors” (emphasis omitted)); The Case of Bankrupts (Smith v. Mills),
(1584) 2 Co. Rep. 25a, 25b, 76 Eng. Rep. 441, 465–68 (K.B.) (holding that the purpose of the
bankruptcy statute was to “relieve the Creditors of the Bankrupt equally, and that there should
be an equal and rateable Proportion observed in the Distribution of the Bankrupt’s Goods
amongst the Creditors, having Regard to the Quantity of their several Debts; so that one should
not prevent the other, but all should be in aequali jure”); CONSIDERATIONS UPON
COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPTS 4 (London, R. Gosling 1727) (“The common End of all the Laws
relating to Bankrupts, is to discover and collect the Estate of the Debtor, in the best and
speediest Manner, in order to make an equal Distribution of it among all the Creditors . . . .”).
25. See W.J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in
the Early Modern Period, 69 TRANS. AM. PHIL. SOC. 1, 6–7 (1979) (explaining the lack of state
administrative and enforcement mechanisms in early modern England).
26. E.g., Duffy, supra note 13, at 286–87, 293 (dating the Pitkin affair to 1704 and 5 Anne to
1706); Andrew J. Duncan, From Dismemberment to Discharge: The Origins of Modern
American Bankruptcy Law, 100 COM. L.J. 191, 198 (1995) (stating that Parliament “passed” 4 &
5 Anne in 1705); Michael Quilter, Daniel Defoe: Bankrupt and Bankruptcy Reformer, 25 J.
LEGAL HIST. 53, 56, 64 (2004) (dating the passage of 4 & 5 Anne to 1705 and the passage of 5
Anne to 1706); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65
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consideration here, an English statute was officially dated according
to the year of the first day of the parliamentary session in which the
27
act was passed. Thus, as happened with the statute introducing
capital punishment for fraudulent bankrupts, 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, the
parliamentary session began in October 1705, but the act only passed
the two houses of Parliament and received royal assent in March
1706. In the statute books, the statute would be dated 1705, but for
the purposes of the historical chronology of events it is necessary to
realize that it was passed in 1706. For this reason, one sometimes sees
the various early bankruptcy acts dated in different years.
A further wrinkle makes dating even more complicated. Until
1752, the English used a modified form of medieval dating in which
28
the first day of the new year was March 25. Because the Act of 4 & 5
Anne was passed on March 19, its year of enactment was 1705 under
29
the old style dating system. To clarify matters, this Article adopts
several conventions. First, all dates are given in modern style. Second,
to keep the chronological developments clear, the Article generally
refers to the date of passage of an act rather than the official date in
the statute books. Third, when the official dates of the acts are listed,
they include the statute book date followed by the date of passage, if
different, in square brackets with the indication “n.s.” for “new style”
for pre-1752 acts which received royal assent before March 25.
A. The Original Purpose of Bankruptcy
Insolvency was particularly fraught with negative meaning in the
early modern economy. The merchant or trader who relied on credit
lived constantly on the edge. The still relatively primitive state of
AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 333, 337, 339 (dating the passage of 4 & 5 Anne to 1705, the Pitkin affair
to 1704, and the passage of 5 Anne to 1706).
27. CHRISTOPHER ROBERT CHENEY, A HANDBOOK OF DATES: FOR STUDENTS OF
BRITISH HISTORY 108 (Michael Jones ed., new ed. 2000) (1945).
28. Thus, for example, the year 1705 ran from March 25 (1705) to March 24 (1706 in
current, or new style, dating).
29. The March-based dating system has led to occasional misunderstandings in recent
scholarship. For instance, one author has interpreted the provision that the Act of 4 & 5 Anne
would come into force on June 24, 1706, to mean that fifteen months passed between the
conclusion of the retroactive application period (March 10, 1705 old style) and the Act’s coming
into force, when, in fact, only three months passed, because the retroactive period in modern
dating ended on March 10, 1706. McCoid, supra note 11, at 166 n.12. To be precise, in modern
dating it would have passed on March 22, 1706, because the switch in 1752 from the March 25 to
the January 1 new year was accompanied by the change from the Julian to the Gregorian
calendar, in which the calendar jumped forward by eleven days (so by statute, when the change
took effect, September 2, 1752, was followed by September 14, 1752).
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communication, travel, and production meant that he could not be
sure when he would receive the next shipment or the next payment
on which his ability to pay his own creditors depended. His goal was
to “synchronize the payments being made to him as a creditor with
those he had to make as a debtor,” and this he could never do with
30
complete assurance. As all merchants and traders who depended on
credit existed in this state of financial instability, the insolvency of one
person who owed significant debts could lead to the failure of many
31
others.
The fragile glue holding together the web of credit on which the
economy depended was confidence, and in the tightly knit premodern world of buyers and sellers sharing book debt or circulating
notes of hand or bills of exchange this confidence was highly personal,
32
resting on reputation and trust and often little else. The bankrupt
disrupted this system. He was seen not only as stealing money which
his creditors might need to keep themselves out of insolvency but
more importantly as stealing their confidence. Early comments to
Parliament illustrate these twin concerns. In 1559, certain
“[c]onsiderations delivered to the Parliament” included the complaint
that, whereas “a poor thief doth steal a sheep or pick a purse, they
[that is, bankrupts] come away with hundreds and thousands at least,
33
and undo a great many honest men.” And in a speech to Parliament
in about 1590, Richard Dane said, “These bankrupts are worse than
thieves [who] rob by the highway for necessity; but these are double
thieves because they were put in trust with many men’s goods, which
30. Julian Hoppit, The Use and Abuse of Credit in Eighteenth-Century England, in
BUSINESS LIFE AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF D.C. COLEMAN 64, 65–67 (Neil
McKendrick & R.B. Outhwaite eds., 1986); see also V. MARKHAM LESTER, VICTORIAN
INSOLVENCY: BANKRUPTCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND COMPANY WINDING-UP IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 2 (1995) (“The legal procedures governing indebtedness
were important because they were the key to sustaining confidence in the credit system that
underlay the British economy.”).
31. Hoppit, supra note 30, at 67.
32. Id. at 65 (“Central to the relationship between the debtor and the creditor was mutual
confidence[] [b]ecause the loan was backed by nothing but personal security . . . .”); Joanna
Innes, The King’s Bench Prison in the Later Eighteenth Century: Law, Authority and Order in a
London Debtors’ Prison, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE? THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN
THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 250, 251 (John Brewer & John Styles eds.,
1980) (explaining that the economy “rested upon an extensively ramified network of credit and
debt”). For an excellent description of book debt, see AMALIA KESSLER, A REVOLUTION IN
COMMERCE: THE PARISIAN MERCHANT COURT AND THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 58–61 (2007).
33. 1 CALENDAR OF THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE MOST HON. THE MARQUIS OF
SALISBURY, K.G. 164 (S.R. Scargill-Bird ed., London, Eyre & Spottiswoode 1883).
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34

by breaking they undo many.” In a credit economy clinging, often
quite precariously, to solvency, the bankrupt was a threatening
35
character.
This fear of bankruptcy provides the backdrop against which the
earliest English legislation played out. Early modern commentators
and modern scholars generally agree that the first English bankruptcy
act, 34 & 35 Henry VIII, c. 4 (1542 [1543]), was intended to help
creditors recover their money from those debtors who were
attempting to defraud them, either through the fraudulent or reckless
expenditure of the borrowed money or by the willful refusal to repay
36
their debts. The act’s preamble spoke of:
divers and sundry persons, craftily obtaining into their hands great
substance of other men’s goods, [who] do suddenly flee to parts
34. Richard Dane, Address to Parliament on the Mischiefs Arising from Bankrupts
Concealing Their Effects; with the Means of Addressing the Grievance (circa 1590) (British
Library, Landsdowne MS 99 f. 185r.) (“These Banckrowts are worse than theves [that] robbe by
the highe waye for necessitie: but these are duble theves becawse they were put in trust with
many mens goods: which by breking they undoe many.”); cf. HONORÉ DE BALZAC, EUGÉNIE
GRANDET 77 (Sylvia Raphael trans., Oxford World’s Classics 2003) (1833) (“A highway robber
is preferable to a bankrupt. A highwayman attacks you, but you can defend yourself and he
risks his life. But the other . . . .”). I thank Professor Jay Westbrook for this reference.
35. See, e.g., A Recital of the Several Circumstances that May Cause a Debtor to Become a
Bankrupt (dated in the catalogue as circa 1571, but likely closer to 1604 based on content)
(British Library, Landsdowne MS 13 f. 55r) (“The abuses and deceipts of bankrupts is growne
intollerable, the remedies p[ro]vided against them be weake, that unlesse the inconveniency
thereof be remedied by this p[ar]liament, all trades of buyinge and sellinge . . . importinge the
benefits of this Common wealthe will in short tyme utterlie decaye . . . .”); THOMAS DEKKER,
THE SEVEN DEADLY SINNES OF LONDON 20 (H.F.B. Brett-Smith ed., Houghton Mifflin Co.
1922) (1606) (“The theefe that dyes at Tyburne for a robbery, is not halfe so dangerous a weede
in a Common-wealth, as the Politick Bankrupt. I would there were a Derick to hang up him
too.”).
36. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAW, FURTHER
REPORT OF MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 2 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan) (“[T]he
bankrupt law was first introduced into England at a period, when, comparatively speaking, trade
was in its infancy, and credit very limited; and that the law was solely enacted to protect
creditors against the frauds of debtors; and the bankrupt was then, with justice, perhaps,
considered in the light of a criminal or offender; and infamy was attached to his name.”); 8
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 233, 236, 243 (noting that statutes of bankrupts initially
targeted a small class of debtors); A TREATISE OF FRAUDS, COVINS, AND COLLUSIONS 26
(London, John Nutt 1710) (stating that statutes of bankrupts aimed to prevent the deception of
creditors); Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy
Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 189, 190 (1938) (calling the 1543 act “a law that began with a brief
statute directed at the pursuit and punishment of a narrow class of fraudulent debtors”); see also
Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the
Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 13–16, 22–23 (1986) (arguing that the treatment of
debtors under the early bankruptcy laws was in part an extension of the vision in early modern
England of the merchant as villain).
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unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay or restore to any
their creditors, their duties, but at their own wills and pleasures
consume debts and the substance obtained by credit of other men,
for their own pleasure and delicate living, against all reason, equity,
37
and good conscience . . . .

These men were called bankrupts, a term the English had borrowed
from the French law, in which the term referred solely to fraudulent,
38
and therefore criminal, insolvents. Only the insolvent’s prebankruptcy behavior mattered in this statute. The debtor who spent
his creditors’ money for reasons other than honest trade and who
refused to pay when required would be treated as a bankrupt. Honest
insolvents, whose losses were brought on by forces outside their
control and who, without deception, presented their disability to their
39
creditors, did not come within the intendment of the act. The
language of the Henrician law made clear the equation of bankrupt
and criminal, for the statute used the word “bankrupt” only once, in
40
the title, “An Act Against Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupt.”
The remainder of the statute referred to the bankrupt only as the
41
“offender.”
The four defining elements of early English bankruptcy that this
statute introduced sought to maximize recovery against the crafty
fraudsters who posed such a serious threat to economic stability. First,
the debtor had no choice about becoming bankrupt. His creditors put
him into bankruptcy, and their petition, originally to members of the

37. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 1 (1542 [1543]).
38. 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *277 (“We have fetched as
well the name as the wickednesse of bankrupts from foreign nations . . . .”); I. Treiman,
Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 L.Q. REV. 230, 231–32 (1927) (“[T]he fraud of the
debtor lay in the mere fact that he was insolvent, rather than in his efforts to cheat his
creditors.”). The common spelling variants seen in sixteenth-century English legal and
legislative texts, such as banckeroote, banckerowte, and banckrote, betray the influence of the
French banqueroute. Pierre Claude Reynard, The Language of Failure: Bankruptcy in
Eighteenth-Century France, 30 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 355, 356–57 (2001).
39. NOMIUS ANTINOMOS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATE OF BANKRUPTS, UNDER THE
PRESENT LAWS IN A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT 2–3 (London, M. Cooper 1760)
(“It is true, the law certainly looks on the Bankrupt as a culprit under its chastisement. The
preamble of the very first statute made against them, of Henry the Eighth, supposes them to be
persons who have run away beyond seas, or elsewhere, from the payment of their just
debts . . . but the necessity of the statute was not at first thought applicable to a man, who stood
in his counting-house at the head of his books; and on any deficiency, was ready to shew his true
estate to his creditors, to give up all to them, or compound for a reasonable part.”).
40. This circumlocution is seemingly borrowed from the French usage faire banqueroute.
41. See 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, §§ 1–2.
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Privy Council and, from 1571 onward, to the chancellor, came to be
42
granted as a matter of course upon their ex parte evidence alone.
Second, the creditors could only petition after the debtor committed a
so-called “act of bankruptcy.” These statutorily defined acts
ostensibly demonstrated the debtor’s intent to hinder, delay, or
43
defraud his creditors. They thus provided the actus reus and the
44
mens rea of the crime of bankruptcy. Third, and arguably the
defining characteristic of most bankruptcy systems, the creditors
would join together in a single bankruptcy proceeding, which would
gather all the assets and then divide them ratably according to the
45
amount of the creditors’ respective debts. Finally, all of the debtor’s
assets came into the bankruptcy estate. With the exception, made in
some later statutes, of necessary clothing, the bankrupt would be
46
stripped of everything. This contrasted with the normal common law
rule that placed strict limits on the attachment of real property and
liquid assets such as bills, bonds, or choses in action for the payment
47
of debt. Thus, a man’s home, so strongly protected under the
42. Id. § 1; 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 2 (1571 [1572]); see also RICHARD BOOTE, SOLICITOR’S GUIDE
TRADESMAN’S INSTRUCTOR 9 (London, B. Tovey 4th ed. 1774); Alderman Backwell’s
Case, (1683) 1 Vern. 152, 153, 23 Eng. Rep. 381, 381 (Ch.) (noting that a bankruptcy commission
must be granted as matter of course upon the filing of a petition). Bankruptcy did not become
voluntary in America until 1841. See Tabb, supra note 11, at 16–18; see also DAVID A. SKEEL,
JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 28–33 (2001)
(discussing the debates over voluntariness). In England, bankruptcy remained involuntary for
merchants until 1841, see 7 & 8 Vict., c. 96, and for non-merchants until 1861, see 24 & 25 Vict.,
c. 134. Voluntariness was abolished in 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 71, but was restored in 1883, 46 &
47 Vict., c. 52.
43. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 1; Treiman, supra note 38, at 233–34 (discussing the English
bankruptcy act of keeping house). By the last major pre-modern revision of the law in 1732, the
number of acts of bankruptcy had increased to about sixteen, and they all described ways of
intentionally avoiding creditors or evading their demands. For a list of acts, see EDWARD
GREEN, THE SPIRIT OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS 37–38 (London, J. Williams 1767); 2
BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *478–79; WYNDHAM BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA
OR, THE MERCHANT’S DIRECTORY 489–90 (London, John Moore 1752). American law retained
the bankruptcy act requirement until 1978. Tabb, supra note 11, at 8.
44. ROBERT GEORGE CECIL FANE, BANKRUPTCY REFORM IN A SERIES OF LETTERS
ADDRESSED TO SIR ROBERT PEEL, BART: LETTERS IV, V, VI, VII 37–39 (London, S. Sweet
1838) (quoting well-known barristers about the treatment of the bankruptcy act as a crime
under the law).
45. See Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV.
223, 225 (1917) (“A special process of collective execution is devised, a process directed against
all of the property of the debtor, restored to for the common benefit and at the common
expense of all the creditors.”).
46. See 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 1 (1732) (noting an exception for wearing apparel).
47. See Innes, supra note 32, at 254; Jones, supra note 25, at 13 (“The ability of creditors to
seize the assets of a debtor was seriously limited.”).
AND
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common law, was no longer his inviolate castle. Bankruptcy gave
creditors a powerful new collection tool, one which they could use on
their own volition, without the agreement of the debtor.
To make matters worse, because none of the early bankruptcy
statutes contemplated discharging the bankrupt of the unpaid
portions of his debts, the process functioned during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries merely as a sort of enforced pause during which
the bankrupt’s assets could be gathered in and distributed in an
49
orderly fashion. In addition, the creditors retained their legal rights
50
to recoup any unpaid debts. As long as the bankruptcy commission
remained in force, future earnings went into the collective and new
dividends would be distributed. Thereafter, the creditors could pursue
all other legal avenues, including keeping the bankrupt in debtors’
prison, until the debts were completely paid.
The next bankruptcy statute, the Act of 13 Elizabeth I, c. 7
51
52
(1571), added two important features to the system. First, it
53
explicitly limited the compass of the statute to merchants. Only
those who bought and sold for a living were subject to bankruptcy.
This would be significant later because it meant that merchants and
traders could be convicted as felons for doing things that non54
merchants could do with impunity. Second, the Act created the
position of commissioners of bankrupt, who were to be appointed by
55
the chancellor to oversee each bankruptcy. The commissioners were

48. See JAMES BLAND BURGES, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY, WITH A
PROPOSAL FOR A REFORM 204, 213–15 (1783) (pointing out the extent to which the early
bankruptcy procedure removed the protections of the common law); Treiman, supra note 38, at
233 (discussing the “special regard to a man’s house” under English law).
49. See Jones, supra note 25, at 16.
50. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 6 (1542 [1543]); 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 10 (1571 [1572]).
51. The Act is sometimes dated 1570, which is inexplicable because no parliaments were
held during the year 1570 under either style of dating. The parliamentary session in which the
Act passed began in April 1571.
52. The Act added many new elements to bankruptcy procedure, but the ones discussed
focus on the foundational elements that characterize bankruptcy. See 1 EDWARD CHRISTIAN,
THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW, BOTH IN
ENGLAND AND IN IRELAND 11 n.2 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1812) (discussing innovations in
the Act).
53. 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 1. It is not clear whether the Henrician Act was intended to apply
generally or only to merchants. See Jones, supra note 25, at 17. The merchant question was a
source of a great deal of litigation and fine distinctions. For an overview, see BEAWES, supra
note 43, at 488–89.
54. See infra notes 375–76.
55. 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 2.
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not government officials but rather prominent local citizens, often
lawyers or merchants, who served in their private capacity and were
56
paid out of the proceeds of the bankrupt’s estate. By the eighteenth
century, an official list of commissions existed for London, with each
57
commission composed of five members. The commissions were
assigned from the list in order by a clerk when a petition of
58
bankruptcy was submitted. Given that the assignees, who collected
and distributed the bankrupts’ estate, were also creditors, bankruptcy
was essentially a private matter largely controlled by those who would
benefit from it with little oversight from the courts and susceptible to
59
both corruption and incompetence.
The Henrician statute of 1543 had one serious liability: it
60
probably did not work. First, it provided little procedure. It
empowered creditors to work together to gather and distribute the
bankrupt’s assets but gave little explanation of how this should
61
happen. Second, it relied on the honesty of the bankrupt—who was
presumed to be a criminal—to give up his estate when all of the
incentives under the law pushed him to do the opposite. Bankruptcy
permitted the creditors to strip the bankrupt of all his assets, imprison
him, and continue to attach future earnings until he had repaid his
debts in full. Furthermore, because the imprisoned bankrupt was not
the state’s responsibility, his imprisonment for debt being a private
62
matter between him and his creditors, he was not fed, clothed, or
housed at public expense while in prison, but rather had to find a way
63
to purchase these amenities at the jailers’ extortionate rates.
Therefore, a bankrupt who hoped to be able to survive his
imprisonment either had to rely on friends and family for funds or
56. 1 GERARD MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL, LEX MERCATORIA OR, THE ANCIENT LAW
MERCHANT 158 (London, T. Bassett 3d ed. 1686) (stating that commissioners “must be
Counsellors at the Law joyned with some citizens or Merchants”).
57. E.g., THOMAS DAVIES, LAWS RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, BROUGHT HOME TO THE
PRESENT TIME 143–46 (London, H. Lintot 1744) (providing ten lists consisting of
commissioners); A SUCCINCT DIGEST OF THE LAWS RELATING TO BANKRUPTS 3 (Dublin,
Brett Smith 1791) (providing thirteen lists consisting of sixty-six total commissioners).
58. BOOTE, supra note 42, at 9.
59. See infra notes 378–85.
60. Jones, supra note 25, at 17–18.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Innes, supra note 32, at 253 (“[T]he courts played no more than a passive and
procedural role . . . .”).
63. Manby v. Scott (1663) 1 Mod. 124, 132, 86 Eng. Rep. 781, 786 (Ex.) (“If a man be taken
in execution and lie in prison for debt, neither the plaintiff, at whose suit he is arrested, nor the
sheriff who took him, is bound to find him meat, drink, or clothes . . . .”).
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64

conceal some of his assets from his creditors. And if the bankrupt
found a way to pay off his debts, his former bankruptcy could prevent
65
him from obtaining credit in the future. Yet, even though the
bankrupt faced the prospect of ruin, the law expected him to
cooperate with his creditors.
The Elizabethan statute of 1571 tinkered with the procedure of
debt collection to make it functional, provided that the debtor played
66
his role obediently. When the debtor did not do so, the law offered
no effective means to make him turn over his assets. The Henrician
and Elizabethan statutes said nothing about post-bankruptcy crime
except that the failure to surrender to the commissioners after a
commission of bankrupt was taken out resulted in the punishment of
67
outlawry. Only in the seventeenth century did laws begin to address
the problem of debtor noncooperation by including penalties
intended to frighten or coerce the debtor into participating in the
bankruptcy process.
B. Coercing Cooperation
The Henrician statute died a quiet death. It was apparently never
repealed, but after the passage of 13 Elizabeth I in 1571, it faded away
68
and was rarely adduced. Yet for all the procedural and
administrative flaws in the Henrician statute, creditors of those
honest but unfortunate insolvents who had suffered loss from fire, for
instance, or a shipwreck, or the failure of their own debtors seem to
69
have quickly seen the value of the bankruptcy mechanism. Under
the common law, the creditors of these honest insolvents could
pursue costly and cumbrous suits for debt, or they could compose
with the debtor. The first option involved long procedural delays and
the prospect of ever-diminishing returns as each successive creditor
70
sued for payment. The second option required creditors to accept

64. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 193, 197–98, 201–02.
65. Id. at 194.
66. 13 Eliz. I, c. 7 (1571 [1572]); see also 1 Jac. I, c. 15 (1604); 21 Jac. I, c. 19 (1624).
67. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 4, § 5 (1542 [1543]); 13 Eliz. I, c. 7, § 9.
68. 1 CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at 7–8 n.4; Jones, supra note 25, at 17–18.
69. These were the paradigmatic examples of misfortunes that could render a man
insolvent without culpability. See HUMBLE PROPOSAL, supra note 18, at 4; REASONS HUMBLY
OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL FOR THE BETTER RECOVERY OF BANKRUPTS ESTATES, AND
FOR THE MORE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION THEREOF (circa 1693).
70. HENRY BRINKELOW, THE COMPLAYNT OF RODERYCK MORS ch. XVII (Sauoy [i.e.,
Strasbourg], Per Fransicum de Turona [i.e., Wolfgang Köpfel] [1542]) (“[W]han any
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only a portion of their debts or a longer period for repayment.
Unless all creditors agreed to the composition, its benefits were lost
because the outlying creditor could imprison the debtor or demand
72
payment in full at the expense of everyone else. In addition,
compositions made the debtor the arbiter of what he could afford to
pay and left him in control of his property during the pendency of the
negotiations. By contrast, bankruptcy gave the creditors access to all
of the debtor’s assets, it was a useful joinder device, and it provided a
powerful stick with which to beat the recalcitrant insolvent—or the
73
hold-out creditor—into agreeing to a composition.
Evidence indicates that creditors early on began to make use of
the bankruptcy law against honest but unfortunate debtors, even
though, by its terms, the Henrician law, at least, was not intended to
apply to them. For instance, in April 1571, just as Parliament was
considering a major new bankruptcy statute, a bill was proposed
entitled, “An Act to repress the oppression of common promoters.” It
included a provision prohibiting bankrupts from bringing penal suits
74
“on penalty of being put in the stocks, and the suit voided.” A
marginal note criticizing the text pointed out that “[m]any honest
men by hard construction may be accounted a bankrupt, and it is not
75
reason his suit should be void . . . .” Similarly, a document discussing
possible changes to the bankruptcy laws dating to around 1580 spoke
of “the bankrupt who often is driven to break by accidents with
76
honest men,” and a draft of an ultimately aborted act from 1601
marchant . . . come to an after deale, and not able to pay his credyte at his due tyme . . . than ye
have a parcyal lawe in making of tachmentys [attachments], first come, first servyd: so one or ij
shall be all payd, and the rest shal have nothing.”); Innes, supra note 32, at 252–53.
71. I. Treiman, Majority Control in Compositions: Its Historical Origins and Development,
24 VA. L. REV. 507, 511, 519 (1938).
72. Id. at 511–12, 521.
73. See, e.g., 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 234 (discussing the use of bankruptcy as a
threat); Opinion on the Right of Strangers to Partake of Bankrupts Good Rateably with English
Creditors (circa 1580) (National Archives (Kew, London), SP 12/146 f. 232) (“The force of this
[bankruptcy] Lawe doth undoubtedlie restraine many p[er]sons of evill consience from
Banckrootinge to the greate benefite of subiectes & of strangers, And also compelleth many
Banckrootes to yelde much better satisfaction to theire Creditors then otherwise they wolde.”).
74. 20 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH,
ADDENDA 1566–1579, at 346 (M.A.E. Green ed., 1871).
75. An Act to Repress the Opression of Common Promoters (1571) (National Archives, SP
15/20 f. 48) (“Many honest men by harde construction may be accompted a Banckerowte and it
is not reason his suite shuld be void . . . .”).
76. Opinion on the Right of Strangers to Partake of Bankrupts Good Rateably with
English Creditors, supra note 73 (“the Bankeroote who often is dryven to breake by acsidentes
with honeste men”).
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“against Co[z]ening Banckrupts and lewd apprentices and factors”
excused from certain penalties any bankrupt who could show that his
insolvency was due to “loss by [bad] debtors, fire, the adventure of
77
the seas, or other casualty [that] hath happened unto him.”
The distinction between honest and fraudulent insolvents was
78
not new. It had been known in antiquity, and many continental
insolvency systems created separate procedures during the medieval
and early modern eras that dealt with honest insolvents civilly and
79
fraudulent bankrupts criminally. A two-track insolvency law had
merit in a society that looked upon bankrupts as criminals because, as
the quotes above suggest, unfortunate insolvents raised somewhat
different issues from fraudulent ones. It was, for instance, more
difficult to justify a bankruptcy law whose primary intent was to
punish the debtor for his willful failure to repay his loans because the
80
debtor had arguably done nothing worthy of punishment. This made
the problem of coercing the bankrupt’s cooperation even thornier.
The honest insolvent, put into bankruptcy against his will and asked
77. Bill Against Cozening Bankrupts and Lewd Apprentices and Factors (1601) (National
Archives, SP 12/283 f. 45) (“losse by Ill debtors, fyer, the adventure of the seas, or other casualty
[that] hath happened unto him”); see also THOMAS GOODINGE, THE LAW AGAINST
BANKRUPTS: OR, A TREATISE WHEREIN THE STATUTES AGAINST BANKRUPTS ARE
EXPLAINED 35 (London, S. Heyrick 1695) (“[T]he main intent of the Statutes is to relieve
Creditors against Frauds and Deceits . . . . Fraud and Cheat lies, or should lie at the bottom of
all; and I understand not the distinction of a Bankrupt by Fraud, and a Bankrupt by Accident,
which I find in some of our Books, as the Laws have been expounded.”).
78. Levinthal, supra note 45, at 237.
79. For a contemporary overview of the French and Dutch systems, see BEAWES, supra
note 43, at 554–70, and for a discussion of the French and Spanish systems, see the Addenda in
THOMAS COOPER, THE BANKRUPT LAW OF AMERICA, COMPARED WITH THE BANKRUPT LAW
OF ENGLAND, at iii–xxvi (Philadelphia, John Thompson 1801).
80. GOODINGE, supra note 77, at penultimate page of preface (“A Bankrupt, by Fraud, I
always hated . . . . But I regret the proceedings against Bankrupts by Accident . . . and am sorry
they are involved in the same Penalties.”); HUMBLE PROPOSAL, supra note 18, at 5 (opining
that honest bankrupts “merit compassion”). There are later perspectives on the same issue. See
SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 104
(testimony of John Ingram Lockhart) (“[N]o better can be the result of a commission issued
against the most upright merchant, whose extensive dealings, and vast, yet prudent ventures,
might all have failed, through uncontrollable events; and who would thus be bowed down before
the same species of tribunal, condemned to surrender in public the last piece of coin, or the last
token of affection; placed on the same footing, and perhaps at the same table, with some guilty
wretch, whose frauds, falsely denominated contracts, are about to receive complete amnesty,
from the hands of the same judges, at the instance of some creditors as criminal as himself.”);
151 CONG. REC. S2466 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (“This bill
punishes people, assumes that all those filing for bankruptcy have purposefully created their
debt problems, imposes a strict standard that does not take into account the circumstances
surrounding the bankruptcy . . . . That’s not fair . . . .”).
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to hand over his all, might have been rather indignant about the
shabby treatment he was receiving from creditors who, not long
before, had probably been friends or business associates. When
confronted with the prospect of a bankruptcy that they (in theory)
81
had no say in commencing, even honest insolvents may have sought
82
to conceal assets or abscond.
The reaction to the dilemma of creating a law that achieved the
cooperation of both fraudulent and honest bankrupts was threefold.
First, seventeenth-century bankruptcy statutes focused less on the
threshold question of what sort of pre-bankruptcy behavior brought
an insolvent under the bankruptcy acts and more on forcing all
bankrupts, through the threat of corporal punishment and
imprisonment, to turn over their assets to the benefit of their
creditors. Second, in reaction to a law that continued to ignore their
interests, debtors colluded with friendly creditors to control when
they entered bankruptcy. Third, eventually accepting some of the
defects in the bankruptcy laws, Parliament considered multiple bills
during the last quarter of the seventeenth century aimed at helping
honest debtors compound their debts with reluctant creditors and
avoid bankruptcy entirely.
The sixteenth-century acts of Henry and Elizabeth provided no
tools for the commissioners to coerce bankrupts to turn over their
83
assets. As this lack of coercive power proved problematic, early in
the seventeenth century Parliament passed two new bankruptcy acts
that punished the bankrupt’s failure to work with the commissioners,
because “the best remedy” for an increase in bankruptcy “will be fear
84
of corporal punishment.” The 1604 Act of 1 James I, c. 15
threatened with imprisonment bankrupts who refused to answer the

81. On collusive bankruptcies, see infra notes 90–94.
82. Barksdale Reading of 21 Jac. I, ch. 19 (1628) (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MS 57 ff. 2v-3r)
(reading on the statute of 21 James I, arguing that the bankruptcy statutes responded to frauds
that bankrupts had committed); SOME OBSERVATIONS WITH RELATION TO THE LAWS
RESPECTING BANKRUPTS: HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THIS PRESENT
PARLIAMENT (circa 1700) (“[A]t present being exposed to the extreme Severity of the most
rigid part of their Creditors . . . , the Bankrupts endeavour to Conceal their whole Estates, and
thereby generally defraud their Creditors of the greatest part of their Debts.”).
83. See A Recital of the Several Circumstances that May Cause a Debtor to Become a
Bankrupt, supra note 35 (“The abuses and deceipts of bankrupts is growne intollerable, the
remedies p[ro]vided against them be weake.”).
84. A Briefe of the Bill Exhibited Against Bankrupts (March 13, 1624) (National Archives,
SP 14/160 no. 74) (“[T]he best remedy will be feare of corporall punishment.”).
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85

commissioners’ questions. Answering falsely with intent to deceive
resulting in damage to one’s creditors in the amount of ten pounds or
more opened the door to a criminal indictment. If found guilty, the
bankrupt was sentenced to stand in the pillory for two hours and have
86
one of his ears nailed to the pillory and then cut off. Twenty years
87
later, 21 James I, c. 19 (1624), extended pillorying and ear-cutting to
punish not just perjury but also the concealment of assets, refusal to
disclose information about the estate to the commissioners, and the
making of an intentionally fraudulent conveyance of twenty pounds
88
or more. In addition, the bankrupt who could not “make it appear
unto the said commissioners, that he or she hath sustained some
casual loss, whereby he or she is disabled to pay what he or she then
89
owed” would also be pilloried and lose an ear. “Casual loss” meant
loss beyond the debtor’s control, thus demonstrating that by this time
lawmakers expected honest insolvents to be brought under the
bankruptcy acts.
Acting against the increasing coerciveness of the law, debtors
took it upon themselves to protect their interests. In principle,
bankruptcy was involuntary. In practice, however, abundant evidence
shows that collusion between the debtor and a favored creditor had
90
become common by at least the late seventeenth century.
85. 1 Jac. I, c. 15, § 8 (1604).
86. Id. § 9. Pillorying and cutting off the ear was a common seventeenth-century
punishment for crimes ranging from “sedition, writing seditious and libellous works, forgery and
coin-clipping to fortune-telling, drunkenness, gambling, adultery, and giving short weight.”
DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 1640–1660, at 7 (1970).
87. This statute is sometimes dated to 1623, presumably because the parliamentary session
began in February 1624 n.s., which would have been 1623 o.s. E.g., 1 CHRISTIAN, supra note 52,
at 37. In fact, no Parliament was held at all in 1623 (dating in modern style).
88. 21 Jac. I, c. 19, § 7 (1624). This was not the first time a statute forbade fraudulent
conveyances by debtors. The fraudulent conveyances act of 13 Elizabeth I, c. 5, passed in the
same 1571 session as the Elizabethan bankruptcy act, although the fraudulent conveyance law
applied more broadly than did the bankruptcy statute—which applied only to merchants.
CHARLES ROSS, ELIZABETHAN LITERATURE AND THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
31, 38 (2003). The Elizabethan statute was not the first fraudulent conveyance act, but it was
broader than earlier acts and consequently displaced them. Id. at 31–32; see also GARRARD
GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 7–8 (1931) (noting that a pre-Elizabethan
fraudulent conveyances law existed but was superseded as the controlling statute by 13
Elizabeth I, c. 5). In 1566, Parliament took up a bill against fraudulent gifts and bankrupts. The
bill died in the House of Commons. 1 H.C. JOUR. 80 (Dec. 19, 1566). In 1571, the two issues
were divided between two bills. See G.R. ELTON, THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 1559–1581,
at 74 (1986) (noting that the two issues were separated at some point before 1576).
89. 21 Jac. I, c. 19, § 7.
90. See, e.g., DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 196 (“[W]e see frequently now, that
Bankrupts desire Statutes, and procure them to be taken out against themselves.”); Jones, supra
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Technically, this collusion was illegal. Influenced by its origins in the
91
statute of 1543, the act of bankruptcy was theoretically a crime, and,
as Lord Mansfield said, “where is the Crime of denying oneself to
92
another, by previous consent and agreement?” In reality it became
so commonplace for a bankrupt to find a sympathetic creditor,
commit a deliberate act of bankruptcy in his presence, and ask the
creditor to file the petition that such collusion generally went
93
unremarked. A document from around 1718 described the situation
to the chancellor: “It is the usual practice when Traders through
Misfortune are forced, or through Knavery design to Break to cheat
their Creditors, to procure some friend of their own to take out a
Com[m]ission of Bankrupt against them, for fear a just Creditor
94
should do it.”

note 25, at 30 n.111 (“There was always concern that the bankrupt might get his friends to
petition for a commission.”); LORD NOTTINGHAM’S ‘MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE’ 163
(D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965) (“Sometimes the bankrupt sets up a friend or two as creditors to
petition against him, and they understanding one another huddle up the execution of a
commission between them, and defeat the rest of the creditors.”); 15 H.C. JOUR. (1706) 292
(statement of Mr. Walker) (“[I]t’s reasonably believed, four in five Commissions are taken out
by the procurement of the Bankrupts themselves.”).
91. E.g., Ex parte Bennet, (1743) 2 Atk. 427, 428, 26 Eng. Rep. 716, 717 (Ch.) (Hardwicke,
L.C.) (stating that a bankrupt “is guilty of a crime and a tort in becoming a bankrupt; and
though the genius and turn of bankrupt acts is altered of late, yet it is by the old acts of
parliament considered as a wrong”); FANE, supra 44, at 37–39 (noting that bankruptcy is
criminalized but concluding that this is an error).
92. Hooper v. Smith, (1763) 1 W. Bl. 441, 442, 96 Eng. Rep. 252, 253 (K.B.). To “deny
oneself” to a creditor meant to have a servant or apprentice falsely tell a creditor who had come
seeking payment of a debt that the debtor was not available to avoid payment. See SELECT
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 23
(testimony of Basil Montagu) (“I wish to add, with respect to the law [against] concerted
commissions of bankruptcy, that it appears to me to have originated in the supposition, that the
bankrupt laws require the act of bankruptcy to be done with intent to defeat a creditor, and
therefore that an act done to benefit the creditor, cannot be considered an act of bankruptcy;
the bankrupt statute requires, that an act of bankruptcy shall be done with intent to defraud or
delay a creditor; therefore we say, that an act which is done by a trader intending to benefit the
creditor, cannot be done to defeat or delay him.”).
93. This is, for instance, what happened in the Perrott case in 1760. See, e.g., sources cited
infra notes 235–36; see also Opinion of Counsel (British Library, Landsdowne MS 558 f. 63r)
(giving the opinion of counsel from 1723 when the lawyer consulted did not even bother to
comment on the fact that the bankrupt had “[d]esired and pressed one Rawson to whom he was
largely indebted to sue out a Com[m]ission of Bankrupt against him” (abbreviations expanded
without indication)).
94. Papers Relating to the Commissions of Bankrupts (probably circa 1718) (British
Library, Stowe MS 416 f. 36v.) (abbreviations expanded without indication); see also 2 KNAPP &
BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 316 (calling arrangements to have a creditor come and demand
money “the common and most ready foundation of commissions of bankruptcy”).
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But if bankruptcy were so unfair to the debtor, why would he
choose to put himself through it, especially before the advent of
discharge? One reason complained of in the evidence was the use of
95
false creditors to prove fake debts. For example, assume a debtor
owed a total of £200 to five creditors, and he had £100 in assets. If he
convinced five more of his friends to pose as creditors to whom he
owed another £200 in total, then each genuine creditor would be
repaid a quarter of his original loan. The bankrupt would recoup £50
from the friendly fake creditors and, perhaps, buy some time to pay
back any real creditors who came seeking the remainder of their
money.
Finally, although Parliament passed no major new bankruptcy
96
legislation between 1624 and 1706, it did not cease to concern itself
with the problem of uncooperative bankrupts. Between 1678 and
1698, it took up at least thirteen separate bills, many of which were
designed to provide the unfortunate insolvent with an attractive
97
alternative to the bankruptcy laws. This legislation employed a
95. 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH
LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 413–14 (1992) (providing examples of fraudulent debtor
cases heard by Lord Mansfield); BRIT. J., Feb. 4, 1727 (describing this scheme); REASONS
HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR ALTERING AND AMENDING THE LAWS CONCERNING BANKRUPTS,
AND FOR PREVENTING THE GREAT LOSSES THAT ARE DAILY SUSTAINED BY THEIR
CREDITORS, SINCE THE EXPIRATION OF THE LATE ACTS, OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS
OF THE REIGN OF HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN ANNE (circa 1718) (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP
100/7).
96. The Act of 13 & 14 Charles II, c. 24 (1661 [1662]), was a minor act concerned with
removing noblemen and investors in certain speculative companies from the purview of the
bankruptcy statutes.
97. 9 H.C. JOUR. 483, 488 (May 27 and June 4, 1678) (considering a bill to improve the
discovery of the estates of bankrupts); 9 H.C. JOUR. 609 (May 2, 1679) (ordering that leave be
granted to consider a bill to prevent a minority of creditors from defeating compositions
acceptable to the majority); 9 H.C. JOUR. 661 (Nov. 24, 1680) (“Ordered, That Leave be given to
bring in a Bill to supply the Laws against Bankruptcy.”); 9 H.C. JOUR. 730 (June 6, 1685)
(“Ordered, That Leave be given to bring a Bill to supply the Defects of the Laws made against
Bankrupts.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 142 (May 22, 1689) (“Pray[ing for a] Bill for the Composition
touching Bankrupts Estates.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 275 (Oct. 26, 1689) (“Ordered, That Leave be
given to bring in a Bill touching a Disposition of Bankrupts Estates.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 364 (Apr.
2, 1690) (ordering another “Bill touching the Disposition of Bankrupts Estates”); 10 H.C. JOUR.
572 (Dec. 4, 1691) (“Ordered, That Leave be given to bring a Bill for the better Discovery and
more equal Distribution of Bankrupts Estates.”); 10 H.C. JOUR. 702 (Nov. 17, 1692) (“Ordered,
That Leave be given to bring a Bill for the better Ordering and Distributing of Bankrupts
Estates, and Relief of their Creditors.”); 11 H.C. JOUR. 3 (Nov. 14, 1693) (“Ordered, That Leave
be given to bring in a Bill for the better Discovery of Bankrupts Estates.”); 11 H.C. JOUR. 191
(Dec. 21, 1694) (“A motion being made, That Leave be given to bring in a Bill for better
Discovery of Bankrupts Estates.”); 16 H.L. JOUR. 142 (Apr. 1, 1697) (passing the Creditors’
Relief (Compositions) Act), codified as 8 & 9 Wm. III, c. 18 (1697); 16 H.C. JOUR. 288, 343
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different tactic from the bankruptcy statutes by reversing the rhetoric
on insolvency. Rather than assuming that all bankrupts were frauds
and cheats, these bills began from the premise that most insolvents
were honest and anxious to pay what they could to their creditors.
The bankrupt became a pitiable unfortunate trying to do his best by
his creditors, and the vengeful creditor, whose unwillingness to accept
a composition prevented everyone from being paid, became the
98
villain. The prologue to the proposed 1694 Bankrupts’ Estates Bill is
similar to others:
whereas bankrupts who are not able to pay their full debts, are
oftentimes desirous to compound for the same, or to satisfy their
creditors to the utmost of their power, but by the perverseness of
some few creditors, . . . such good intentions have been obstructed,
to the manifest prejudice of other creditors who have had the
greatest share and interest in such bankrupts’ estates, and the said
bankrupts thereupon, despairing of any good accommodation with
their creditors, have withdrawn themselves out of their reach, or
consumed in prison the greatest part of their estates, which
otherwise by a reasonable composition, would have been disposed
99
of amongst their creditors.

In these bills, concealing assets or oneself was no longer treated
as a crime but rather as an understandable response to overbearing
and obstinate creditors. The bills proposed that once a certain
percentage of the creditors, usually two-thirds, agreed to a
composition, the remainder would be forced to join, even if a
100
bankruptcy proceeding had already commenced against the debtor.
Although the bills came with an important caveat voiding any
agreements in which it was proved that the debtor had not made a full
(May 17, 1698; July 5, 1698) (Creditors’ Relief (Composition) Repeal Act), codified as 9 & 10
Wm. III, c. 29 (1698).
98. This rhetoric began early. See, for example, a document dated circa 1580 complaining
about the “Eville dealinge” of some creditors who
wolde overthrowe suche agrements, and utterlie spoille a nombre of poore men even
to their owne and other the creditors greate losses, for as the execution of the statute
taketh from the banckeroote all that he hath to the utter overthrowe of him and his
familie and the creditors comonlie not half paid, So good compositions bringeth in
time full payement to the Creditors, and preservation of the poore men.
Opinion on the Right of Strangers to Partake of Bankrupts Goods Rateably with English
Creditors, supra note 73 (interlinear additions not marked). For similar rhetoric, see REASONS
HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL FOR THE BETTER RECOVERY OF BANKRUPTS
ESTATES, AND FOR THE MORE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION THEREOF, supra note 69, at 149.
99. 1 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1693–1695, supra note 17, at 360–61.
100. E.g., id. at 361.
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they also
and honest disclosure of his books and estate,
demonstrated some understanding that the debtor was far more likely
to hand over his assets if he knew that he would get something in
return.
Only one of these bills passed—in 1697. It was retroactive,
applying to failures before November 1696, and its repeal a year later
over the objection of many merchants suggests that it had been
intended as a sort of one-time amnesty in response to poor economic
102
conditions brought about by the war with France. Less than a
decade later, Parliament would take up reform again, this time within
the bankruptcy law itself. Yet despite having begun to realize the
necessity of a debtor-friendly carrot like discharge, the lawmakers did
not give up their old club of threatening punishment. Indeed, they
paired discharge with the harshest possible penalty. Discharge would
succeed, eventually; capital punishment would be a failure, perhaps
right from the first.
II. THE PIVOT POINT (1705–1707)
The one-sidedness of early English bankruptcy, exacerbated by
the threat of punishment for refusing to cooperate, created the need
for a mechanism like discharge that would offer the debtor a carrot to
103
balance against the existing sticks. Nonetheless, although some
reformers had already advocated some kind of discharge, when a
101. E.g., id. at 364.
102. 2 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1695–1697, at 504–06 (1903); 3
MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1697–1699, at 240–41 (1905). The preamble to the
repeal act blames fraud, accusing debtors of packing the vote with fake creditors. The broadside
plea not to repeal the Act confirms that this was a consideration. It pointed out that “several
Abuses and Perjuries have been committed; but that can be no reason, why (for the faults of
some few) others, for whom chiefly this Act was made, should have no Benefit by it.” REASONS
HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE HOUSE OF LORDS, WHY THE ACT,
INTITULED, AN ACT FOR THE RELIEF OF CREDITORS, BY MAKING COMPOSITION WITH THEIR
DEBTORS, IN CASE TWO THIRDS IN NUMBER AND VALUE DO AGREE, SHOULD NOT BE
REPEALED (1698).
103. See REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT
THEREOF 8 (London, J. Morphew 1707) (“That before the passing the late Act, some further
Provision was necessary both with respect to Bankrupts and Insolvent Persons for the procuring
their Liberty; and also with respect to Creditors for the securing a larger, more equal, and more
speedy Distribution of their Debtors Estates.”); REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Feb. 26, 1706, at 98
(Daniel Defoe arguing that, at the time the 1706 Act was under consideration in the House of
Commons, a bill with just penalty and no positive incentives for the bankrupt to cooperate
would be “Preposterous in its Nature, Unjust in Practice, and not Practicable in Common
Reasoning”).
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major financial scandal persuaded Parliament to think seriously about
bankruptcy reform in 1705 and 1706, the legislators’ immediate
reaction was to turn to capital punishment. The moderating
mechanism of discharge was an afterthought proposed almost a year
later and passed despite a quite mixed reaction from the merchant
community.
A. Early Proposals for a Capital Punishment Provision
For over a century prior to 1706, legislators had toyed with the
idea of making the bankrupt’s failure to cooperate in his economic
evisceration a capital crime. As early as 1559, the list of
“Considerations delivered to the Parliament” recommended that
bankruptcy be made a felony with the possibility of pardon the first
104
time if all the creditors petitioned for it. A document that may have
been a proposal for the 1604 bankruptcy act recommended that “[i]f
105
the bankrupt forswear the damage of his creditors to a certain
106
value, he is to be indicted and suffer as in [fel]ony without
107
108
admittance of his book, and his goods saved for his creditors.” The
clause “without admittance of his book” referred to the refusal of
benefit of clergy, also called “pleading the book,” and a defendant
only pled benefit of clergy, a type of first offender reprieve, if he or
109
she faced capital punishment.
No evidence has thus far answered the question whether a
provision making bankruptcy a capital offense found its way into any
drafts of the 1604 Act, but such a clause did make it into the draft of
the next statute. The act that became 21 James I, c. 19 of 1624 was
110
originally taken up in the House of Commons in 1621. The 1621 and
1624 bills must, in their preliminary drafts, have been nearly identical,
104. 1 CALENDAR OF THE MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 33, at 162, 164.
105. The text is partially effaced, but the remaining letters and the context suggest that the
word was “certaine.”
106. The original document has deteriorated, and the key word after “suffer as in” has been
partly obliterated by a hole. Based on context, it is very likely “felony.”
107. From “without” to “book” interlinear.
108. A Recital of the Several Circumstances that May Cause a Debtor to Become a
Bankrupt, supra note 35 (“If the Bankrupt forsweare ye damage of his Creditors to a certaine
value, he is to be indicted and suffer as in [fel]ony without admittance of his book and his
goodes saved for his Creditors.”).
109. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *366–67 (detailing the benefit of clergy); 1 JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 458–63 (London,
Macmillan & Co. 1883) (same).
110. 1 H.C. JOUR. 537 (Mar. 5, 1621).
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for verbatim printed summaries of the two exist. Both summaries
indicate that the laws would punish with pillorying fraudulent
conveyance, refusal to disclose assets, and failure to demonstrate to
the commission that the loss suffered was caused by misfortune. The
bills then went on to punish as a felon without benefit of clergy any
bankrupt who absconded and did not surrender himself to the
commissioners. In other words, the offender would be hanged. The
briefs offered the justification that “[t]his wilfull deceit is worse than
burglary, or robbing by the high-way, which may be prevented, this
112
cannot.”
In debates in the House of Commons on May 24, 1621, Sir
Edward Coke, at that time the famous former judge, appears to have
reacted to this provision with the following observation: “Adrian
would have bankrupts whipped to death. They deserved it. But I like
not laws written in blood. It is sufficient that it is so penal in some
113
cases.” Other members shared Coke’s opposition. The heavily
edited manuscript draft of the House of Lords’ version of the 1624 bill
shows that the Lords struggled with the capital punishment clause
114
more than with any other provision of the bill. They attempted to
salvage the clause by adjusting the wording, crossing out lines, and
115
making short substantive additions. In the end, however, the Lords
abandoned the idea and dropped the entire clause, which
consequently did not appear in the final law.
The argument that fraudulent bankrupts should be treated as
felons did not die out. In a petition to the House of Lords around
1696, the merchants of London suggested that it “may be very useful
in a Law to be made for time to come, whereby it may be made
Felony for Debtors to [e]mbezel their Effects, or to abscond

111. The 1621 brief is reprinted at 7 WALLACE NOTESTEIN, FRANCES HELEN RELF &
HARTLEY SIMPSON, COMMONS DEBATES, 1621, at 104–08 (1935); the 1624 brief is at A Brief of
the Bill Exhibited Against Bankrupts (National Archives, SP 14/160 no. 74).
112. 7 NOTESTEIN ET AL., supra note 111, at 107–08; A Brief of the Bill Exhibited Against
Bankrupts, supra note 111.
113. 5 NOTESTEIN ET AL., supra note 111, at 176 (“But I like not Lawes written in bloode.
Tis sufficient that it is so penall in some cases.”).
114. An Act for the Further Description of a Bankrupt, and Relief of Creditors Against
Such as Shall Become Bankrupts, and for Inflicting Corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts in
Some Special Cases (May 4, 1624) (Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/25).
115. Id. at f. 5.
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116

themselves . . . .” In the chapter of his 1697 book, Essays Upon
Several Projects, proposing bankruptcy reforms otherwise highly
favorable to debtors, author and political commentator Daniel Defoe
recommended that any merchant or trader demonstrating fraudulent
intent either by absconding upon becoming insolvent or by failing to
cooperate with the bankruptcy process should “be guilty of Felony,
and upon Conviction of the same, shall suffer as a Felon, without
117
Benefit of Clergy.”
That the death penalty after so much time finally became part of
the bankruptcy law in 1706—at exactly the moment when Parliament
made an abrupt policy about-face and decided to offer the bankrupt
the carrot of discharge—can be explained as a response to a very
public scandal involving the massive financial scam that two London
merchants, Thomas Pitkin and Thomas Brerewood, nearly pulled off
in 1705. The anger and frustration of lawmakers and creditors over
their inability to scare Pitkin and Brerewood into making a full and
honest disclosure and restitution of the money they had stolen boiled
over into a series of parliamentary statutes, one of which was the 1706
Act of 4 & 5 Anne.
B. The Pitkin Affair (1705)
On Saturday, February 10, 1705, Thomas Pitkin met with his
business partner, Thomas Brerewood, in the Swan Tavern in Cornhill,
118
in the heart of the mercantile district of London. The men met to
pull the trigger on a fraud that had been at least nine months in the
119
making. After the meeting, Pitkin would leave London, absconding
first to Scotland and later to Holland, and setting in motion an
economic panic, an international manhunt, and a reform of English
120
bankruptcy law.

116. REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL
TEMPORAL IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED, AGAINST SOME CLAUSES DESIR’D TO BE
INSERTED IN THE BILL, INTITULED, AN ACT FOR RELIEF OF CREDITORS (circa 1696).
117. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 222–23.
118. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL: OCCASION’D BY THE MANY FALSE
MISREPRESENTATIONS AND UNJUST REFLECTIONS OF MR. DANIEL DE FOE IN HIS SEVERAL
DISCOURSES ON THAT HEAD HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF ALL FAIR
TRADERS 26 (London, B. Bragg 1706) [hereinafter OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL].
119. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705) (containing a petition of Pitkin’s creditors claiming
that the scam had been going on for nine months).
120. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 5, 26–27.
AND
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Pitkin, a linen draper, or wholesale cloth merchant, had his shop
at the sign of the Black Spread Eagle in Kings Street, Cheapside,
121
London. He was successful enough to have contracted a marriage
122
with the daughter of a wealthy merchant. Brerewood served as the
procurement agent for army regiments controlled by several of the
123
most powerful noblemen of the day. A man of means, he came from
a leading family of Chester, and his grandfather, Robert Brerewood,
124
had been a justice of the King’s Bench. Although Pitkin was the
face of the scandal, contemporaries believed that Brerewood had
masterminded the scheme in which he involved Pitkin as an effective,
125
but perhaps not particularly enthusiastic, dupe.
The fraud itself, to the extent it can be deduced, appears to have
126
been relatively simple. Pitkin, using at least in part money provided
for the purpose by Brerewood, paid off some of his existing creditors
early, giving the impression that he was flush with cash in the wake of
127
his profitable marriage. Having acquired the reputation for wealth,
121. Letter obligatory from Thomas Pitkin to John Winter (Oct. 27, 1704) (Rylands Library
(Manchester, England), RYCH/3791/3); see also Letter Obligatory from Thomas Pitkin to Elias
Barnes (Jan. 20, 1705) (Rylands Library, RYCH/3791/8 and RYCH/3791/9) (letters obligatory
both dated Jan. 20, 1705 n.s. and indicating that Pitkin was still at Kings Street).
122. Petition of Thomas Brerewood to the House of Lords (Mar. 28, 1707) (Parliamentary
Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/6/117/2372); see also 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707) (noting that
Pitkin’s wife possessed a great fortune).
123. See 5 NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS
FROM SEPTEMBER 1678 TO APRIL 1714, at 526 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1857) (noting
that Brerewood was an agent of “the four regents”).
124. See Petition of Frances Brerewood, Wife of Thomas Brerewood, Praying to Be Heard
by Counsel Against Brerewood’s and Pitkin’s Bill (Mar. 31, 1707) (Parliamentary Archives,
HL/PO/JO/10/6/117/2372) (referring to the marriage portion given to Brerewood’s wife by
Brerewood’s father, Henry Brerewood, of ten houses in Chester “which were late ye Estate of
Sir Robert Brerewood Knight” (abbreviations expanded without indication)); Anita
McConnell, Brerewood, Sir Robert (1588–1654), in 7 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 476 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds., 2004).
125. 15 H.C. JOUR. 310 (Feb. 25, 1707); see also THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS
PITKIN; DISCOVERING THE FRAUDULENT CONTRIVANCE AND PRACTICES OF THOMAS
BREREWOOD, THE SAID PITKIN’S PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLICE (circa March 1707) (Guildhall
Library (London, England), Bside 13.22) (“Pitkin, by the repeated Sollicitations of Brerewood,
was at last prevailed upon to Engage in this Affair.”). But see REV. ST. ENG. NATION Feb. 23,
1706, at 94 (“differ[ing] from the General Opinion in this Case” and arguing that “the whole
Plot, Contrivance, Management, and Method of that Capital Fraud, was Mr. P[it]kin’s, wholly
his own . . . and the other Gentleman, meerly hook’d in, to bear some of the Scandal”).
126. It is also a direct ancestor of one of the most common bankruptcy scams, called a
“bustout,” committed in the United States today. See WICKOUSKI, supra note 20, at 10.
127. 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707); Petition of Thomas Brerewood Praying to Be Heard
by Counsel at the Bar Against a Bill to Subject the Estate of Thomas Brerewood to the
Creditors of Thomas Pitkin, Notwithstanding Any Agreement or Composition Made with the
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Pitkin proceeded, on Brerewood’s instructions, to amass a huge
quantity of merchandise on credit. Estimates of his debts ranged from
128
£50,000 to as high as £100,000. To give some sense of how large a
sum that was, consider that a wealthy merchant of the time would
have had an annual income of between about £400 and £600 on a
129
capitalization of between £8,000 and £12,000.
As he acquired the goods, Pitkin secretly passed them on to
130
Brerewood. In addition, prior to absconding, he transferred his
entire estate to Brerewood so that when his creditors realized that he
had fled and tried to use bankruptcy to recuperate their money, they
131
would find nothing left to go after. The plan apparently envisioned
that Brerewood, who actually held all the goods, would step forward
and graciously offer to buy the debts of Pitkin’s creditors for about
132
forty cents on the dollar (or eight shillings, six pence in the pound).
The conspirators assumed that the creditors would be anxious to get
something and would agree to the deal. Presumably, after quietly
selling off the merchandise Pitkin had accumulated and repaying
himself, Brerewood would split the remainder with Pitkin, who would
be able to return to England free of liability or risk of bankruptcy.
The plan did not work out quite as intended. Pitkin’s creditors
133
learned of his absence immediately and became suspicious. When
Pitkin did not return promptly, the creditors took out a commission of
134
bankrupt, and, given the extent of the fraud and the number of
135
creditors (later estimated to be over 140), on February 20, 1705,

Creditors of the Said Thomas Pitkin (Mar. 28, 1707) (Parliamentary Archives,
HL/PO/JO/10/6/117/2372).
128. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705) (petition of Pitkin’s creditors, claiming debts of
above £70,000); 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707) (testimony before the House of Commons
claiming just under £60,000 in debts); 5 LUTTRELL, supra note 123, at 545 (estimating that on
May 1, 1705, Pitkin owed debts of £100,000); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS
PITKIN, supra note 125 (claiming that the total debts amounted to £51,000).
129. STANLEY CHAPMAN, MERCHANT ENTERPRISE IN BRITAIN: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR I 22–24 & tbl.1.1 (1992) (citing estimates from 1688 and 1759).
130. 15 H.C. JOUR. 309 (Feb. 25, 1707); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN,
supra note 125.
131. 15 H.C. JOUR. 308–09 (Feb. 25, 1707).
132. Id.; THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, supra note 125. There were
twenty shillings in a pound and twelve pence in a shilling.
133. 15 H.C. JOUR. 310 (Feb. 25, 1707); OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra
note 118, at 27.
134. LONDON GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 1705.
135. THE CASE OF MR. GEORGE WILCOCKS, ATTORNEY AT LAW (circa Mar. 1707)
(Guildhall Library, Bside 12.118).
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they also petitioned the House of Commons for a public act
136
condemning Pitkin. In their petition they explained that they had
been unable to locate any of Pitkin’s assets and that if none were
located, many creditors would be ruined. They wanted Parliament to
address the problem that “the Laws, now in force, have not provided
137
sufficient Remedies for the Discovery of Frauds of this Kind.” The
law needed to be able to force the bankrupt to disclose and deliver his
assets to his creditors. The Commons responded by creating a
committee “to consider some Means to prevent the Prejudice, that
happens to Trade by the fraudulent breaking of Traders, and for
138
punishing the same.”
The resulting statute, entitled “An Act for the Relief of the
Creditors of Thomas Pitkin, a Bankrupt, and for the Apprehending of
him, and the Discovery of the Effects of the said Thomas Pitkin and
139
his Accomplices,” became law on March 14, 1705. Among other
provisions, it threatened Pitkin with life imprisonment and standing in
the pillory three times a year if he did not return to London and
140
cooperate with his creditors. In the end, Pitkin had to be captured in
Holland and extradited back to London, where he told his creditors
141
all, laying the blame squarely on Brerewood. Other than spending
some time in prison while assisting his creditors in fingering his
partner, Pitkin never seems to have made any restitution, and at some
142
point he was able to move to a small village in East Anglia.
Brerewood did not give up so easily. Although the creditors
identified him as an accomplice and the House of Lords ordered him
143
taken into custody in early March 1705, he still managed to salvage
part of the original scam by hiring an attorney, George Wilcocks, to

136. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN,
supra note 125.
137. 14 H.C. JOUR. 542 (Feb. 20, 1705).
138. Id.
139. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 12 (1704 [1705 n.s.]).
140. ANNO REGNI ANNAE REGINAE ANGLIAE, SCOTIAE, FRANCIAE, & HIBERNIAE,
TERTIO & QUARTO 212 (London, Charles Bill [1705 n.s.]).
141. 15 H.C. JOUR. 334 (Mar. 11, 1707) (petition of Thomas Brerewood); 15 H.C. JOUR.
310–11 (Feb. 25, 1707) (containing various accounts of Pitkin’s capture in Holland).
142. See REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 14, 1706, at 128 (complaining that Pitkin “walks the
Streets, and shows his Face”); THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, supra note
125 (mentioning that Pitkin had been in custody); Will of Hassel Pitkin (Dec. 15, 1724)
(National Archives, PROB 11/626) (the 1724 will of Pitkin’s son Hassel Pitkin, mentioning that
his father lived in the village of Belchamp Otten).
143. 5 LUTTRELL, supra note 123, at 525–26.
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144

negotiate a composition with Pitkin’s creditors. Wilcocks assured
the creditors “that 8 [shilling] 6 [pence] in the Pound was the utmost
that Brerewood’s Estate would reach to pay,” and thereby convinced
145
them all to sign a composition in September 1705. But the creditors
eventually got wind of the fact that Brerewood held much more of the
stolen assets than he had let on, and they obtained a parliamentary
act against him in April 1707, making, despite the previous
composition, his entire estate liable to Pitkin’s debts on pain of life
146
imprisonment and pillorying three times a year.
That was not the end of the story. Brerewood fled to Livorno,
Italy, where his creditors found him in December 1707 and at great
147
expense hauled him back to London to stand trial. He was
convicted in the London criminal court in March 1709 of “Defrauding
Mr. Pitkins Creditors, and Abscond[ing] contrary to an Act of
Parli[a]ment made on his Account” and sentenced as the statute
148
against him required. Yet by November he had been freed on a
royal pardon after having compounded with Pitkin’s creditors to pay
an extra one shilling six pence in the pound over the original
149
agreement.

144. THE CASE OF MR. GEORGE WILCOCKS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, supra note 135.
145. THE CASE OF THE CREDITORS OF THOMAS PITKIN, supra note 125; LONDON
GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 1705, at 2 (providing notice of the accord between Brerewood and his
creditors).
146. An Act to Subject the Estate of Thomas Brerewood to the Creditors of Thomas Pitkin,
Notwithstanding Any Agreement or Composition Made with the Creditors of the Said Thomas
Pitkin, 5 Anne, c. 23 (1706 [1707]).
147. 6 LUTTRELL, supra note 123, at 241; British Library, Add. MS 38464 f. 21r (accounting
for some of the expenses for the manhunt and return of Brerewood to England); The Case of
the Creditors of John Coggs Deceased, and John Dann Against the Creditors of Thomas Pitkin
d
t
d
(n.d.) (British Library, Add. MS 38465 f. 84v) (“[A]t the executing the s . Agreem . by the s
rs
ts
Coggs & Dann with the Assignees of Pitkins Cred . there were produced severall Acco . of the
d
t
him
charges of obteyning and prosecuting the s . Act of Parliam . against Brerewood, and bringing
£
over from beyond Sea, amounting to above 1800 .”).
148. THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE QUEEN’S COMMISSION OF THE PEACE, AND OYER AND
TERMINER, AND GOAL-DELIVERY OF NEWGATE, HELD FOR THE CITY OF LONDON AND
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, AT JUSTICE-HALL IN THE OLD-BAYLY, Mar. 2, 1709, at 4 [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY].
149. LONDON GAZETTE, Nov. 3, 1709, at 2 (announcing a composition with Pitkin
creditors); Petitions for the Pardon of Thomas Brerewood (1709) (British Library, Add. MS
61617 ff. 158a–59a) (requesting pardon by Queen in exchange for additional payment by
Brerewood); Case of the Creditors of Thomas Pitkin (circa 1710) (Hampshire Record Office,
44M69/G2/177 ff. 1–2) (indicating that Pitkin creditors obtained pardon for Brerewood). This
was still not the end of the story, for Brerewood contracted with his bankers, Coggs and Dann,
to pay the debt. Pitkin’s creditors then went against the bankers, who ended up ruined. The
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The Pitkin affair was ostensibly the exact sort of fraud that the
bankruptcy acts were intended to punish, but when Pitkin absconded
in February 1705, the governing law was the 1624 bankruptcy statute,
which would have stripped him of his assets and sentenced him to two
150
hours in the pillory and the loss of an ear. Pitkin had secreted his
assets, so he had no fear of them being taken from him provided he
kept his mouth shut, and a few hours in the stocks seemed to his
creditors a rather puny punishment for such a grand crime. Instead,
Pitkin’s scam had people calling for blood. Even such staunch
advocates of a kinder, gentler bankruptcy law as Daniel Defoe and
his sometime ally and newspaper-writing counterpart, John Tutchin,
editor of the Observator newspaper, advocated for forceful
151
punishment. Something, they said, needed to be done to deter
debtors from committing these sorts of frauds and to punish them
152
severely if they did. These sentiments did not go unnoticed in the
153
Houses of Parliament.

Case of the Creditors of John Coggs Deceased, and John Dann Against the Creditors of
Thomas Pitkin, supra note 147.
150. For a discussion of the common law of fraud and larceny, see infra notes 169–76.
151. DANIEL DEFOE, REMARKS ON THE BILL TO PREVENT FRAUDS COMMITTED BY
BANKRUPTS 13 (London 1706) [hereinafter DEFOE, REMARKS] (writing that if the debtor who
absconds is “ever, Pitkin like, . . . recovered and brought back by Force, he goes directly to the
Gallows, as he deserves”); see also OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118,
at 17 (saying of Defoe, “[i]t was observed, that your Self and the rest of those Gentlemen who
appeared on the same side with you, cry’d up Felony, the Penalty of the Bill, as a mighty
Security to the Creditors”).
152. See, e.g., OBSERVATOR (London), Feb. 24, 1705, at 1 (“But what shall we do with such
Cheats as this Pitkin? I think Hanging is his Due. Obs[ervator] ’Tis not his Due, because the
Law does not Punish a Crime of that Nature with Death. . . . But I think it highly necessary to
Crop these Vices in the Bud. If this Pitkin be not Punish’d, such Bankrupts will soon come in
Fashion.”).
153. See, e.g., 15 H.C. JOUR. 291 (Feb. 12, 1706) (describing the testimony of Walker, a linen
draper, that “this Act was made upon the account of that notorious Fraud of one Pitkyn”);
OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 5–6 (claiming that the Pitkin
affair was the impetus behind the bankruptcy bill); DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 3
(noting the appeal to Parliament made by Pitkin’s creditors); ALEXANDER JUSTICE, A
GENERAL TREATISE OF MONIES AND EXCHANGES 80 (London 1707) (characterizing the Pitkin
Act as “being a good Precedent for a more general Law for regulating those Affairs, and
preventing frauds, which began to be very common; the Excellent Parliament now in Being,
pass’d the following Act, the good Effects of which will be daily felt in England more and
more”).
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C. The Act of 4 & 5 Anne (1706)
On March 19, 1706, the Act of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, received royal
154
approval. For the first time it granted bankrupts who cooperated
with the commission of bankruptcy the possibility of receiving a
discharge of their debts and a small stipend from their estate with
which to begin again. For this monumental shift of focus, 4 & 5 Anne
holds a place of importance in the history of Anglo-American
bankruptcy. But the discharge provision came into the bill only in its
last stages. Initially, the purpose of the bill was to punish fraudsters
like Pitkin as the felons they were thought to be: with death by
hanging.
The House of Commons passed the bill condemning Pitkin on
March 1, 1705 and sent it to the House of Lords the same day. The
next day, following the second reading of the bill in the Lords, it was
155
submitted to committee. The March 3, 1705, entry in the published
Journals of the House of Lords states only that the committee
156
recommended that the Pitkin bill pass without amendments. The
manuscript journal, kept by the clerks of the House, gives a fuller
account. According to the manuscript, the committee had reported
out the bill with a clause related to frauds committed by bankrupts in
157
general. The Lords objected to the clause, which was removed. The
idea of a new, general bankruptcy act, however, was not discarded,
and the Lords ordered the common law judges to draft a bankruptcy
bill directed at “prevent[ing] [f]rauds frequently committed by
158
[b]ankrupts.” The judges returned a bill in time for it to be read two
159
days later, on March 5. This bill passed the House of Lords with
minor amendments, and was before the House of Commons when the
160
Queen prorogued Parliament, thereby expunging all pending bills.
The rejected clause and the subsequent judges’ draft formed the
original nucleus of the Act of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17 that eventually
became law a year later, in March 1706. The initial March 1705 draft
154. 18 H.L. JOUR. 162 (Mar. 19, 1706).
155. 17 H.L. JOUR. 685 (Mar. 2, 1705 n.s.).
156. 17 H.L. JOUR. 687 (Mar. 3, 1705 n.s.).
157. 6 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1704–1706, at 298 (1966).
158. 17 H.L. JOUR. 687 (Mar. 3, 1705 n.s.).
159. Id. at 689.
160. The bill passed the House of Lords on March 7, 1705. 17 H.L. JOUR. 691. It was read in
the House of Commons on March 7 and 8, but it never had the required third reading before
Parliament was prorogued on March 14, ending the session. 14 H.C. JOUR. 564–65 (Mar. 7,
1705).
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was short—only two-and-a-half manuscript pages—and it did not
161
contain provisions concerning either discharge or the death penalty.
Instead the judges had written a simple bill narrowly tailored to
162
punishing the likes of Pitkin. The preamble, which the final version
would retain, sought to prevent the crimes committed by persons who
“have and do daily become bankrupt, not so much by reason of losses
and unavoidable misfortunes as to the intent to defraud and hinder
their creditors of their just debts and duties to them due and
163
owing.” To accomplish this, the bill required the bankrupt to
provide the same cooperation and disclosure as in the seventeenthcentury statutes, but instead of two hours in the pillory and the loss of
an ear, the penalty would be life imprisonment and standing in the
164
pillory.
The Lords made two changes to the draft before sending it on to
165
the House of Commons. First, they amended the penalty clause so
that the uncooperative bankrupt, rather than spending his life in
prison, would suffer as a felon without benefit of clergy. Second, the
Lords added a sunset provision, setting the act to expire after three
166
years. Both of these new provisions would appear in the final bill.
Modern scholars and even Chancellor Hardwicke in an opinion
delivered in 1744 have assumed that the eventual 1706 bill was timelimited because the new discharge concept that was found in the final
version was meant to be a temporary experiment—or in Hardwicke’s
167
thinking, a temporary expedient. The manuscript record suggests
161. Initial Draft of 4 & 5 Anne (Mar. 5, 1705) (Parliamentary Archives,
HL/PO/JO/10/6/85/2131).
162. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 6 (asserting that the
bankruptcy bill was brought in at the same time as the Pitkin bill “to prevent and curb such like
Practices for the future”).
163. Initial Draft of 4 & 5 Anne, supra note 161, at f. 1 (“[H]ave & doe dayly become
Bankrupt, not soo much by reason of Losses and unavoidable misfortunes as to the intent to
defraud & hinder their creditors of their just debts & dutys to them due & owing . . . .”).
164. Id. at f. 3.
165. Id.; Manuscript Journal of the House of Lords, 24 Oct. 1704–14 Mar. 1705 (Mar. 6,
1705) (Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/5/1/40).
166. See 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, §§ 1, 16 (1705 [1706 n.s.]).
167. See, e.g., Ex parte Burton, (1744) 1 Atk. 255, 255–56, 16 Eng. Rep. 163, 164–65 (Ch.)
(stating that the discharge provision in the statute of Anne “was temporary at first, and never
intended to be a perpetual law, but was made in consideration of two long wars which had been
very detrimental to traders, and rend[e]red them incapable of paying their creditors”); Cohen,
supra note 11, at 156 (describing one historian’s belief that discharge “was devised in response
to mercantile difficulties existing immediately prior to the passage of the 1705 act”); Louis
Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19 n.67 (1919)
(suggesting that the “dangers” of the 1706 Act’s “leniency” led to stricter provisions in the 1732
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otherwise, for the sunset provision came into the statute nearly a year
before discharge. Instead, the legislative history indicates that in the
original bill, it was the death penalty provision that was meant to be
temporary.
After almost 150 years of thinking about making fraudulent
bankruptcy a felony and with the Pitkin affair simmering in the
background, why would the Lords have been hesitant about
permanently recategorizing bankruptcy crime as a felony without
benefit of clergy? In the view of one bankruptcy historian, the
introduction of the penalty of death for fraudulent bankruptcy was an
insignificant
change
that,
“[w]hile
obviously
quite
dramatic, . . . should not be overstated . . . [because] bankruptcy was
no different from most property crimes of that era, which also
168
provided for the possible imposition of the death penalty.” In fact,
bankruptcy was quite different from other similar crimes of the era.
As a property crime, bankruptcy resembled larceny, except that
169
larceny required that the stolen property be obtained illegally. Thus,
larceny could not cover the situation in which a person received
goods through a contractual agreement and then made off with them.
170
Such an act would have to have been addressed civilly. More
importantly, although the early eighteenth century witnessed a
sustained increase in the number of felonies removed from benefit of
clergy, many larcenies remained clergyable, meaning that those
171
convicted were not hanged. Indeed, during the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, when some members of Parliament were
bankruptcy act); McCoid, supra note 11, at 166 n.12, 182 (“The introduction of the discharge is
described as initially an experiment because the limitation from the outset on the duration and
coverage of the 1706 act strongly suggests that it was meant to be tentative in character.”).
168. Tabb, supra note 11, at 11.
169. 6 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1483–1558, at
564 (2003) (defining larceny as “a taking and carrying away of a chattel of value from the
possession of someone with better title, without that person’s consent, intending permanently to
deprive him of the possession”). Indeed the question of servants or bailees making off with
property received in the course of their duties had exercised sixteenth-century judges, requiring
an act of Parliament in 1529 to declare that it was a “felony for a servant to abscond with or
‘imbezil’ goods worth 40s. delivered to him by his master to keep to his master’s use.” Id. at
567–68.
170. See 2 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 816 (London,
A. Strahan 1803) (“Where indeed the possession is honestly obtained upon a contract or trust in
the first instance, the subsequent dishonest conversion of it . . . is no other than a breach of trust,
for which the party injured has a civil remedy.”).
171. See J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660–1800, at 144 (1986)
(describing property crimes newly excluded from clergy during the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries).
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already advocating hanging bankrupts, nearly all larcenies were
172
clergyable.
To extend the comparison beyond property crimes, fraudulent
bankruptcy was analogous to common law fraud, also called cheat,
and forgery. Neither of these were capital crimes in 1706, though
some types of forgery became capital during the course of the
173
eighteenth century. Fraud, for instance, which the common law
limited to a narrow list of acts including using false weights and
measures, selling goods with counterfeit marks, and playing with false
174
dice, had been extended a year before the passage of the first
bankruptcy act to include the use of false tokens or counterfeit letters
to obtain personal property. But the punishment prescribed was to be
by pillorying, “or otherwise, by any corporal pain, (except pain of
175
death).” None of the other crimes against public trade, including
smuggling, were capital offenses in 1706, and most were categorized
176
as misdemeanors.
Thus, in imposing capital punishment in the 1705 draft and the
eventual 1706 law, Parliament treated bankruptcy as a special case,
and the fraudulent bankrupt as a particularly incorrigible character.
In so doing, the legislators continued to employ an old approach to
fight an old battle, using coercion and threats to try to solve the
perennial problem of forcing the debtor to give up his assets when the
rewards of doing so were not readily apparent. But at the same time,
the sunset provision suggests that they were far from convinced that
177
death was the right penalty. This is further evidenced by an
alteration in the draft proffered when the Lords took up the bill again
during the following session in November 1705. The proposed text
was nearly identical to the March draft except for a blank after the
words “being thereof lawfully Convicted by Indictment or

172. Id. at 143.
173. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 109, at 181–82; 2 EAST, supra note 170, at 853, 1003; BEATTIE,
supra note 171, at 146 (explaining that forgery was removed from benefit of clergy in 1729).
Blackstone equated forgery with fraudulent bankruptcy, calling both crimen falsi—a crime of
falsehood. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *157.
174. 3 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 995 (London, A.J.
Valpy 1816).
175. Id. at 996 (discussing 33 Hen. VIII, c. 1).
176. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *154–60.
177. Cf. BURGES, supra note 48, at 289 (claiming that “[w]henever the framers of a law
found themselves at a loss to prevent what they wished effectually to prohibit, they enacted the
penalty of death”). James Oldham kindly pointed this text out to me.
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178

Information Shall Suffer.” It seems that the Lords intended to leave
open to further discussion the imposition of capital punishment. They
did not have that debate, however, because they chose to abandon
179
their own bill in favor of one proposed by the Commons.
By the time the Act of 4 & 5 Anne passed the two Houses of
Parliament and received royal assent in March 1706, it had morphed
180
into a major reform of bankruptcy law. In addition to introducing
capital punishment and discharge, it made important procedural
changes, such as requiring the commissioners to hold three creditors’
meetings to help organize the process of proving debts and examining
181
witnesses. The bill that finally became “An Act to Prevent Frauds
Frequently Committed by Bankrupts” was first read in the House of
182
Commons in late October 1705. Although different from the Lords
bill of March, it retained most of that draft’s language, including the
felony provision. The Commons bill was read a second time on
183
November 8 and then sent to committee, where it languished into
184
the new year. At that point, according to Daniel Defoe, “several
Persons on both sides began to consider how to make it a compleat
Act, and both to relieve the miserable but honest Debtor already
fallen into Disaster, and secure Trade against the numerous Mischiefs
185
of Bankrupts for the Future.” As a result, on February 4 the
committee was instructed to “receive a Clause, for the better
discovery and preventing Frauds committed by Prisoners and
Bankrupts, and for the Relief of such Prisoners for Debt as Shall
186
187
resign their Effects to their Creditors.” If Defoe is to be believed,
178. Bankrupts Prevention of Frauds Bill (1705) (Parliamentary Archives,
HL/PO/JO/10/6/85/2150 f. 3).
179. 18 H.L. JOUR. 13 (Nov. 7, 1705) (first reading of bill). No further readings of the bill are
recorded.
180. CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at 59 n.1 (discussing how this statute ushered in “a new æra
in the system of the bankrupt law”).
181. 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, §§ 1, 18 (1705 [1706 n.s.]) (capital punishment); id. § 7 (discharge); id.
§ 13 (three meetings).
182. 15 H.C. JOUR. 5 (Oct. 31, 1705).
183. 15 H.C. JOUR. 15 (Nov. 8, 1705).
184. Defoe had been actively involved in the debates about the bankruptcy bill. He was
himself a bankrupt, and it was a topic that had long concerned him greatly. See Quilter, supra
note 26, at 54–55, 62–63, 68.
185. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 3–4.
186. 15 H.C. JOUR. 125–26 (Feb. 4, 1706).
187. It is not clear that Defoe always told the truth in the service of his political projects.
See, e.g., OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 25–33 (accusing Defoe
of “varnishing over” the truth in his advocacy of the bankruptcy bill).
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the committee’s initial response to their mandate had two parts:
discharge and requiring all creditors to come into the collective.
The idea of discharge did not originate in 1706. In 1662,
Parliament had considered a bill relieving debtors worth less than £10
188
of their debts upon their relinquishing two-thirds of their assets. The
string of composition acts repeatedly proposed in the last quarter of
the same century had also assumed a proceeding analogous to
discharge, though within the context of contract rather than
189
bankruptcy. Defoe had called for discharge in his 1697 book, Essays
190
Upon Projects, and he and his newspaper, A Review of the State of
the English Nation, in which he wrote passionately in favor of
bankruptcy reform during February and March 1706, were at the
191
peak of their influence at the time of the 1706 debate.
Writing shortly after the passage of the 1706 Act, Defoe claimed
that the discharge provision had been an attempt to resolve an
absurdity in an early version of the bill. In early English bankruptcy,
creditors retained the right to remain outside the collective and
pursue their regular common law remedies. If, however, the debtor
were forced to surrender everything, then the creditors participating
in the bankruptcy would receive an unfair advantage because nothing
would be left for the outlying creditor. Conversely, the debtor
remained exposed to prosecution for debts by creditors who did not
come in. “From this Circumstance it seem’d so rational, either to
force all the Creditors to come in, or to discharge the Debtor from
them that stood out, that when such an Offer was made to the House,
192
it was too reasonable to be opposed . . . .” Based on Defoe’s
constant commentary in his Review, it appears that the idea of forcing

188. Draft of an Act for Relief of Creditors and Release of Poor Prisoners (Jan 27, 1662 n.s.)
(Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/10/1/310A)
189. McCoid, supra note 11, at 182–85; REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED,
AGAINST SOME CLAUSES DESIRED TO BE INSERTED IN THE BILL, INTITULED, AN ACT FOR
RELIEF OF CREDITORS, supra note 116 (presenting the opposition of the merchants of London
to a clause in a composition bill allowing for discharge and an allowance).
190. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 214; see also OBSERVATOR, Feb. 24, 1706 n.s., at 1
(calling for discharge).
191. Quilter, supra note 26, at 58, 62–63. Defoe offered statements of his own role in the
process. See REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 19, 1706, at 133; REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 23,
1706, at 142; DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 18 (declaring, “I confess, I press’d hard in
Parliament for an Amendment” concerning the certificate requirement).
192. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 4.
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creditors into the bankruptcy initially attracted more attention and
193
generated more antagonism than did the idea of discharge.
Perhaps as a consequence, the creditor requirement did not
make it into the final bill and may not even have survived the House
of Commons. By contrast, when the Commons committee reported
out a bill on February 27, 1706, it included a discharge provision that
probably also granted the bankrupt a small allowance of up to 5
194
percent of his net estate to enable him to begin again. It seems that
all the clause required the bankrupt to do to obtain his discharge was
to swear an affidavit that he had turned over all his assets fully and
195
honestly. The bill narrowly made it out of Commons on March 6
196
and was immediately given to the Lords.
On March 7, the Lords sent the bill to the committee of the
197
whole house, and the opposition to discharge intensified. The bill’s
198
supporters believed that it would pass in early March. To help
ensure passage, they recruited merchants to appear before the Lords
199
to voice their support. That plan backfired when the merchants
200
heard the details of the bill. They had been in favor of a bill to
“prevent frauds [] frequently committed by bankrupts,” which was
the title inherited from the Lord’s initial 1705 draft, but they did not
like the idea, as one said, that “I may be paid my debts rather by
201
affidavit than [by] money.” In response, the Lords added an
amendment requiring that no certificate of discharge be granted
unless the commissioners of the bankruptcy certified to the chancellor

193. REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Feb. 26, 1706, at 98 (stating that the main objection being
argued in the House of Commons was the creditor rule). Perhaps this had been Defoe’s
intention all along. By focusing attention on the creditor rule, he and his allies may have hoped
that discharge would fly under the radar.
194. This ended up as 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, § 7 (1705 [1706 n.s.]).
195. 6 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1704–1706, supra note 157, at 427–28.
196. 15 H.C. JOUR. 188 (Mar. 6, 1706) (reporting a vote of 54 to 53 on a rider making the bill
retroactive, which was the last part of the bill voted on).
197. 18 H.L. JOUR. 140–41 (Mar. 7, 1706).
198. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 8; see also A LETTER
FROM A NORTH-BRITAIN, TO HIS FRIEND IN LONDON 1 (1708).
199. See supra note 198.
200. REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 21, 1706, at 138; OBSERVATIONS ON THE BANKRUPTS
BILL, supra note 118, at 8–9; see also DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 8 (“[T]he
[merchants’] Arguments were so weak, and the People appear’d so hot, and so visibly
partial . . . .”).
201. 6 MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1704–1706, supra note 157, at 427–28 (“I
fear this Bill may have ill consequences. I like the Bill as to the title of it, but it will encourage
sloth and those that venture on others’ estates.” (quoting testimony of another merchant)).

KADENS IN FINAL

1268

4/1/2010 1:07:40 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1229

or Lord Keeper in writing that the bankrupt had made a full and
202
honest disclosure of his assets. The bill was sent back to the
Commons with this amendment and was passed into law on March 19,
203
1706.
Within a month of the passage of the Act, the number of
docketed commissions of bankruptcy skyrocketed. In 1705, an
estimated 159 commissions were opened; in 1706, that number grew
to 567. Bankruptcy commissions did not reach 1706 numbers again
204
until the 1770s. Breaking 1706 down by quarter shows the impact of
the Act even more dramatically: quarter one, prior to the passage of
the Act saw thirty-one commissions issued; quarter two, during the
period when the Act was available retroactively, saw ninety-one;
205
quarter three saw 166; and quarter four, 279.
Unfortunately, easy discharge would not last. In January 1707,
less than a year after the passage of the Act, the House of Commons
received a petition from the merchants and traders of London
complaining that, notwithstanding the Act, “there are still carried on
divers notorious Frauds (and it may be feared) wilful Perjuries, and
secret Evasions of the said Law, to the manifest Prejudice of Trade,
and the endangering of the Nation’s Credit both at home and
206
abroad.” A committee was immediately created to investigate
207
abuses of the new bankruptcy law. In early February, the Commons
received a petition from the company of mercers, grocers,
apothecaries, and haberdashers of the city of Worcester complaining
that the bankruptcy bill “hath been made use of by fraudulent
Persons, to the Damage of their Creditors,” and asking that the bill be
202. Manuscript Journal of the House of Lords, 14 June 1705–21 Nov. 1706 (Mar. 11, 1706)
(Parliamentary Archives, HL/PO/JO/5/1/41) (amendments made to the act); 18 H.L. JOUR. 153
(Mar. 13, 1706) (additional amendments made and agreed to); 15 H.C. JOUR. 198–99 (Mar. 19,
1706) (reading amendments from the Lords, including amendment concerning discharge
certificate); REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Mar. 16, 1706, at 130 (Defoe discussing this
“Amendment”); REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL, NOW DEPENDING IN
PARLIAMENT RELATING TO BANKRUPTS (1706) (Guildhall Library, Bside 17.87) (referring to
the Lords’ amendment).
203. 18 H.L. JOUR. 162 (Mar. 19, 1706).
204. JULIAN HOPPIT, RISK AND FAILURE IN ENGLISH BUSINESS 1700–1800, at 182–83
(1987); see also Papers Related to the Commissions of Bankruptcy (n.d.) (British Library, Stowe
416 f. 30r). (listing the number of bankruptcy commissions sealed between June 24, 1706, and
April 14, 1719, including 715 commissions for the year June 24, 1706 to June 24, 1707, and only
200 commissions for the following year).
205. HOPPIT, supra note 204, at 187–88.
206. 15 H.C. JOUR. 240 (Jan. 17, 1707).
207. Id.
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208

amended. The following week, the Commons heard testimony of
London merchants concerning the “Abuses, and ill Practices, arising
209
from the said Act.” Perhaps significantly, during the same period,
the bankruptcy committee was also taking testimony about the Pitkin
affair, finally learning how Pitkin had obtained his money and about
Brerewood’s attempts to cheat the creditors with his disingenuous
210
offer of a composition.
On February 27, 1707, exactly one year after the first bankruptcy
act with discharge was introduced, the Commons received a bill to
211
amend the 1706 Act. A key change was the requirement that fourfifths of the creditors in number and value consent to the bankrupt
212
receiving his certificate of discharge. The Commons passed the bill
in late March, sending it to the Lords, who considered but refused
213
several proposed amendments in favor of debtors, and returned the
214
bill unaltered with their assent on April 4. Again the impact on the
opening of bankruptcy commissions was immediate. In the first
quarter of 1707, before the new law was in place, 149 commissions
were opened, but in the second quarter only sixty-four, in the third
quarter, thirty-six, and in the fourth quarter, forty-nine. The numbers
215
remained well below their 1706 peak in the following years. The
new rule helped create the phenomenon of the undischarged
bankrupt: the bankrupt who had handed over his assets but who did
not receive a discharge in return, and who therefore remained liable
216
for all unpaid debts.
The stiffened requirements for discharge affected the place of
capital punishment in the statutory scheme in two contradictory ways.
The original thought in 1706—at least according to Daniel Defoe—
217
was that a carrot would work better than a stick. If the bankrupt
knew he had some hope—not only of getting out of prison or out
208. 15 H.C. JOUR. 280 (Feb. 8, 1707).
209. 15 H.C. JOUR. 291 (Feb. 12, 1707).
210. 15 H.C. JOUR. 308–11 (Feb. 25, 1707).
211. 15 H.C. JOUR. 314 (Feb. 27, 1707).
212. 5 Anne, c. 22, § 2 (1707).
213. 7 THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 1706–1708, at 78–82 (1966) (quoting a
description in the manuscript minutes concerning the vote on the amendments and describing
the amendments).
214. 18 H.L. JOUR. 313–14 (Apr. 4, 1707).
215. HOPPIT, supra note 204, at 188.
216. For a discussion of the undischarged bankrupt, see infra notes 332–38 and
accompanying text.
217. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 3–5.
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from under the shadow of the threat of imprisonment, but also of
having that portion of the debts that he could not pay forgiven—then
he would be more likely to deal honestly with his creditors under the
bankruptcy commission. He would not need to conceal assets as the
218
only way to survive the bankruptcy ordeal. But when Parliament
reacted to alleged frauds by making discharge more difficult to
obtain, many bankrupts continued to have an incentive to conceal
assets to protect themselves against the possibility that they would not
be released from prison and freed of their debts. Consequently, acts
of fraudulent bankruptcy continued alive and well, sometimes
committed by otherwise honest men afraid of not getting a discharge.
Yet only a handful of bankrupts were ever prosecuted, let alone
hanged. Part III attempts to explain why.
III. PUNISHMENT FOR FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY (1706–1820)
The two acts of Anne were both set to expire in 1709 but were
219
extended until 1716, when they were permitted to lapse. A new
bankruptcy act, passed in 1719, reintroduced capital punishment and
discharge, but, after being continued twice, that act, too, was allowed
220
to expire in 1729. Finally, in 1732, Parliament passed a major
bankruptcy reform bill incorporating prior laws and adding some new
elements. This bill also included discharge and the felony provision,
and thereafter capital punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy
221
remained a part of English law until 1820. Thus, for 108 years
between 1706 and 1820, England supposedly executed fraudulent
bankrupts, but only four men were in fact hanged: Richard Towne, a
tallow-chandler, in 1712; Alexander Thompson, an embroider, in
1756; John Perrott, a cloth merchant, in 1761; and John Senior, a

218. See REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL, NOW DEPENDING IN
PARLIAMENT RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 202 (“This Bill will prevent Bankrupts
concealing their Effects, both by the Severe Penalties it Enacts, and the Incouragements given
thereby . . . .”).
219. 7 Anne, c. 25 § 4 (1708 [1709]).
220. 5 Geo. I, c. 24, §§ 1, 3 (1718 [1719]), continued by 11 Geo. I, c. 29 (1724 [1725]), further
continued by 13 Geo. I, c. 27 (1727).
221. 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 1 (1732). This statute also had a sunset provision but was continued
multiple times until it was made permanent by 37 Geo. III, c. 120 (1797). See SELECT
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 51
(testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly).
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222

clothier, in 1813. A handful of other men were convicted but were
223
pardoned or had their sentences reduced or overturned.
This could be interpreted as a remarkable record of deterrence,
but the evidence of continued bankruptcy crime suggests otherwise.
The reality seems to have been that imposing capital punishment for
fraudulent bankruptcy was a spectacular failure—not simply because
it did not prevent the frauds at which it was aimed but also because it
224
was so rarely enforced, permitting other frauds to flourish. This
failure will be studied from both a micro and a macro perspective,
examining, on the one hand, the motivations of individuals and, on
the other, the systemic problems that arose in the century after the
introduction of discharge and capital punishment. Section A takes the
first approach, presenting a microhistory of the bankruptcy of John
Perrott, the paradigmatic fraudulent bankrupt. Perrott borrowed
money dishonestly and categorically refused to pay it back once the
bankruptcy proceedings began. For his obstinacy, he was hanged. Yet
when he dropped dead at the end of a rope, his creditors still could
not locate their missing money. The penalty, therefore, did not
further either of the traditional goals of bankruptcy: repaying
225
creditors or deterring debtor fraud.
Section B discusses the broader reasons why capital punishment
failed. Even in the face of such a harsh penalty, and even with the

222. Because no official records were kept, it is not certain that this list is complete. There
are, however, two reasons to believe that no one else was hanged for fraudulent bankruptcy.
First, no newspaper stories or Old Bailey accounts have surfaced. Second, the appendix to an
1819 parliamentary committee report on the criminal laws records only the four known
executions. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS, &C., REPORT, 1819, H.C. 585, at 132,
147, 152–53.
223. See the Appendix for the complete list.
224. James Bland Burges, the author of a treatise on bankruptcy reform in the late
eighteenth century, asserted that the death penalty provision was not used because it was legally
inoperative. In the printed version of the statute, the fraudulent bankrupt was to be “convicted
by Judgement or Information.” As Burges pointed out, however, the common law mandates
that criminal defendants be proceeded against by indictment. BURGES, supra note 48, at 289–90;
see also GREEN, supra note 43, at 225–28 (this appears to be the earliest edition in which this
point is made). Although Burges was right on the law, he was wrong on the statute. As Edward
Christian related in a later treatise, the words “judgment or information” were a printer’s error.
The parliamentary roll containing the official text of the statute had “indictment or
information.” CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at 123 n.1 (citing King v. Bullock, (1807) 1 Taunt. 71,
168 Eng. Rep. 595 (E.C.)).
225. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS,
supra note 7, at 80 (testimony of Archibald Cullen) (“The bankrupt law was introduced with a
view to prevent and punish the frauds of debtors, and to distribute their property equally
amongst all their creditors . . . .”).
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possibility of discharge, bankruptcy crimes continued to be
committed. Contemporaries believed fraud flourished because these
crimes went mostly unpunished. As a result of the lack of
prosecutions, the rest of the bankruptcy system ended up in
disequilibrium, though one that differed from what existed prior to
1706. Instead of bankruptcy being a creditors’ remedy, it became—
too often for the likes of contemporaries—a fraudulent debtors’
playground.
A. The Bankruptcy of John Perrott (1760–1761)
John Perrott’s bankruptcy and execution in 1761 captured the
attention of the times and continued to be remembered decades later
226
as the quintessential bankruptcy fraud. The case was so famous that
a nineteenth-century editor of Blackstone’s Commentaries called
227
Perrott the last bankrupt hanged. In fact, he was not. That honor
went to John Senior, a clothier from the village of Alverthope,
outside Wakefield in Yorkshire, who in 1813 became the fourth and
last man hanged for fraudulent bankruptcy in England. Senior did
what many bankrupts probably did: he concealed some of his goods,
in this instance a relatively small amount of cloth worth half his total
228
debt.
He was likely hanged because he compounded his
concealment with fraud. Although it does not appear that his
creditors had learned of the hidden assets during the initial period of
investigation, before receiving his certificate, Senior began trading in
his brother’s name. “This excited suspicion, and led to enquiries,
which terminated in the assignees’ instituting the present
229
prosecution.” He was found guilty on the evidence of the many
people who had helped him hide the cloth and move it from place to
230
place in the dead of night. The judge “intimated” that Senior should
231
expect no mercy, and he was accordingly hanged a few weeks later.
The case stirred some passing interest in local newspapers, but by the

226. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
227. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *482 n.a.
228. See Fraudulent Bankrupt, HULL PACKET, Apr. 6, 1813, at 4 (reporting on Senior’s case
and also discussing his creditors and his total debts of £1,181); 2 CHITTY, supra note 174, at 516–
17 (using Senior’s indictment as a model and listing concealed property worth £560 out of total
debts of £1,181).
229. Fraudulent Bankrupt, supra note 228, at 4.
230. HULL PACKET, Mar. 30, 1813, at 4.
231. Fraudulent Bankrupt, supra note 228, at 4; Execution, LEEDS MERCURY, Apr. 10, 1813,
at 3.
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time the bankruptcy lawyer and activist, Basil Montagu, testified
before a parliamentary committee studying bankruptcy reform five
years later, Senior’s story was nearly forgotten. In enumerating to the
committee the men executed for bankruptcy crime, Montagu could
only note, “I rather think, but am not certain, that a person has been
232
executed within the last eight or nine years, at York.”
By contrast, John Perrott’s bankruptcy had all the necessary
titillating elements to excite public curiosity: money, sex, and intrigue.
Capitalizing on the interest, several pamphlets were published laying
out the story in great detail, and a number of archival documents and
judicial opinions flesh out the numerous legal proceedings in which
Perrott engaged. These permit a close-up view of the bankruptcy
process and show how the capital felony provision was ultimately
unable to prevent or to provide redress for fraud.
On January 17, 1760, John Perrott, a cloth merchant, called his
creditors together at the Half Moon Tavern in Cheapside, London to
233
inform them that he could not pay his debts. Through 1758, Perrott
had done business on a cash basis. In 1759, he suddenly began to buy
on credit and in significantly larger quantities than before. But he had
built a good reputation for honesty during the nearly thirteen years
he had been trading for his own account, and his creditors let his debt
234
mount. Even at the January 17 meeting, the creditors were
favorably impressed with his forthrightness; nevertheless, they
decided to sue out a commission of bankruptcy and arranged for one
of their number to call at Perrott’s warehouse so that he could “be
235
denied.” Denying yourself to a creditor meant instructing an agent
to deny a creditor who came seeking money access to you in order to
avoid payment. Accordingly, the following morning William Hewitt, a
warehouseman and one of Perrott’s principle creditors, went to
236
Perrott’s warehouse and was duly denied by the apprentice.

232. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 21.
233. 1 AN AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER A COMMISSION OF
BANKRUPTCY AGAINST JOHN PERROTT 1 (London, R. Griffiths 1761) [hereinafter AUTHENTIC
NARRATIVE].
234. 2 KNAPP & BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 316.
235. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Oct. 21, 1761, at 403 (concerning the act of
bankruptcy); see also 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 1, 3.
236. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 235, at 394 (testimony about the act of
bankruptcy); Bankruptcy Commission Docket Book (Jan. 19, 1760) (National Archives, B4/16 f.
22) (describing Hewitt as a warehouseman).
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Perrott may have hoped he could avoid a commission of
bankruptcy, for he had a major fraud in the works, and the scrutiny of
237
a bankruptcy proceeding was going to reveal it. Instead, he may
have believed that by calling the creditors together and appearing
honest, they would be willing to compound the debt, or he may have
been trying to pull off the sort of scheme, often lamented in the
bankruptcy literature, in which a debtor put out word that he was
insolvent and about to commit an act of bankruptcy, and the creditors
rushed in to cut deals. The debtor, who was in fact solvent, then
238
walked away with the money he had been absolved from repaying.
Hewitt promptly petitioned for a commission, which issued the
239
day after Perrott committed the act of bankruptcy.
The
commissioners met immediately, and at that meeting they found
240
Perrott a bankrupt, and he “surrendered himself as such.” Between
Perrott’s reluctant testimony and the evidence of his accounts and
associates, the commissioners soon realized that a large sum of money
was unaccounted for. Several pieces of evidence made them
suspicious early on. First, though Perrott’s early account books were
organized and thorough, during 1758 they began to become confused,
241
and by 1759 they were in “total disorder.” Second, his annual debt
suddenly and unaccountably increased from less than £300 in the
242
years before 1758 to upwards of £27,000 in 1759. Third, at the same
time that he was buying more on credit, he had also begun to sell
anonymously through a broker, Henry Thompson. Perrott sent goods
to Thompson, who then invited merchants to make offers without
243
telling them whom he represented. These prospective buyers,
244
among them the leading merchants in town, offered to buy at 15 to
20 percent below prime cost, and Perrott always ordered Thompson

237. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 4 (“An examination, exhibiting such
strong proofs of the deponent’s misconduct, was not likely to extenuate the justly preconceived
suspicions of his creditors.”).
238. See, e.g., 5 Geo. I, c. 24, § 1 (1718 [1719]) (describing a similar practice); THE
BANKRUPT. A MODERN CHARACTER (circa 1785) (laying out the same scheme).
239. Bankruptcy Commission Docket Book, supra note 236 (recording the issuance of the
commission by Sir Robert Henley, the Lord Keeper, naming five commissioners, of whom three
were esquires and two gentlemen).
240. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 1.
241. Id. at 4 n.(*).
242. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 270.
243. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 6.
244. Id. at 33 (naming several merchants, including Sir Samuel Fludyer, alderman and future
Lord Mayor of London).
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to accept the buyers’ price. Neither Perrott nor Thompson could
245
produce records of these transactions.
In addition, by deposing several witnesses about Perrott’s
business activities, the commissioners learned of two potential acts of
concealment. In his testimony, Thompson revealed that the day after
the commission was sued out, Perrott had his apprentice deliver a
package to Thompson for safe keeping. The package was sealed with
three seals, and Perrott told Thompson that it contained personal
papers unrelated to the bankruptcy. Two days before Thompson
246
testified, Perrott retrieved the package. Perrott later informed the
commissioners that the package contained “‘nothing but letters from
247
the fair sex;’ which he had since destroyed.” The fullest account of
the case gave the following alert: “[I]t is necessary to advertise the
reader, to keep in his memory the paper parcel sealed with three
seals . . . as it was principally owing to the same paper parcel, that this
248
complicated scene of iniquity was at last unravelled.”
The commissioners also received a tip leading them to a certain
Patrick Donelly, a wigmaker who told them on March 13 that about
two weeks after the commission issued, Perrott sent him two large
boxes, claiming that the boxes contained his clothing and asking
Donelly to hold onto them while he looked for lodging. Several days
later, Perrott instructed Donelly to deliver the boxes to rooms in a
249
house in the fashionable Queen Square. The house was occupied by
a Mrs. Mary Anne Ferne. Ferne claimed during an interview that she
had known Perrott for about a year but had received no money,
250
banknotes, or other effects from him, and the matter was dropped.
On April 19, the commissioners presented Perrott with a written
interrogatory regarding the whereabouts of £13,500 that could not be
251
accounted for. Relativizing money historically is difficult, but the
course of this case indicates that the missing £13,500 represented a

245. Id. at 5–6.
246. Id. at 6–7.
247. Id. at 12.
248. Id. at 7.
249. Id. at 10–11.
250. Id. at 11.
251. Id. at 17 (“As you do admit that you have spent the last week . . . with Mr. Maynard,
one of your assignees[,] to settle and adjust your accounts and to draw up a true state thereof, to
enable you to close such your examination; and do likewise admit . . . there is a deficiency of the
sum of 13,513l . . . . Give a true and particular account; What is become of the same, and how,
and in what manner you have applied and disposed thereof?”).
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very large sum. Indeed, it was nearly twice the annual income of the
252
highest paid barristers of the time.
Perrott responded to the interrogatory by saying that he had lost
about £2,000 on goods sold in the previous year and otherwise, “for
nine or ten years, I have, and am sorry to say it, been extremely
253
extravagant, and spent large sums of money.” The commissioners
scoffed at this claim. Perrott had only been running up his credit for a
year, and an amount like £13,500 was, they felt, too large to spend in
so short a time, especially because Perrott claimed that he had never
gambled and because his books showed him to be a man of frugal
254
habits. Exercising their statutory power, the commissioners had
Perrott committed to Newgate Prison until he saw fit to provide a
255
complete and reasonable account of the missing money.
After six weeks in Newgate, he sent notice to the commissioners
256
that he would answer their question. At a meeting on June 5, 1760,
Perrott presented the commissioners with an account. Each entry was
in round numbers, totaling £15,030. The entries included such items
as rent, food, clothing, travel expenses, wages, commissions paid to
his agent, and sales losses. The largest entries were: £2,700 for
“House-keeping . . . with rent, taxes, and servants wages”; £920 for
“Tavern expenses, coffee-house expenses, and places of diversion”;
£3,000 for sales losses; and £5,500 for “Expenses attending the
257
connection I had with the fair sex.” Perrott submitted no evidence
to support this accounting, and the commissioners, unsatisfied with
his response, sent him back to Newgate. Perrott petitioned the Lord
Keeper to be released, but “his Lordship, on hearing the said
deposition read, thought it so infamous in all its circumstances, that
258
he did not think it necessary to order any attendance upon it.”
The commissioners had well before this time concluded that
Perrott was engaged in some sort of fraud, but they lacked hard
evidence. Even testimony of a former maidservant of Mary Ann

252. DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727–1875: THE RESHAPING OF
PROFESSIONAL ELITE 106–08 (1982). Attorney General Charles Yorke, one of the best paid
barristers of this time, earned £7,322 in 1763. In 1770, the two most successful barristers earned
just over £8,000. Id. at 107–08.
253. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 17.
254. Id. at 5, 17; 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 269–70.
255. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 17.
256. Id. at 17–18.
257. Id. at 18–19.
258. Id. at 19–20.

A

KADENS IN FINAL

2010]

4/1/2010 1:07:40 PM

THE LAST BANKRUPT HANGED

1277

Ferne, who came forward seeking the advertised reward of 20 percent
259
of the bankrupt’s estate to anyone uncovering the missing assets,
only provided the information that, before meeting Perrott, Ferne
260
had been poor but that now she was flush with money. The servant
also mentioned that Ferne had hidden a paper package sealed with
three seals, which the servant believed contained banknotes, and she
claimed that Perrott had instructed her that if anyone came to search
261
the house, she should show them his rooms and not Ferne’s.
Nevertheless, the servant’s testimony was considered insufficient to
obtain warrants or bring suit, so no further discovery was made, and
on July 26, 1760, the assignees paid a dividend to the creditors of five
262
shillings in the pound.
Making another attempt to obtain his liberty, Perrott turned to
the courts. He brought writs of habeas corpus in King’s Bench three
times arguing that he should be released because he had answered the
commissioners’ questions. The first petition resulted in no published
263
report, and Lord Mansfield remanded Perrott to Newgate. The next
petition, however, produced an important opinion that established
the right of commissioners to keep bankrupts imprisoned even after
264
they had answered the commission’s questions.
265
In Rex v. Perrott, heard on February 10, 1761, Perrott argued
that (1) he had already given a full answer to the commissioners’
questions, and (2) the commissioners’ jurisdiction to question him,

259. Id. at 20; see also, e.g., LONDON GAZETTE, Apr. 19, 1760, at 3 (offering a reward
because “there is great Reason to believe that the greatest Part of [Perrott’s] Effects are now
concealed”). Offering a reward of a percentage of the bankrupt’s estate was one of the statutory
powers of the assignees. 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 20 (1732).
260. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 21 (deposition of Sarah Reed on June 20,
1760).
261. Id. at 22.
262. Id. at 27; Bankrupts, PUB. ADVERTISER, June 16, 1760, at 3 (announcing the dividend);
see also PUB. LEDGER, Feb. 19, 1760, at 131 (listing in detail Perrott’s commercial merchandise
sold at auction).
263. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 27 (case heard in September 1760).
264. Id. at 28–29. In December 1760, Perrott petitioned the Lord Keeper for his liberty.
“This matter was debated before the chancellor, when it was determined that the prisoner could
obtain redress only in the court of King’s Bench; as the matter in question was strictly of legal
determination.” 4 JACKSON, supra note 4, at 208. Consequently, Perrott ended up back before
Mansfield. See Response of Lord Keeper to Perrott’s petition (Dec. 20, 1760) (National
Archives, B1/38 f. 235); see also Response of Lord Chancellor to Petition (Jan. 22, 1761)
(National Archives, B1/39 f. 3).
265. For this date, see the marginal note at Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1215, 1215, 97 Eng.
Rep. 796, 796 (K.B.).
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and therefore to commit him to prison, lasted only for the statutory
forty-two days that the bankrupt had to surrender himself and be
examined. Mansfield summarily dismissed point one, saying that
Perrott’s answer to the commissioners was “very insufficient and
266
unsatisfactory.” On the second issue, he pointed out not only that
the bankruptcy statutes gave the commissioners the general power to
examine and imprison the bankrupt beyond the statutory period until
he made a full answer but also that this was the clear intent of the
267
legislature. “The Objection has been strongly argued,” Mansfield
said, “[b]ut there is no Case to support it. It is a new invention, and
268
would entirely defeat the end and intention of the bankrupt-acts.”
Finding himself once again in Newgate, Perrott agreed to submit
269
to yet another examination by the commissioners. This time he
explained that about six years previously he had become acquainted
with a certain Sarah Powel. Although for the first five years of their
270
relationship he spent £400 or £500 on her, during 1759 he had
271
lavished money upon her to the amount of £5,000. He provided an
accounting of this money, each entry listing the month in which he
sent Powel the money and the place to which he sent it: £100 at
272
Christmas in 1758, £500 in January 1759, £400 in February 1759, etc.
The commissioners were still not convinced. First, Perrott could
not provide any details about the money he spent on Powel during
the first four years of their acquaintance, nor could he remember
where she had lived during those years, even though he claimed to
have visited her often and to have written to her. Second, Perrott said
that all of the money he sent to Powel came from his agent, Henry
Thompson, rather than from (traceable) bank notes. Unfortunately,
273
Thompson had since died. Conveniently, so had Powel, who had
266. Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1122, 1123, 97 Eng. Rep. 745, 746 (K.B.).
267. Id. at 1124, 97 Eng. Rep. at 746 (opinions of Mansfield, C.J., Foster, J., and Wilmot, J.).
268. Id., 97 Eng. Rep. at 746. It was, in fact, not a new invention, according to testimony
before a House of Commons committee on bankruptcy reform in 1818. Prior to Perrott’s Case,
it had been an open question whether the commissioners’ ability to imprison the bankrupt
exceeded the forty-two-day grace period. It had also been an open question whether they had
the power to determine the truthfulness of the bankrupt’s answers to their questions, or whether
any plausible answer was sufficient. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE
BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 52 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly).
269. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 29.
270. Id. at 34.
271. Id. at 29–31.
272. Id. at 30–31.
273. Id. at 31–33.
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died penniless of consumption about ten months earlier, meaning that
Perrott had known of her death when he gave his previous accounting
on June 5, 1760, falsifying his claim that he had covered up the truth
274
to avoid disgracing her. In fact, Perrott could provide no proof at all
of sending enough money to Powel to keep her in luxury. On the
contrary, the commissioners dug up evidence that Powel had
complained to others of Perrott’s parsimony. To make matters worse,
the commissioners discovered that Powel, also known as Rachel Sims,
was a prostitute, or, as a contemporary account put it, she was “in
keeping, as the fashionable term is, by different persons, but was
deserted at the time of Perrott’s meeting her [and] had contracted an
habit of drinking, an habit not uncommon to ladies of her profession
275
and disposition . . . .”
Back Perrott went to Newgate, and once again he brought a
habeas corpus petition before King’s Bench, which heard the case on
276
June 8, 1761. Perrott again argued for his release on the ground that
he had fully answered the commissioners’ inquiry. This time, four
barristers spoke on his behalf:
Mr. Gould, Mr. Serj. Davy, Mr. Coxe, and Mr. Stowe argued that he
ought now to be discharged, as having given a full and complete
Answer to the Questions propounded to him: And it is not material,
in the present Respect, whether it be true or false; or whether his
277
Conduct was prudent or imprudent.

Two other barristers disagreed, insisting that Perrott’s story was
incredible and therefore, by definition, an unsatisfactory response.
The court concurred and remanded Perrott to Newgate without
278
opinion.
Perrott next filed suit in Common Pleas for false imprisonment
against the commissioners, but that proceeding was halted when the
279
commissioners made a “fatal discovery.” Sometime in June 1761,
William Hewitt, the assignee, was walking in the garden of Lincoln’s
Inn when he saw a dejected-looking woman leaning against the wall.
He approached this stranger and asked her what was the matter (or at
274. Id. at 33.
275. Id. at 35.
276. For this date, see the note at Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1125, 1125, 97 Eng. Rep. 745,
746 (K.B.).
277. Rex v. Perrott, (1761) 2 Burr. 1215, 1216, 97 Eng. Rep. 796, 796 (K.B.).
278. Id., 97 Eng. Rep. at 796.
279. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 36.
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least so the “remarkably provindential” [sic] story goes). She told
him that she had been fired by a certain Mrs. Ferne. Hewitt,
recognizing the name and thinking that it might turn up some
information in the Perrott case, directed the woman, whose name was
281
Mary Harris, to Thomas Cobb, the assignees’ attorney. Harris was
taken before Justice John Fielding, the famous London police
282
magistrate, where she deposed as follows.
According to Harris, four years earlier Ferne had been a servant.
She and Harris had lodged together and had even been bedfellows,
and at that time Ferne had very little money. On February 14, 1761,
Ferne had called upon Harris for the first time in two years and the
next day, she asked Harris to become her maid. Harris lived with
Ferne and worked for her from March 5 to June 4, 1761. While there,
she saw banknotes worth £4,000 in Ferne’s possession. Ferne
explained the money by saying that “she had it from Fellows, whom
283
she always made to pay for favours received.” Ferne also told
Harris that when she had met Perrott she had no money at all and
284
that “all her fortune was owing” to Perrott, and that “if she had
known that . . . Perrott was going to fail, she would have got all she
could from him . . . that his creditors should not have had any
285
thing.”
Harris recounted accompanying Ferne on her visits to Perrott in
Newgate. She saw Ferne cut banknotes in half and give one of the
halves to Perrott. Once she heard Perrott and Ferne talking about
buying the fancy house of Sir John Smith in Queen’s Square. Perrott
gave her half of a banknote for £1,000 and Ferne unsuccessfully bid
£999 for the house. Ferne and Perrott spoke frequently about the
opulence in which they would live when he got out of prison. Most
importantly, Harris revealed that Ferne expected her lodgings to be
searched, so she kept the half banknotes in a copy of Rochester’s

280. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 271. The assignees had, in September 1760,
increased the reward for information to 40 percent of the recuperated assets. Whether or not
that affected the servant’s willingness to talk is not discussed in the Authentic Narrative, nor is
the discovery of Mary Harris. See 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 7.
281. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 271.
282. 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 7–10.
283. Id. at 7–8.
284. Id. at 8–9.
285. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted).
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Poems, and when the searchers came, she intended to take up the
286
book and pretend to read.
Based on this testimony, the commissioners issued a warrant for
287
Ferne’s house and Perrott’s rooms at Newgate. At Ferne’s, the
searchers found halves of five banknotes, dated February or March
1761, amounting to £185. The other half of four of the notes turned
up tied in a rag at the bottom of Perrott’s trunk in Newgate, along
288
with half of a note for £1,000. Because banknotes were like modern
checks with serial numbers, bearing the names of the payees,
endorsers, and the bank cashier, they could be traced. The tracks of
289
these five notes led the assignees to Martin Mathias, a solicitor.
Mathias deposed that Ferne had hired him the previous year, in
May 1760, to work on Perrott’s case. A month later she brought him
thirteen banknotes, in denominations between £100 and £500, totaling
£2,200. All of the notes had been cut in half and glued back together
with wax. When asked about this, Ferne explained that they had been
sent to her from out of the country and cut in half and mailed
separately for safety. She asked Mathias to exchange the notes for a
290
single note of £2,200. Mathias sent the notes to the Bank of
England, receiving in return three notes: two for £1,000 and one for
£200. He gave these to Ferne. Mathias testified that he believed the
money belonged to Ferne, whom he understood to be a lady of high
291
birth and means.
Ferne’s explanation to the commissioners for having the
banknotes gave a somewhat different impression. According to her,
she acquired the money for granting favors to gentlemen. In
particular, she had two elderly gentlemen friends, one who wore “a

286. Id. at 9–10.
287. According to 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233 at 11, Justice Fielding of the
London metropolitan court issued a search warrant on June 25, 1761, but according to the
affidavit of William Hewitt, sworn on June 20, recounting the discovery of the notes, the search
was made “by Virtue of a Warrant under the hands and seals of the Major part of the
Commiss[ioners].” The Information of William Hewitt One of the Assignees of John Perrott a
Bankrupt (June 20, 1761) (London Metropolitan Archives, CLA/047/LJ/13/1761/005); see also
LONDON GAZETTE, June 23, 1761, at 4 (reporting that a warrant had issued on June 18, and
indicating that the bank notes had already been found). Thus the date in the Authentic Narrative
must be a mistake.
288. 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 11.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 13–14.
291. Id. at 16. Pye Donkin, another attorney involved in Perrott’s case, also deposed that he
believed Ferne to be a woman of fortune, from an aristocratic family. Id. at 32.
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blue coat, and a star upon his breast, and a cockade in his hat” and
the other, a man of seventy, who wore “a white coat, with a star on it,
292
and a light blue garter.” She did not know the men’s names, but
when she needed money, she would contact them at the coffee houses
they frequented, and they would give her cash or notes. The half
banknotes ended up in Perrott’s trunk for safe keeping because, “her
Maid-servant being apt to drink, she, [Ferne], apprehended if she and
her servant should both happen to be in liquor together, there would
293
be some danger of setting the house on fire.”
The commissioners then set out to discredit every aspect of
Ferne’s testimony. She claimed that she had loaned Perrott money
before his bankruptcy, but the commissioners learned that she was a
common prostitute from a poor family who, a few years earlier, had
been reduced to allowing “the gentlemen soldiers then quartered [at
294
Northampton] to participate indiscriminately of her favours.” They
discounted the story of the elderly gentlemen, in part because there
was no light blue garter in any order of British chivalry, “and it is well
known that foreigners are not accustomed to be so extravagantly
295
munificent.” Most importantly, the assignees succeeded in tracing
back most of the thirteen original banknotes to merchants who had
296
paid Perrott’s agent for cloth.
The game was up. In September 1761, the assignees preferred a
bill of indictment against Perrot at the London criminal court, the Old
297
Bailey, for concealing his effects.
After a month-long delay
298
requested by the creditors, Perrott was tried on October 21, 1761.
The trial lasted six hours as the prosecution painstakingly explored

292. Id. at 19.
293. Id. at 21–22 (emphasis omitted).
294. Id. at 25, 34.
295. Id. at 26–27.
296. Id. at 35–38, 40–41.
297. Index to Indictment Books (London Metropolitan Archives, CLA/047/LJ/10/002 f.
106v) (listing Perrott’s indictment on September 14, 1761). The assignees had been planning for
this since March, when they sought permission from the creditors to prefer an indictment. PUB.
LEDGER, Mar. 18, 1761, at 263.
298. The trial was delayed from its original docketing on September 18 because the
assignees’ solicitor, Thomas Cobb, was unable to get the evidence ready in part because of the
difficulty in tracking down Perrott’s former apprentice, who had moved to Dublin. Affidavits of
Thomas Cobb in King Against John Perrott (Sept. 18, 1761) (London Metropolitan Archives,
London Session Papers CLA/047/LJ/13/1761/006).
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299

the money trail. Perrott, in his defense, could only say that he had
sent all the money he received from Thompson to his mistress, Sarah
Powel, and that the half banknotes in his trunk were Ferne’s. She had
asked him to keep them, and because she was supporting him while
he was in Newgate:
I thought I should be very ungrateful, if I did not; and the reason she
gave me was, her house had been attempted to have been broke
open twice; and for the favours she was pleased to compliment me
300
with, she said she thought she had some little right so to do.

Perrott’s counsel apparently focused on alleged procedural
301
errors. The Old Bailey proceedings do not record this part of the
trial, but some of the claims can be pieced together from discussions
in later treatises. One was that Hewitt, the petitioning creditor,
improperly testified at Perrott’s trial about the discovery of the
hidden notes, even though “the Creditor of a Bankrupt cannot be a
302
Witness, for he swears to increase his own Dividend.” Another
complaint was that the warrant committing Perrott to Newgate had
certain flaws, including incorrectly reciting the title of the controlling
303
statute, which should have vitiated it. The objections were ignored.
The day before his execution, the two assignees came to visit
Perrott in prison. They found him remorseful and willing to answer
questions. Assuring him that they forgave him, they asked where the
money was. “[A]fter a deep pause, Perrott said, I have this day
304
received the Holy Sacrament, and will answer no more questions.”
The assignees went away empty-handed. One account attributes
Perrott’s unwillingness to confess even after his conviction to a
supposed plot to have a rescue party made up of seamen show up at

299. GEN. EVENING POST (London), Oct. 22, 1761, at 1; PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD
BAILEY, supra note 235, at 399–402.
300. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 235, at 404.
301. 2 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at 42.
302. GREEN, supra note 43, at 219; ST. JAMES’S CHRON., Oct. 22, 1761, at 3 (recounting that
the assignee was permitted to testify after he agreed to take no dividend from the bill in
question). Green also pointed out the collusion between Perrott and Hewitt in the commission
of the act of bankruptcy. GREEN, supra note 43, at 219.
303. GREEN, supra note 43, at 217–18 (“We make the Observation, because we think it
extreamly remarkable, that a Warrant which had been settled and approved by some of the
ablest of the Profession, should be liable to so palpable an Objection; and besides, we could not
but admire, that as the Commitment had been so much canvassed and litigated in Westminster
Hall, the Objection should have escaped . . . Notice . . . .”).
304. 4 BLOODY REGISTER, supra note 5, at 274.
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the prison, “secur[e] the turnkey at the gate, forc[e] the keys from
305
him, and then carry[] off the prisoner.”
Several days after Perrott’s execution on November 11, 1761,
Ferne was taken into custody and turned over “the half of two Bank
notes; the other moiety of which were sometime since found in the
possession of Perrott in Newgate. These notes were artfully concealed
behind the backboard of Perrott’s picture, which was in this Lady’s
306
apartment.” In April 1762, Perrott’s creditors “unanimously agreed
to prosecute the Celebrated Lady who was party in concealing the
307
Bank-notes, with the utmost rigour.”
John Perrott was the type of bankrupt that Parliament had in
mind in 1706 when it passed the first Act of Anne. He was the latterday Thomas Pitkin, who obtained his creditors’ money through fraud,
and through fraud prevented them from recuperating it. What the
legislators had not anticipated, however, was that anyone would
prefer to go to the gallows rather than disclose where he had hidden
the money. In Perrott’s case, the statute had failed miserably. The
threat of death did not scare him into revealing his assets, and once he
308
was dead, his creditors were no closer to being repaid. Despite the
309
two sometimes being equated, bankruptcy was not like murder. The
goal of bankruptcy had always been to get the creditors their money
back. Vengeance and retribution were not part of the law, at least not
explicitly, and they did not further its stated goals. A dead debtor did
not pay his debts. Perhaps a frightened debtor did, and Perrott’s

305. Id. at 275–76. Several other rumors circulated in the newspapers after Perrott’s death.
One story said that, a day before his death, Perrott had given a friend a “Tortoiseshell SnuffBox, with a Lady’s Picture in it set in Gold” as well as “some other Things of Value, which were
contained in the said Box.” WHITEHALL EVENING POST (London), Nov. 26, 1761, at 3. Another
story claimed that Perrott was buried under a fictitious name in his hometown of NewportPagnel. WHITEHALL EVENING POST, Nov. 28, 1761, at 3.
306. LLOYD’S EVENING POST, Nov. 13, 1761, at 478.
307. LONDON CHRON., Apr. 24, 1762, at 394.
308. ST. JAMES’S CHRON., Dec. 1, 1761, at 4 (“The Punishment Mr. Perrot has lately
undergone, will appear to be scarce adequate to his Crime when considered in all its
Consequences. It may be alledged, that when a Man forfeits his Life for his Misdemeanors,
nothing further ought to be expected or required of him. But this Forfeiture of Life makes no
Amends to the Persons injured . . . .”).
309. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra
note 7, at 50–51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (explaining that, in the treaty of Amiens
between England and France in 1801, the two governments agreed to give up offenders who fled
justice, but the only offenders listed were “murderers, persons guilty of forgery, and fraudulent
bankrupts”); DANIEL SAUTERIUS, THE PRACTISE OF THE BANCKRVPTS OF THESE TIMES 31–32
(London, John Norton 1640) (equating bankrupts with murderers).
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assignees had authorized the publication of an account of the case
310
ostensibly “as a terror to future offenders.” The problem, as Section
B describes, was that prosecutions were so infrequent and convictions
so difficult to obtain that much of the threat had gone out of the
statutory penalty.
B. The Failure of Capital Punishment
Despite initial optimism that the availability of discharge and the
threat of capital punishment would improve debtor cooperation and
end fraud, bankrupts discovered that they still needed to conceal
assets. Yet, while fraud continued to flourish, indictments and
convictions for fraudulent bankruptcy were few. The failure to
prosecute encouraged bankrupts to do whatever necessary, honest or
not, both to protect their property and to obtain their discharge. As a
result, the bankruptcy system became a morass of fraud. In fact, in
311
Ireland, which had adopted English bankruptcy law in 1772, the
situation grew so serious that British parliamentarians discussed
312
eliminating bankruptcy entirely in that part of the kingdom.
Nonetheless, despite urgent calls for reform, by 1820, the only
significant change was the abolition of the death penalty, a provision
whose lack of enforcement was arguably the source of many of the
other problems.
1. The Problem of Fraud. In the aftermath of the Acts of Anne,
commentators had greeted the discharge and death penalty provisions
with enthusiasm. Daniel Defoe predicted that the 1706 Act would
result in less fraud:
Instead of flying from the Law for fear of Punishment, he now will
fly to the Law for Protection; instead of absconding and hiding
himself from his Creditors, now he will run to seek them out, offer
them all he has as their Due, and demand his Liberty as his
313
Right . . . .

310. 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at i.
311. 1 CHRISTIAN, supra note 52, at vi; 2 id. at 1 (discussing the introduction of English
bankruptcy law into Ireland).
312. 38 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 987 (T.C. Hansard ed., London 1818).
313. DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 16.
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With discharge available, “[n]one then in their Wits” would
314
commit fraud when the penalty for doing so was so steep. Perhaps
the initial reaction to the new law was indeed as Defoe predicted, for
around 1718, during a period when the most recent bankruptcy
statute containing discharge and the death penalty had lapsed,
commentators bemoaned the increase in fraud and portrayed the
expired law as a great success. According to one broadside, most of
the usual frauds “were Remedied, and in a great Measure prevented,
whilst the late Acts were in force . . . the Consequences [being] so
fatal, that during all that Time, there are but Two Instances of
315
Persons Convicted as Fraudulent Bankrupts.”
One of those convicted was John Ristow, a weaver from London,
who in December 1710 tried to ship £500 worth of household goods
316
and shop merchandise out of the country rather than pay his debts.
His creditors caught him in the process of transferring his effects from

314. REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL
DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS (1707) (British Library,
Cup.645.b.11.(7*)) (“It is Felony by the late Act for the Bankrupt to abscond with his Effects,
and not appear and deliver the same: None then in their Wits (unless they design to run away)
will fraudulently remove their Goods, when they are certain to be debarr’d their Liberty, and
also lyable to be hang’d, if they do not afterwards discover and deliver them back to their
Creditors.”); REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT
THEREOF, supra note 103, at 5 (“The Prospect of Liberty afforded by the Act will prevent
Persons from Transporting themselves and Estates.”); REV. ST. ENG. NATION, Feb. 28, 1706, at
102 (Defoe noting that all that will be required is to hang two or three bankrupts and no one
else will dare to cheat).
315. REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR ALTERING AND AMENDING THE LAWS
CONCERNING BANKRUPTS, AND FOR PREVENTING THE GREAT LOSSES THAT ARE DAILY
SUSTAINED BY THEIR CREDITORS, SINCE THE EXPIRATION OF THE LATE ACTS, OF THE
FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE REIGN OF HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN ANNE, supra note
95 (naming eight bankrupts who had absconded since the expiration of the acts); see also
REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR MAKING MORE CERTAIN THE LIBERTY OF SUCH
BANKRUPTS WHO SHALL FAIRLY AND JUSTLY SURRENDER THEMSELVES, AND EFFECTS,
PURSUANT TO THE ACT NOW DEPENDING, OR ANY OTHER ACTS NOW IN BEING, TO PREVENT
FRAUDS COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS 1 (circa 1718) (“Since the Expiration of the late Law of
Bankruptcy, on the 26th June, 1716, great Numbers have withdrawn Themselves and Effects,
some out of the Kingdom, and others into obscure Places, and have Secreted very considerable
Sums of Money, and large Quantities of Goods, which would undoubtedly be voluntarily
Surrendred, if the Liberty of the Bankrupt be made secure.”).
316. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, May 16, 1711, at 3, lists him as Restow. The
newspapers and the record of his bankruptcy commission, however, spell the name Ristow.
Advertisements, LONDON GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1710, at 2; DAILY COURANT (London), Sept. 12,
1711, at 2; Bankruptcy Commission Docket Book (Dec. 13, 1710) (National Archives, B4/1
f. 17).
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317

a river barge to a sea-going vessel. Ristow was found guilty and
318
sentenced to death but then pardoned. Less than two years later,
the second bankrupt convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy was not so
lucky. Richard Towne was a London tallow chandler, whose reaction
to hearing about the bankruptcy commission taken out on him was to
sneak out of town at three o’clock in the morning with a large
319
quantity of tallow and his account books. He was caught when the
boat on which he was attempting to flee to Holland was turned back
320
by bad weather. At trial he looked every bit the fraudster. He tried
to prove that his petitioning creditor owed him money by producing
321
forged notes, and one of his character witnesses called him “as great
322
a Rogue as any in England.” Towne was found guilty and hanged
323
less than two weeks after his trial.
Although no further executions took place until the 1756
conviction of Alexander Thompson, the fact that only three people

317. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 316, at 3.
318. Id. at 4; REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR ALTERING AND AMENDING THE LAWS
CONCERNING BANKRUPTS, AND FOR PREVENTING THE GREAT LOSSES THAT ARE DAILY
SUSTAINED BY THEIR CREDITORS, SINCE THE EXPIRATION OF THE LATE ACTS, OF THE
FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE REIGN OF HER LATE MAJESTY QUEEN ANNE, supra note
95 (naming the two convicted bankrupts: “Town the Tallow-Chandler, that was Hang’d, and J.
Risteau, who was Pardon’d”). The absence of other evidence corroborates Ristow’s pardon. Of
his trial or execution the newspapers say nothing, which would be rather unusual for that time.
The deaths of the other bankrupts hanged were always noted in the newspapers. The only
notices about Ristow discovered in the newspapers are a notice of the commission against him
in the LONDON GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1710, at 2, and a notice of the auction of his goods in the
DAILY COURANT, Sept. 12, 1711, at 2.
319. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, POST BOY
(London), Dec. 16, 1712, at 1; LONDON GAZETTE, Apr. 10, 1712, at 2 (offering a reward for
Towne’s capture).
320. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319.
321. Id. (stating that Towne produced three notes, “which being afterwards view’d by the
Judges and Jury, it appear’d plainly to them, that Mr. Thomas’s Hand was counterfeited; and,
That the Body of the Notes was writ by the Prisoner”); see also Bankruptcy Commission Docket
Book (Apr. 8, 1712) (National Archives, B4/1 f. 40) (docketing Towne’s commission and listing
Wm. Thomas, Citizen and Joiner of London, petitioning creditor); A Particular Account of the
Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319 (identifying William Thomas as the
prosecutor).
322. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319.
He was apparently also an accomplished liar. Upon his capture, Towne was found to be carrying
very little money. He claimed that the two bags containing a total of 800 guineas—a gold coin
worth one pound and one shilling—that he had secreted under his coat when he fled had fallen
overboard as he leaned over the ship’s railing to be seasick in the bad weather. Id. He later
claimed that the 800 guineas were a fabrication. 3 A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF REMARKABLE
TRYALS OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS MALEFACTORS 75 (London, J. Brotherton 1721).
323. EVENING POST (London), Dec. 20, 1712, at 3.
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were found guilty of fraudulent bankruptcy in the first fifty years after
the passage of the 1706 Act does not alone constitute evidence that
fraud actually declined. Newspaper advertisements describing
concealment of effects and failure to surrender to commissioners
324
appeared as early as 1707. A notice might read, “there is Reason to
believe that Robert Willan . . . did, in the Night-time, between 20th
and 21st Instant, remove and convey away all his Shop Goods and
Books of Account; in order, as tis supposed, to prevent a Seizure
thereof, under the Commission of Bankrupt then issued against
325
him,” or speak of “there being great reason to think he has
endeavoured to conceal his effects, and as there is now lying in
different peoples [sic] hands in London and parts adjacent, and on
board some ships in the river, bound for Spain, bales of woollen
326
goods, household furniture, plate, &c.” These advertisements were
not common, but they were published in a steady trickle throughout
327
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Yet most of the men mentioned in the advertisements apparently
were never brought to trial, let alone convicted and hanged. The
Proceedings of the Old Bailey describe only twenty-four bankruptcy
328
trials between 1706 and 1820. The index to the Old Bailey
329
indictment books from 1715 to 1792 records six additional cases.
These account for some of the London and Westminster cases, and
newspaper stories, court documents, and comments in other sources
add another several dozen names from London and around the
country, but only seven of these men are known to have been

324. See Appendix. These advertisements were not published prior to the 1706 Act, even
though concealing and failure to surrender were crimes under the earlier statutes.
325. DAILY POST (London), July 23, 1730, at 2.
326. GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER (London), Aug. 2, 1765, at 3 (noting the
bankruptcy of Frederick Shepherd).
327. See Appendix.
328. See Appendix.
329. Twelve of the fourteen cases recorded in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey between
1715 and 1792 are also mentioned in the indices. The additional names not in the Proceedings
are in the Index to the Old Bailey Indictment Books (London Metropolitan Archives,
CLA/047/LJ/10/001): Benjamin Bailey (concealment, indicted July 18, 1753); George William
Pope (concealment, indicted Dec. 4, 1752); and Robert Wright (concealment, indicted July 11,
1750). The 001 volume of the indices is unpaginated. The names are in order of date of
indictment listed by last name in alphabetical sections. The second volume of the Index to
Indictment Books (London Metropolitan Archives, CLA/047/LJ/10/002), mentions: Edmund
Francis Calze, at f. 24r (concealment, indicted July 5, 1779); Derrick Martin, at f. 94v
(concealment, indicted Apr. 13, 1774); Thomas Rawbone, at f. 122v (perjury in his examination
before the commissioners, indicted Apr. 19, 1784).
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330

indicted. As no official records were kept, this list of bankruptcy
criminals cannot be considered exhaustive, and the continuity of
complaints about bankruptcy fraud suggests that it was not an
331
isolated problem.
Fraud continued to occur, in part because the benefits promised
332
by discharge were too often unobtainable. The requirement that
four-fifths of the creditors in number and value sign the certificate of
discharge meant that one or two significant and angry creditors could
prevent the discharge and keep the bankrupt in debtors’ prison
333
indefinitely. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they occasionally did
330. See Appendix for the full list.
331. See, e.g., INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM THE PRESENT METHODS IN TAKING OUT
AND EXECUTING COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPT (circa 1707–1710) (Chetham’s Library
(Manchester, England), H.P. 2950) (including several examples of fraud by debtors in
concealing); Letter to the Editor, LONDON CHRON., May 3, 1759, at 426 (same); Letter to the
Editor, PUB. ADVERTISER, Nov. 1, 1773, at 1–2 (complaining about the “very great and flagrant
Abuses of the Bankrupt Laws”); 35 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 312, at 244 (“The
evil of which he complained, was the multiplication of fraudulent bankruptcies to an extent
which threatened the most frightful consequences to the commerce and morals of the
country.”). But see CONSIDERATIONS UPON COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPTS, supra note 24, at 5–
6 (claiming that concealment was less common than creditors imagined).
332. But see REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS
FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT
THEREOF, supra note 103, at 5 (claiming that many certificates had been signed since the
passage of the Act a year before and only a few challenged). Bankruptcy crime is probably a
given, so not all crime can be explained by external factors. Current figures estimate that
“approximately ten percent of all bankruptcy cases involve abuse or fraud.” WICKOUSKI, supra
note 20, at 1.
333. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 32–33 (testimony of Basil Montagu) (listing reasons creditors withhold their signatures); id.
at 34 (“I am certain also, that deserving bankrupts have very great difficulty sometimes in
obtaining the signature of the last one or two creditors, from the consciousness of the power
which such creditors possess, so that the good intentions of the great body of the creditors are
for a time delayed.”); id. at 52–54 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (“I have known several
instances of the most harsh and inhuman refusals of certificates by creditors.”); THE
DEPLORABLE CASE OF SUCH UNFORTUNATE DEBTORS AS HAVE BEEN DECLARED
BANKRUPTS (post 1707) (Guildhall Library, Bside 11.39) (“Some of their Creditors, sharpen’d
with their Losses; others provoked at not being preferr’d to the Prejudice of the rest, will always
refuse to sign such Certificate.”); PHILANTHROPOS [ERASMUS PHILIPS], PROPOSALS FOR
PROMOTING INDUSTRY AND ADVANCING PROPER CREDIT; ADVANTAGEOUS TO CREDITORS
IN PARTICULAR AND THE NATION IN GENERAL: IN A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT
29–30 (1732) (complaining about creditors who spitefully refuse to sign certificates). The
unwillingness of creditors to sign the certificate was predicted in 1707 in a broadside. See
REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL DEPENDING IN
PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 314 (pointing out that under
compositions the debtor retained control of his property and the creditors had to sign the
agreement to get their money, but under bankruptcy “the whole of his Effects will be in his
Creditors[’] hands, and no Loss accrues by their refusing to sign a Certificate for his
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just that. In 1731, a group of bankrupts petitioned the House of
Commons for relief. They had been imprisoned for “from One to
Fourteen Years” after having, so they claimed, conformed to the
334
bankruptcy laws and turned over all their assets. Nevertheless, some
of their creditors, rather than sign the certificate, had left them to
335
“linger out the Remainder of their Days in Misery and Want.” In
1759, a House of Commons committee reported on the difficulty of
obtaining the necessary number of signatures and described the plight
of bankrupts who were either left in prison for years or unable to
rebuild their lives out of constant fear of being arrested for their old
336
debts. Calculations for the years 1757 to 1759 showed that 52
337
percent of bankrupts did not receive their certificates of discharge.
By the period from 1786 to 1805, however, that number had fallen to
338
between 40 and 45 percent.
Nonetheless, even though discharge became somewhat easier to
obtain toward the end of the century, many bankrupts still had nearly
the same incentives after 1706 to conceal assets to ensure their
339
survival during bankruptcy. In particular when the bankruptcy was

Discharge”). The rules about obtaining signatures for the certificate were slightly modified over
time, without solving the underlying problem. For an overview of that development, see SELECT
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 99
(testimony of Basil Montagu).
334. And if they, in fact, had not conformed, they were in a double bind. If they kept silent
and did not turn over their concealed assets, they could support themselves in prison but not
please their creditors. But if they reported their crime, they were liable to be executed as felons.
SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 86
(testimony of Archibald Cullen).
335. RICHARD GRAY, TO THE HONOURABLE THE COMMONS OF GREAT-BRITAIN IN
PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED. THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE BANKRUPTS NOW CONFINED FOR
DEBT IN HIS MAJESTY’S PRISONS OF THE KING’S BENCH AND THE FLEET (circa 1731)
(Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP 100/4).
336. 28 H.C. JOUR. 603–04 (June 2, 1759).
337. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 98 (testimony of Basil Montagu).
338. Id. at 97.
339. PHILANTHROPOS, supra note 333, at 32–33 (“’[T]is greatly to be feared some of that
Denomination, being sensible of the Disposition of those they had to deal with, have made
Concealments, to maintain themselves in Prison . . . or procur’d fictitious ones to make the
Number and Value requir’d; chusing rather to run the Risque of being hang’d than that more
terrible Death of starving in Prison . . . .”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS,
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1817, H.C. 486, at 16 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan) (stating that the
law gives bankrupts the choice to conceal or to starve); SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO
CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAW, FURTHER REPORT, supra note 20, at 1 (testimony of
Thomas Nowlan) (“[B]y requiring the bankrupt to surrender his last shilling, it reduces him to
the dreadful alternative of choosing between starvation and felony.”).
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not collusive and the debtor therefore had perhaps little sense of the
hostility he would encounter from his creditors, he stood a good
chance of not receiving his certificate. Already in 1707, an anonymous
commentator had pointed out the difficult situation this created for
the bankrupt when deciding whether to deal honestly with his
creditors: “with humble Submission, it seems very hard, if not too
much Hardship, for to be obliged, on the Penalty of Death, to
surrender Person and Effects, and yet have hardly room for Hope
left, that ever they shall be discharg’d from that Confinement till
340
Death give them Enlargement.” After 1706, bankrupts had an
additional reason to conceal assets besides providing for their own
immediate needs: according to later evidence, creditors came to
341
expect bribes before they would sign the certificate.
Bankrupts did not conceal assets unaware of the possible legal
consequences. Although in one Old Bailey case the defendant
excused his flight and refusal to appear before the commissioners—a
capital felony—on the basis that someone had informed him that he
was liable to be hanged for some other bankruptcy fraud that he had
342
unknowingly committed, it appears likely that most merchants and
traders had a reasonable understanding of the elements of the crime
of fraudulent bankruptcy. The Lord Mayor of London had ordered at
least one of the proposed bankruptcy bills and the account of Richard
Towne’s trial to be published, presumably to inform the city’s
343
344
merchants. Newspapers printed summaries of other bills, and the
popular Proceedings of the Old Bailey recounted many of the London
345
trials.
Finally, an affidavit from 1768 demonstrates that the participants
in a rather routine concealment understood the consequences of their
actions. Barbara Wilson related the following conversation between
340. REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE HONOURABLE HOUSE OF COMMONS, TO PASS
FURTHER CONFIRM ALL SUCH CERTIFICATES OF BANKRUPTS, AS
HAS BEEN ALLOWED AND CONFIRMED BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR OR TWO OF THE JUDGES
(circa 1707) (Chetham’s Library, H.P. 2462).
341. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 32, 100 (testimony of Basil Montagu).
342. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Oct. 13, 1708, at 3 (John Slaorgan).
343. ABSTRACT OF THE BANKRUPTS ACT OF 5 GEO. I (1719) (London Metropolitan
Archives, CLA/040/07/004); A PARTICULAR ACCOUNT OF THE TRYAL OF RICHARD TOWNE,
TALLOW-CHANDLER, FOR FELONY (London, J. Morphew 1712) (title page).
344. See, e.g., Abstract of a Bill for Preventing Frauds Committed by Bankrupts, DAILY J.
(London), June 9, 1731, at 1.
345. See Appendix.
AN EXPLANATORY ACT, TO
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her brother-in-law, Samuel Wilson, the bankrupt, and his brother and
sister:
And the said Samuel Wilson at that time say’d that he thought that
his Brother William Wilson and this Examinant would have been
called and Examined before the Commissioners upon Oath. Upon
which the said William Wilson reply’d that he would not willingly
appear at Guildhall to be Examined, for that if he did he should
Hang him, meaning the said Samuel Wilson. After which Samuel
Wilson and his Sister Mary Wilson, who was then also present, say’d
that he would not do to go there, for if he did he must swallow a few
346
Pills.

Samuel Wilson was a haberdasher, and the goods for which he risked
347
his life were worth about £70. No trial ever occurred, however,
because Wilson apparently solved his problem by ensuring that
348
Barbara disappeared, thereby dashing the assignees’ hopes of
349
bringing him to justice.
The bankrupts who committed the crimes of absenting
themselves or of concealing their assets were not necessarily those
who lost their creditors’ money through reckless or fraudulent prebankruptcy behavior. The Act of 1706 and those that followed it
defined fraudulent bankruptcy solely as the post-bankruptcy
concealment of assets or failure to surrender. The reasons why the
debtors became insolvent were not taken into account anywhere in
the eighteenth-century statutes, which paid no attention to the old
350
honest insolvent–fraudulent bankrupt distinction. Ostensibly, the
346. The Information of Mrs. Barbara Wilson (Apr. 1, 1768) (London Metropolitan
Archives, OB/SP/1768/04/026) (abbreviations expanded, punctuation and capitalization
somewhat modernized).
347. Id.
348. GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER, May 7, 1768 (giving notice of Barbara’s
disappearance with “greatest reason to believe that the said Barbara Wilson, hath been spirited
away by the agents of the said Samuel Wilson”); see also Manuscript Draft of Newspaper Notice
(May 1768) (London Metropolitan Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/15); Thomas King at the
Provocation of Thomas Dibbs Against Samuel Wilson (May 4. 1768) (London Metropolitan
Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/14) (affidavit of assignees); Petition of Samuel Wilson (May 1706)
(London Metropolitan Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/16) (denying Samuel Wilson’s involvement
with the disappearance of Barbara); Affidavit of Mary Wilson (May 20, 1768) (London
Metropolitan Archives, OB/SB/1768/05/17) (denying Mary Wilson’s involvement with the
disappearance of Barbara).
349. Thomas King at the Provocation of Thomas Dibbs Against Samuel Wilson, supra note
348 (concerning the need to delay trial).
350. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 104 (testimony of John Ingram Lockhart); id. at 66 (testimony of Robert Waithman)
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clause in the 1624 Act of James I, which penalized with pillorying and
cutting off an ear the inability to demonstrate that one had become
insolvent through misfortune rather than recklessness or fraud,
remained in force throughout the period under consideration here,
but as one witness pointed out to the parliamentary committee in
351
1818, it was “obsolete.”
One result of this omission, however, was that creditors often
turned their decision whether or not to sign the certificate into a
352
comment on the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy behavior. Implicitly, then,
the law gave the creditor two forms of compensation: his money and
“a private vindictive satisfaction, by permitting the creditor to refuse
353
his consent to the certificate.” Yet the imprisonment that commonly
resulted when discharge was denied came with no attendant
354
indictment, trial, or finding of guilt by an impartial tribunal. The
justification for this was that imprisonment for debt was coercive
355
rather than penal, but that distinction would have been lost on
bankrupts, even the honest but unfortunate ones, who had handed
356
over their entire estate only to find themselves imprisoned for years.

(complaining about the lack of differentiation between ex ante honest and fraudulent behavior);
id. at 52–53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (stating that the statute did not require
consideration of ex ante behavior); DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 23 (“Nor do any
former Concealments from Creditors entitle a Bankrupt to the Penalties of this Act, provided
they are fairly acknowledg’d . . . .”).
351. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 105 (testimony of John Ingram Lockhart); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *156
(discussing 21 James 1, c. 19 as still in force and describing punishment under the statute). In
March 1817, a bill titled “To Make Better Provision for the Repression of Bankruptcy,” H.C.
Bill [157] (Eng.), was proposed in Parliament but never passed.
352. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 52–53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly).
353. Id. at 96 (testimony of Basil Montagu).
354. Id. at 53 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly); REASONS HUMBLY OFFER’D FOR MAKING
MORE CERTAIN THE LIBERTY OF SUCH BANKRUPTS WHO SHALL FAIRLY AND JUSTLY
SURRENDER THEMSELVES, AND EFFECTS, PURSUANT TO THE ACT NOW DEPENDING, OR ANY
OTHER ACTS NOW IN BEING, TO PREVENT FRAUDS COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, supra note
315, at 1 (arguing that imprisonment was worse than a felony conviction because, in the former
case, there was no trial); see also Prisoner Petition (Nov. 27, 1732) (National Archives, SP 36/28
d
f. 304) (complaining that “I have Labour under as being confined for almost nine Years and
being committed by the Commissioners of Bankrupts upon suspition of concealment and having
from time to time beged and pleaded if they had anything against me to try me if not that they
would discharge me but cannot git grants for Either: I am halfe starved at times and have no
Substance but what I can git by beging at the common Grate”).
355. Cohen, supra note 11, at 155.
356. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 85–86 (testimony of Archibald Cullen) (“It is quite clear, and on all hands admitted, that
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2. Why Capital Punishment Failed to Deter Fraud. The failure to
make use of the death penalty provision—as opposed to long-term
imprisonment at the creditors’ whim—to punish fraudsters was not
entirely unexpected. A gloss on the capital felony clause in the
summaries of the proposed 1621 and 1624 bankruptcy bills explained
in happy justification, “This is more in terror to them [that is,
357
bankrupts], then likely to be prosecuted by the Creditors.” Those
skeptical of the 1706 statute repeated the same refrain, only now
critically. “[I]f this Bill Pass,” they warned, “it will never be
358
executed.” The latter prognostication turned out to be virtually
correct. Creditors prosecuted infrequently because of the severity of
the punishment and the cost and difficulty involved. Even when
creditors did bring lawsuits, juries may have been reluctant to convict
not only because of the penalty but also because they understood the
potential for fraud in the bankruptcy system itself.
Testimony before several parliamentary committees studying
bankruptcy reform in 1817 and 1818 suggested three main reasons
why creditors prosecuted so few fraudulent bankrupts. First, and most
prominently, many witnesses believed that capital punishment was
359
simply too severe a penalty for the failure to repay debts. In 1819,
the power in question has been given, not for the purpose of punishment, but for the single
purpose of enforcing a discovery. In point of fact, however, its operation is always penal, and in
most cases, penal only.”); see also id. at 87 (“Mr. Justice Blackstone, when he said that after the
abolition of the peine forte et dure, there was no such thing as torture in the English law, had
forgotten the power of commitment by commissioners of bankrupt. What is it but a species of
torture . . . to wring a confession of supposed guilt, by the sufferings or the terrors of
imprisonment?”); ERASMUS PHILIPS, THE CREDITOR’S ADVOCATE AND DEBTOR’S FRIEND
10–12 (London, T. Corbett 2d ed. 1731) (describing the bankruptcy of Nathaniel Dickenson in
1729 in which he had assets sufficient to pay his creditors, but the assignees failed to proceed
with the distribution and instead left him in prison).
357. 7 NOTESTEIN ET AL., supra note 111, at 107–08; A Brief of the Bill Exhibited Against
Bankrupts, supra note 111.
358. REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR PASSING THE BILL, NOW DEPENDING IN
PARLIAMENT RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 202 (“Objection 5. It is further Objected
by some, That if this Bill Pass, it will never be executed; as it was in the Case of Transporting of
Wooll which was Felony by a former Law. Answer. The Case is greatly different: The Exporter
of Wooll, had a Right therein, and only the Interest of the Government concern’d, but here a
Man’s property is Fraudulently wrested from him, which irritates Passion; so that such as are for
letting Men Rot in Prison, and making Dice of their Bones, are likely enough to put an Act of
this kind in Execution.”); see also DEFOE, REMARKS, supra note 151, at 17 (“I know ’tis
objected, that the Felony part will never be put in Execution.”); OBSERVATIONS ON THE
BANKRUPTS BILL, supra note 118, at 17–18 (explaining that the penalty would not deter those
dishonest enough to have committed the fraud in the first place).
359. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 17–19 (testimony of Basil Montagu); id. at 50–51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly); id. at
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Stephen Curtis, a leather factor in London, described to a
parliamentary committee investigating the death penalty a case in
360
which the bankrupt’s fraud was clearly proved. Curtis was the
assignee, and the commissioners urged him to prosecute on the
grounds that “it was a difficult thing to prove offences and crimes of
this sort against a bankrupt so completely as to bring him to justice;
and that the assignees ought not to let an occasion pass where they
361
had an opportunity of making an example.” Curtis refused “for no
other reason than that the man would certainly have suffered
362
death.” The result of this unwillingness to prosecute was that some
bankrupts committed their crimes with impunity, their creditors
having no alternative but to permit them to keep their concealed
363
assets.
Second, assignees were also reluctant to prosecute because
364
bringing a bankrupt to trial was expensive. In a vestige of medieval
law, bankruptcy crime was tried in a criminal court by private
prosecution, and therefore the assignees of the bankrupt’s estate,
themselves creditors of the bankrupt, had to bring the indictment, try
the case, and foot the bill. Going to trial might have made some
financial sense had the creditors believed a conviction would lead to
the recovery of significantly more of the bankrupt’s assets, though
even then they were ultimately taking money from their own pockets.
365
But if the creditors lost, which they usually did, they got nothing;
and if the bankrupt went to his grave without breaking down and

67 (testimony of Robert Waithman); SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 222,
at 64 (testimony of Smith); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at
16 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan); id. at 25 (testimony of Joseph Miller).
360. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS, supra note 222, at 96–97 (testimony of
Stephen Curtis).
361. Id. at 97.
362. Id.
363. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly); id. at 46–47 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor)
(discussing the case of James Nowlan “who lay in Newgate from the year 1793 to 1808, and was
then liberated in consideration of the punishment that he had sustained by his long
imprisonment, and without any satisfaction whatever being derived to his creditors”).
364. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 47 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor) (“I think the expense and the trouble are the
sole causes of non-prosecution, with the difficulty of conviction.” “And not motives of
humanity?” “Certainly not.”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339,
at 84 (testimony of J. Mayhew) (“[T]he expense of such proceedings is so enormous, that
creditors are altogether prevented from adopting them.”).
365. See Appendix for conviction rates.
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divulging his concealed money, as Perrott did, they also got nothing.
Prosecuting a bankrupt was, therefore, largely a matter of private
vengeance and perhaps a strategy to scare the fraudster into turning
over his assets in return for the assignees withdrawing or conceding
the case. This might account for the several instances at the Old
Bailey in which the prosecution appeared and announced it had no
366
evidence to put forth, resulting in the bankrupt’s acquittal.
The third reason assignees avoided bringing suit was the
difficulty of obtaining a conviction. The prosecution had to prove not
only the fraud but also the act of bankruptcy, the petitioning
creditor’s debt, proper notice to the bankrupt, that the bankrupt was
a merchant or trader, that the commissioners were properly
367
appointed and sworn, and several other procedural matters. To
accomplish this, they could not use the testimony of creditors—who
were assumed to be biased because self-interested—or of the
bankrupt, who was the defendant in a criminal trial and therefore not
368
expected to incriminate himself.
Even if the prosecutors could prove all the necessary elements
and demonstrate that all procedures had been correctly followed,
seemingly certain victories might be dashed on the rocks of mistakes
in the wording of notices or indictments. One such instance was the
369
trial of William Tucker in 1807. Tucker was a serge manufacturer
370
“much given to swearing,” and he was indebted for the “enormous

366. See Appendix for the relevant cases of Thomas Dawson (1729), Thomas Carter (1774),
Thomas Evans (1790), and John Ibbetson (1806).
367. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at 26 (testimony of
Joseph Miller) (“[T]here being so many technical requisites to support a prosecution, renders
conviction nearly impossible.”); id. at 84 (testimony of J. Mayhew) (“[S]uch is the difficulty of
giving evidence of such proof to a jury, that solicitors, I believe, in general are altogether
deterred from doing it.”); SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT
LAWS, supra note 7, at 77 (testimony of William Cooke) (“[T]he necessity of proving the
petitioning creditor’s debt and the bankruptcy increase the chance of the person prosecuted
escaping.”).
368. GREEN, supra note 43, at 219 (stating that creditors could not serve as witnesses);
FANE, supra note 44, at 39.
369. For another example, see the case of Edward Frith, tried at the Old Bailey in 1738, who
was acquitted because of mistakes in the indictment. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Oct.
11, 1738, at 151; see also THOMAS LEACH, CASES IN CROWN LAW DETERMINED BY THE
TWELVE JUDGES, BY THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH, AND BY COMMISSIONERS OF OYER AND
TERMINER AND GENERAL GAOL DELIVERY, FROM THE FOURTH YEAR OF GEORGE THE
SECOND TO THE TWENTY-NINTH YEAR OF GEORGE THE THIRD 11–13 (London, T. Wheldon
1789).
370. TREWMAN’S EXETER FLYING POST, July 2, 1807, at 1.
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371

sum” of £23,000. The prosecution was well on its way to proving
that Tucker had failed to appear before the commissioners of
bankruptcy, as required by the statute, when Tucker’s counsel
pointed out that the summons to appear was dated “eight hundred
372
and seven, the word thousand is left out.” On this basis, the court
373
directed a verdict for the defendant.
The parliamentary commission testimony focused on these three
reasons—dislike of the penalty, cost, and procedural hurdles—but
contemporaries hinted at others. Juries, for instance, seem to have
374
disfavored sending bankrupts to the gallows. If some juries did
nullify, they might have done so in response to certain well-known
structural problems in the bankruptcy law. One was the inconsistency
of making a bankrupt subject to capital punishment for concealing his
effects whereas a non-merchant, who could not be made a bankrupt,
could secrete his assets with impunity, leaving the creditors merely to
375
fume. James Bullock, on trial for fraudulent bankruptcy in 1807,
made this exact point in his statement to the jury:
I will say that law is severe, it is partial. You, gentlemen, are like
myself, men that get your living by buying and selling. There is every
man, even the greatest bulk of society, may buy as many goods of
you and me, and other tradesmen, they may pledge them, keep
them, embezzle them in any way they may think fit; there is no
criminal attachment to them, they may go to prison, and live upon
our property. It seems to me very hard, when we, who are subject to
so many misfortunes, should be liable to loose [sic] our lives, when
376
they may go at large.

371. Tucker, the Bankrupt, TREWMAN’S EXETER FLYING POST, Dec. 10, 1807, at 3.
372. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Dec. 2, 1807, at 49.
373. Id.; Singular Bankruptcy Case, HAMPSHIRE TELEGRAPH & SUSSEX CHRON., Dec. 14,
1807, at 4.
374. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at 16 (testimony of
Thomas Nowlan); id. at 66 (testimony of Thomas Tilson). The Nowlan evidence related to
Ireland. Jury nullification would, however, explain the case of Albertus Burnaby, who was
acquitted for failure to prove the act of bankruptcy, although the trial proceedings seem to
clearly prove the act. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, July 11, 1726, at 2–3.
375. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 51 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly).
376. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Sept. 16, 1807, at 399.
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Bullock, however, was insufficiently sympathetic or convincing. The
jury found him guilty, though his sentence was later commuted on
377
review without opinion.
Another structural problem in the bankruptcy law that might
have encouraged jury nullification was its susceptibility to fraud by
378
creditors. A man was made a bankrupt by the ex parte declaration
of a person claiming to be a creditor for a certain, statutorily required
379
amount. The alleged bankrupt had no right to object to the granting
of the commission. He could only petition the Lord Chancellor to
have it superseded, and the dispute could take months or years to
380
work its way through Chancery. In the meantime, his alleged
creditors had taken possession of his assets, leaving him nothing with
which he could fight his case, unless he committed a felony by
381
concealing assets or had friends or family to support him.
The man who believed himself to have been wrongly made a
bankrupt refused to submit to the examination of the commissioners
at the risk of a prosecution for capital felony, as George Page
382
discovered in 1819. His conviction was overturned on the ground
that properly surrendering but then refusing to answer particular
383
questions did not constitute a capital offense. The defendant who
felt that his creditors had put him into bankruptcy with fraudulent

377. King v. Bullock, (1807) 1 Taunt. 71, 168 Eng. Rep. 595 (E.C.); 1 EDWARD CHRISTIAN,
THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW BOTH IN
ENGLAND AND IRELAND 295–96 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 2d ed. 1818); SELECT CASES
FROM THE TWELVE JUDGES’ NOTEBOOKS 107–08 (D.R. Bentley ed. 1997) (the trial judge’s
notebook commenting on the procedural argument).
378. See INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM THE PRESENT METHODS IN TAKING OUT AND
EXECUTING COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPT, supra note 331, at 1–2 (providing examples of
creditors’ fraud); 1 OLDHAM, supra note 95, at 414–15 (providing an example of a creditor-fraud
case before Lord Mansfield).
379. GREEN, supra note 43, at 71–72.
380. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 56–57 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (“I have known several instances of this kind:
commissions taken out without any colour of justification, either in respect of the insolvent
circumstances of the supposed debtor, or of there having been any act of bankruptcy committed;
and I have known that such commissions have in the end been superseded, and the persons who
took them out have been ordered to pay all the costs of the proceeding: but I never knew an
instance of this kind in which the person against whom the commission had been taken out, was
not, notwithstanding his ultimate success, completely and irretrievably ruined.”).
381. Id.
382. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Feb. 17, 1819, at 145–50.
383. Rex v. Page, (1819) Russ. & Ry. 392, 397, 168 Eng. Rep. 861, 865 (C.C.R.).
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designs, on his money perhaps or on his customers and trade, had to
hope that the jurors agreed, as they did when they acquitted John
Essington in 1729 to “general Satisfaction, it appearing a scandalous
385
and malicious Prosecution, carried on by the Debtors to his Estate.”
A final reason for the failure of capital punishment—a reason
which contemporaries did not explicitly mention—might have been
the inconsistency with which it was enforced, on the occasions that
indictments were even brought. As mentioned above, Richard Towne
was hanged in 1712 for trying to ship his goods out of the country,
386
whereas in 1710, John Ristow had been pardoned for the same act.
In 1708, John Sleorgin, a London weaver, was acquitted after
convincing the jury that his setting out for Holland after being made a
bankrupt and his running away from his creditors after they caught
him was all an unfortunate mix-up. He claimed he did not know of
the commission against him and that he was headed to Holland on an
387
innocent cloth-buying trip.
In 1756, Alexander Thompson
absconded from London as soon as he had received the insurance
money for a fire that destroyed his shop. He was arrested upon his
return to the city and convicted for failure to appear before the
bankruptcy commissioners, even though he claimed he had no notice
388
of the bankruptcy. Reviewing the Thompson case sixty years later,
the bankruptcy reformer, Basil Montagu, opined that “I very much
doubt whether any man now existing could be induced to proceed to
execution against such a person for such an offense; it does not
389
appear upon the trial, that he had any actual notice.”
It so happened, however, that Thompson was a particularly
unsympathetic character. A reputed playboy, he mistreated his

384. See SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra
note 7, at 33 (testimony of Basil Montagu) (using bankruptcy to eliminate competition); id. at 57
(testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly) (causing competitor expenses and malice).
385. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Feb. 26, 1729, at 7. But see the advertisement
taken out by Essington’s assignees after the publication of the Old Bailey proceedings, DAILY
POST, Apr. 14, 1729, at 1 (accusing the stenographer, who “was employ’d . . . to take the said
Tryal . . . fairly and impartially, and not to make (as he has done) the said unjust, or any
Reflection, on the Gentlemen concerned in the said Prosecution”).
386. See supra notes 319–23.
387. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, supra note 342, at 3 (where the name is
spelled Slaorgan); LONDON GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1707, at 2; THE BANKRUPT’S DIRECTORY 32
(London, J. Morphew 1708) (listing John Sleorgin, Weaver, London).
388. PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Jan. 15, 1756, at 85, 87.
389. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 21 (testimony of Basil Montagu).
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London wife and disrespected her father, the purveyor of mineral
390
waters to the King. He never overcame the suspicion that he was
responsible for the fire that burned down his shop and killed two
391
servants. And when he absconded, he returned to his native
Scotland and bigamously took a second wife. Her father, hearing
rumors about Thompson’s London wife, made him return most of the
marriage settlement. To get the money back, Thompson returned to
London and hired a woman to go before a justice of the peace and
swear that she had been living with him but that they were not
married. But she ended up confessing the trick to a lawyer, who had
392
Thompson hauled before a magistrate and arrested. It may well
have been these foibles and frauds, and not his relatively paltry debts,
393
that led the jury to decide to hang him. This possibility highlights
the real unfairness of the private prosecution of fraudulent bankrupts.
Whether or not a bankrupt was going to face death depended a great
deal upon how angry and insulted his creditors were, and how much
they preferred revenge to money. As Richard Towne’s prosecuting
390. 3 SELECT TRIALS FOR MURDER, ROBBERY, BURGLARY, RAPES, SODOMY, COINING,
FORGERY, PYRACY AND OTHER OFFENCES AND MISDEMEANOURS, AT THE SESSIONS-HOUSE
IN THE OLD-BAYLEY 270–71, 274 (London, J. Wilkie 1764) [hereinafter SELECT TRIALS]
(describing Thompson’s treatment of his wife and father-in-law and the threatening letter to his
father-in-law); PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD BAILEY, Jan. 15, 1756, at 85 (identifying the fatherin-law as “Mr. Davis”); LONDON GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1756, at 2 (describing the threatening letter
sent regarding Thompson to Thomas Davis of St. Albans near Pall Mall); GEN. ADVERTISER,
July 25, 1751, at 1 (announcing that Thomas Davis, who had a water warehouse on St. Albans
near Pall Mall, had been appointed purveyor of mineral water to the king); GEN. ADVERTISER,
Dec. 5, 1751, at 3 (identifying Davis’s water warehouse as in St. Albans Street, Pall Mall); PUB.
ADVERTISER, May 17, 1756, at 2 (advertisement of Thomas Davis, purveyor to the king).
391. See 3 SELECT TRIALS, supra note 390, at 271–73; WHITEHALL EVENING POST, Feb. 21,
1756, at 3 (“Thompson, one of the Malefactors, who was executed Yesterday, on his being ask’d
if he set his House on Fire in Bury-Street, St. James’s, declar’d he was innocent.”).
392. 3 SELECT TRIALS, supra note 390, at 273–74. The jury may have known what they were
doing in finding Thompson guilty. While he sat in prison awaiting his execution, an anonymous
letter believed to have come from Thompson, was sent to his father-in-law, Thomas Davis,
threatening that: “[If Davis] don’t clear Mr. Thompson (a Person now under Sentence of Death
in Newgate [Prison],) he, the said Davis, shall have a Present sent him of his Son’s Heart, who is
a Boy of Twelve Years of Age. That, if the said Thompson suffers, so sure shall one of his, the
said Davis’s Family, suffer likewise a crueler Death.” LONDON GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1756, at 2
(some punctuation adjusted); 3 SELECT TRIALS, supra note 390, at 274.
393. His debts amounted to just slightly over the £200 minimum required by statute to be
proved by the eight creditors who petitioned for a commission. 5 Geo. II, c. 30, § 23 (1732)
(requiring three or more creditors to prove debts of at least £200). PROCEEDINGS OF THE OLD
BAILEY, Jan. 15, 1756, at 86 (listing the debts of petitioning creditors); Bankruptcy Commission
Docket Book (Apr. 22, 1755) (National Archives, B4/13 f. 192) (docketing of the commission
listing the same petitioning creditors); Fresh Advices from Our Correspondents, WHITEHALL
EVENING POST, Feb. 21, 1756, at 3 (mentioning Thompson’s execution).

KADENS IN FINAL

2010]

4/1/2010 1:07:40 PM

THE LAST BANKRUPT HANGED

1301

creditor said when asked if he would visit the defendant in prison, “he
394
would not go to see the Prisoner till he saw him go be hang’d.”
Another assignee, less angry or less bloodthirsty, might simply have
refrained from bringing the indictment in the first place.
The failure to enforce the capital punishment provision of the
bankruptcy statutes appears to have had an adverse effect on the
entire bankruptcy system and not just on the limited set of frauds at
which the provision was aimed. English bankruptcy was originally
weighted heavily in favor of the creditors. The creditors chose
whether to take out a commission, they controlled the bankrupt’s
estate during the pendency of the proceeding, and they retained their
rights to pursue the debtor for debts left unpaid after the bankruptcy
liquidation. When debtors obtained any favors at all they had to steal
them through illegal collusion. In this system, the penalties prescribed
in the seventeenth-century statutes were thumbs on the scale, helping
the creditor by nudging the debtor toward cooperation. But such
nudging was relatively gentle compared with the fist that, in principle,
could be brought down on debtors after 1706 and the invention of the
capital crime of fraudulent bankruptcy. With the introduction of
discharge, however, the debtor suddenly had some weight on his own
side of the balance. If the offsetting penalty provision had worked
effectively, the bankruptcy law might have evolved more quickly
toward a functioning equilibrium between creditors and debtors. But
the threat of death proved to be so useless that the fist the legislators
395
thought would keep debtors in line ended up being an empty glove.
The capital felony provision became “for want of prosecutors, a dead
396
letter.”
Consequently, with nothing offsetting discharge, the scale
tipped—or at least contemporaries perceived it to tip—in favor of the
bankrupts. One member of the 1818 parliamentary committee
considering bankruptcy reform claimed that in most commissions on
which he had served as a commissioner, “the bankrupt had acted with
great injustice towards his creditors, generally with dishonesty and
fraud . . . and this conduct I can only trace to one cause, and that is,
394. A Particular Account of the Tryal of Richard Towne, Tallow-Chandler, supra note 319.
395. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 339, at 16 (testimony of
Thomas Nowlan) (“I also consider that enactment, which declares concealment . . . to be a
capital felony, and which was intended to prevent fraud, operates as its principle
protection . . . . ”).
396. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 50 (testimony of Sir Samuel Romilly).
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the facility with which almost every bankrupt goes through the
397
operation of his commission.” The bankrupt breezed through the
398
bankruptcy because most commissions were taken out collusively.
The friendly creditor arranged to be elected assignee, and he saw to it
that the bankrupt, and his concealed goods, were protected. Then,
using bribes, threats, and persuasion, he influenced the other
399
creditors to sign the certificate. This was made simpler after 1809
when Parliament amended the law to require that only three-fifths of
400
the creditors in number and value sign the certificate. As a result,
“it was rather more easy for a fraudulent than an honest bankrupt to
obtain” his discharge, and this greatly irritated both members of
401
Parliament and the men involved in the bankruptcy system. The
fraudster felt confident that he could get away with his bribes, false
debts, and cooked books because no effective checks existed on such
402
behavior. No one was going to enforce the penalty provisions in the
bankruptcy statutes such that “nine times out of ten, the commission
403
is worked for the benefit of the bankrupt, and not of the creditors.”
A bankruptcy procedure with discharge and without the threat of

397. Id. at 103 (testimony of John Ingram Lockhart).
398. Id. at 40 (testimony of Joseph Fitzwilliam Vandercom).
399. See id. at 70 (testimony of William Cooke) (“I think the certificate is the great ground
of fraudulent commissions; it is the great inducement to bankrupts to concert commissions to be
issued against them . . . .”).
400. 49 Geo III, c. 121, § 18 (1809).
401. 38 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 312, at 985; see also SELECT COMMITTEE
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 34 (testimony of Basil
Montagu); id. at 41 (testimony of Joseph Fitzwilliam Vandercom) (complaining that the
fraudulent bankrupt was as likely to obtain his discharge as the honest bankrupt).
402. This was not a new development in 1818. See CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRESENT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT,
SO AS TO RENDER THEM MORE BENEFICIAL BOTH TO CREDITOR AND DEBTOR 5 (London,
W. Richardson 1795) (“Lord Hardwicke in his time declared, that ‘the laws had turned the edge
of commissions of bankruptcy, from being, as they were originally, remedial to the creditors,
and in the nature of punishment to the bankrupts, whom they considered as offenders, to be the
accidental occasion of great frauds.’”).
403. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 68 (testimony of Robert Waithman); see also SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO
CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 20, at 2 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan
concerning Irish law) (“The law, instead of preventing, encourages fraud; for it makes no
adequate distinction between the frugal and honest, though unfortunate, trader, and the
extravagant, crafty and fraudulent bankrupt; it does not encourage and protect the former, nor
deter or punish the latter; for in its sanguinary and indiscriminating severity, he calculates upon
and finds certain impunity.”).
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punishment for crimes had become, in the eyes of creditors and their
404
lawyers, a debtor’s remedy.
In 1818, the bankruptcy commissioner, Archibald Cullen,
sounded the death knell of the bankruptcy system that England
invented in the sixteenth century and had attempted to triage with
band-aids ever since:
The bankrupt law was introduced with a view to prevent and punish
the frauds of debtors, and to distribute their property equally
amongst all their creditors; but it has not succeeded; and however
wise the original plan may have been thought, yet it does not now,
even with all its subsequent alterations and accessions, appear to
effect either of the objects which it professed; the property is not
forthcoming, or it is wasted: the same frauds still exist, neither
diminished nor punished; and a new class has sprung up, engendered
by the very proceedings, which have been instituted to prevent
them; so that the prominent and growing evil of the present day,
with respect to debtor and creditor, appears to be the bankrupt law
405
itself.

Faced with such damning testimony, the House of Commons
immediately took up the mantle of bankruptcy reform. A major bill
was offered in 1818, then returned to committee, shortened, offered
406
again in 1819, and again returned to committee and cut down.
Through all the revisions, one set of clauses remained constant.
Capital punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy was to be abolished
because the existing law did not deter frauds due to the lack of
407
convictions and the excessive severity of the penalty. Instead,
404. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 44 (testimony of Germain Lavie, solicitor) (“As the bankrupt laws are at present
administered, I conceive they afford advantage to no one, except the bankrupt.”); 1 OLDHAM,
supra note 95, at 413 (quoting Lord Mansfield’s complaints before the House of Lords in 1781
that bankruptcy “made a bankrupt’s fortune” and that “every day proved the increase of frauds
under the bankrupt laws” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
405. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
7, at 80 (testimony of Archibald Cullen).
406. A Bill [as Amended by the Committee] to Amend the Laws Relating to Bankrupts,
1819, Bill [284]; A Bill [as Amended on Re-commitment] to Amend the Laws Relating to
Bankrupts, 1819, Bill [339]; LESTER, supra note 30, at 33–34.
407. A Bill [as Amended by the Committee] to Alter and Amend the Laws Relating to
Bankrupts, 1818, Bill [403], at 35 (“[W]hereas the punishment of death awarded by the said
statute against such persons as should be lawfully convicted of any of the offences mentioned
therein, hath been found inefficient to deter fraudulent Bankrupts from the frequent
commission of such flagitious conduct as was intended to be remedied by the said statute, by
reason of the great difficulty of procuring a conviction of such offenders, and of the reluctance
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fraudulent bankrupts, defined, as before, as those failing to appear
before the commissioners or concealing assets in the amount of £20 or
more, would, upon indictment and conviction, be “adjudged to be
guilty of felony, and . . . transported for life, or for any period not less
than fourteen years, according to the magnitude of the offence or
offences of which such Bankrupt or Bankrupts shall be convicted as
408
aforesaid.” In addition, a new crime was created for destroying,
fabricating, or changing books or documents with intent to defraud
creditors or to obtain a certificate. This misdemeanor was to be
punished by “transportation for any term not exceeding fourteen
years, or to solitary confinement and hard labour in any of His
Majesty’s gaols or houses of correction, in proportion to the enormity
409
of the offence or offences.” The 1818/1819 bill never passed, and
410
fraudulent bankruptcy remained a capital felony for one more year.
In 1820, bankruptcy crime was finally removed from the list of capital
411
offenses in an omnibus death penalty reform bill. The new penalty
was transportation for seven years to life or imprisonment at hard
labor for up to seven years.
Paired with the limited availability of discharge, capital
punishment failed as the counterbalancing mechanism tasked with
encouraging reluctant debtors to cooperate in their bankruptcy. The
assignees’ reluctance to pursue such an expensive and severe penalty
freed debtors to try to protect their assets, both by concealing and by
defrauding the discharge process through bribes and collusive
bankruptcies, knowing that they would likely face no ramifications.
As a result, according to the witnesses testifying before the House of
Commons committee in 1817 and 1818, non- or merely partial
cooperation by bankrupts was endemic and uncontrollable.
CONCLUSION
Vengeance and retribution may not have been explicit goals of
the bankruptcy law, but they have contributed to the manner in which
creditors and society at large viewed bankrupts. Bankruptcy was

of assignees and others to prosecute such Bankrupts, on account of the too great severity of
such punishment, to the great discouragement of fair and honest industry, and the increase of
fraud and immorality . . . .”).
408. Id. at 36.
409. Id. at 37.
410. LESTER, supra note 30, at 33–34.
411. 1 Geo. IV, c. 115, § 2 (1820).
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devised in 1543 to combat the perceived crime of debtors who lived
large on their creditors’ money or who borrowed money never
intending repayment. By 1706, the law’s focus shifted toward creating
a civil bankruptcy system in which insolvents—honest or not—would
willingly repay their debts in the hope of receiving a discharge, and in
which only post-bankruptcy fraud would be punished as a felony.
But the system did not work particularly well. Although
412
discharge came to be considered an essential part of bankruptcy, the
failure to enforce the capital felony provision permitted fraud to
flourish and eventually to undermine the goal of rewarding only the
cooperative bankrupt. This occurred during an era in which people
involved in the bankruptcy system understood the need for an
effective balance between debtors and creditors to ensure voluntary
413
cooperation by the bankrupt.
This understanding raises the
question: Why, if the nonenforcement of the penalty for fraud led to
systemic disequilibrium and failed to encourage honest cooperation,
414
was capital punishment for bankruptcy not abolished earlier?
One part of the answer lay in the work of late eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century English reformers advocating generally
415
against the death penalty. Early eighteenth-century proponents of
bankruptcy reform had not generally shared the reformers’
squeamishness about hanging people. Although many pamphlets and
broadsides written during the first half of the eighteenth century had
called for a variety of changes, both minor, such as changes in the
416
means of obtaining discharge, and major, such as switching to a

412. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *472 (expressing the view that the English law of
bankruptcy was based on a give and take between creditor and debtor, where the creditor
obtained the bankrupt’s cooperation and the debtor obtained a discharge); SELECT COMMITTEE
APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 55 (testimony of Sir
Samuel Romilly) (stating that discharge was necessary to bankruptcy because it was the only
justification for taking the debtor’s property and making him answerable to his creditors).
413. See, e.g., 38 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, supra note 312, at 986 (explaining that the
bankrupt’s assistance in recovering the debts was so valuable that it was worth giving him
something significant in return).
414. Cf. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL
TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17, 56–59 (1975) (asking the
same question with regard to capital punishment of theft).
415. GATRELL, supra note 6, at 326–30; Hay, supra note 414, at 57–58.
416. REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL
DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS, supra note 314 (arguing that only the
chancellor and the Lord Keeper should decide on discharge).
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417

voluntary bankruptcy system, one provision that most of these texts
accepted without objection was that fraudulent bankrupts should
418
hang.
Yet, despite some refinement of tastes in criminal penalties later
in the century, bankruptcy continued to make people angry, and they
419
wanted to see it “properly” punished. Even Cesare Beccaria, whose
book on punishment was relied on by English criminal law reformers,
420
felt that fraudulent bankrupts should be punished severely. Since
1543, responses to bankruptcy had been colored by the same human
421
impulses that controlled victims’ reactions to other sorts of crimes.
Creditors wanted revenge, or they wanted the bankrupt to suffer, or
422
they wanted him to serve as an example. Creditors wanted the

417. OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY OFFERED TO THE PARLIAMENT BY
SEVERAL CREDITORS, MERCHANTS AND TRADERS OF LONDON, RELATING TO THE BILL NOW
DEPENDING CONCERNING BANKRUPTS (circa 1718) [hereinafter OBSERVATIONS AND
PROPOSALS] (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MP 100/6); PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY OFFER’D TO THE
PARLIAMENT, BY THE MERCHANTS AND TRADERS OF LONDON, FOR AN ACT TO PROMOTE
TRADE AND CREDIT, AND ENCOURAGE HONEST INSOLVENT, AND FOR SUPPLYING THE
DEFECTS OF THE LATE ACT FOR PREVENTING FRAUDS FREQUENTLY COMMITTED BY
BANKRUPTS (circa 1707) [hereinafter PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY OFFER’D] (Chetham’s
Library, H.P. 2354); INCONVENIENCES ARISING FROM THE PRESENT METHODS IN TAKING OUT
AND EXECUTING COMMISSIONS OF BANKRUPT, supra note 331, at 2; Letter to the Author,
BRIT. J., Feb. 4, 1727, at 1.
418. OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS, supra note 417; PROPOSALS MOST HUMBLY
OFFER’D, supra note 417; PHILLIPS, supra note 356, at 17. But see OBSERVATOR, Feb. 24, 1705,
at 1 (referring to the idea of making fraudulent bankruptcy a capital felony, “[w]e have too
much Hanging in England, we might make the Lives of Malefactors more Beneficial to the
Commonwealth than their Deaths can be”).
419. See Letter to the Printer, ST. JAMES CHRON., Dec. 1, 1761, at 4 (writing in response to
the Perrott case, “[a] fraudulent Bankrupt is one of the worst of Robbers, because he takes
Advantage of the Trust and Confidence reposed in him by his Creditors”); York Assize
Intelligence, HULL PACKET, Mar. 30, 1813, at 4 (including the judge’s peroration upon
sentencing John Senior in 1813: “after having taken advantage of the beneficent provisions of
the law respecting persons in trade, which in cases of insolvency where all the effects have been
given up [to] annihilate their debt, and sends them into the world as new men with fresh credit;
but (addressing John Senior) ‘you, instead of complying with the conditions of the law,
fraudulently concealed from your creditors a considerable part of your effects, as a fund to
supply your future want, or perhaps for the purpose of extravagance’” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
420. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 130 (Philadelphia,
Philip H. Nicklin 1819); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *156 (citing Beccaria regarding
fraudulent bankrupts); GATRELL, supra note 6, at 331–32 (explaining Beccaria’s importance for
English reformers).
421. See, e.g., supra notes 33–35.
422. DEFOE, ESSAY, supra note 17, at 205–06 (relating the story of a creditor who
imprisoned a bankrupt even though he had no money to pay the debts because “[r]evenge is
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423

debtor to pay his “victims” figuratively as well as literally, and they
wanted to make sure that bankruptcy was viewed with such horror
424
that community pressure alone would deter others. At a certain
rather visceral level, it seems, punishment was more important than
ensuring cooperation.
The challenge was finding a penalty to replace death. Ordinary
imprisonment was no different from what creditors were entitled to
do on their mere ex parte claim of a debt owed. Some commentators
thought that fraudulent bankrupts should simply be denied the
benefits of discharge, even if they later ended up disclosing their
425
assets or appearing before the commissioners. One Irish solicitor
testifying before Parliament in 1818 suggested more colorfully that:
[O]ne fraudulent bankrupt, dressed in yellow trowsers and jacket,
with the nature of his offence placarded thereon, and sweeping the
street between the Commercial Buildings and Royal Exchange in
Dublin, between the hours of two and four o’clock in the afternoon,

sweet”); see also 1 AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE, supra note 233, at i (claiming that the prosecution
of Perrott was not pursued for vengeance but rather as an example).
423. It is, perhaps, significant that it fell to one of the staunchest opponents of the capital
punishment provision to point out that a bankrupt should not “be put to death for the nondelivery of his property, particularly when it is remembered that the offender is not the only
person to blame; there must be a feeling in the community, that the imprudent confidence
reposed by creditors, is not wholly exempt from censure.” SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO
CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note 7, at 21 (testimony of Basil Montagu).
424. The concern with stigma is of long standing, as is the belief that the stigma of
bankruptcy is declining. See, e.g., DANIEL DEFOE, THE COMPLETE ENGLISH TRADESMAN, IN
FAMILIAR LETTERS; DIRECTING HIM IN ALL THE SEVERAL PARTS AND PROGRESSIONS OF
TRADE 84 (London, Charles Rivington 1726) (celebrating the fact that bankruptcy was no
longer something to fear because “a Commission of Bankrupt is so familiar a thing, that the
debtor oftentimes causes it to be taken out in his favour, that he may the sooner be effectually
deliver’d from all his creditors at once . . . . Some have said, this law is too favourable to the
bankrupt; that it makes tradesmen careless; that they value not breaking at all, but run on at all
hazards, venturing without forecast and without consideration, knowing they may come off
again so cheap and so easie, if they miscarry”); Letter to the Editor, PUB. ADVERTISER, Nov. 1,
1773, at 2 (“At present Bankruptcy is but a Name; it is become so fashionable and
countenanced, and the travelling through it is so very easy and expeditious, that few have any
dreadful Apprehensions from it.”).
425. REMARKS ON THE LATE ACT OF PARLIAMENT TO PREVENT FRAUDS FREQUENTLY
COMMITTED BY BANKRUPTS, WITH PROPOSALS FOR THE AMENDMENT THEREOF, supra note
103, at 6 (depriving fraudsters of the benefit of the Act is preferable because it is not penal but
rather “Privative of the Favour of the Act”); REASONS HUMBLY OFFERED FOR ALTERING
SEVERAL CLAUSES IN THE BILL DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO BANKRUPTS,
supra note 314 (“Exclusion from the Benefits of the late Act, will more effectually answer the
end designed.”).
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would make a more salutary impression upon the public feeling,
426
than could be produced by a score of executions at Newgate.

Long after the punishment for fraudulent bankruptcy was reduced to
seven years’ imprisonment at hard labor, James Fitzjames Stephen,
the author of an authoritative early history of English criminal law,
lamented that this penalty was insufficient. Although he
acknowledged that the old law was too severe, he believed that many
instances of fraudulent bankruptcy deserved more than imprisonment
427
for even ten years. Fraudulent bankruptcy, he wrote, was just like
“wholesale robbery or theft, and the very fact that it looks a less
outrageous offence and is one which an apparently respectable
person may be tempted to commit, is a reason, I think, for punishing
428
it with special severity.” Parliament had probably felt the same way
in 1706 when it made fraudulent bankruptcy a felony without benefit
of clergy, though at that point they could still hope that the penalty
would effectively deter fraud.
The impulse to punish bankrupts is not a relic of an
unenlightened age. Modern American bankruptcy has largely solved
the cooperation problem by making bankruptcy voluntary, increasing
the availability of discharge, and limiting the use of criminal sanctions
to true cases of fraud or crime. Nonetheless, the desire to punish
bankrupts remains, even when evidence points to the conclusion that
such punishment does not result in optimal social or economic
429
results. As Senator Wellstone said during debates over the 2005
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, “[t]his
430
debate is about punishing failure.”

426. SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONSIDER OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS, supra note
20, at 7 (testimony of Thomas Nowlan).
427. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 109, at 232.
428. Id.
429. Megan McArdle, Sink and Swim. Bankruptcy Helps the Undeserving—and That’s the
Way It Should Be, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2009, at 30–32; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical
Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 passim
(2006).
430. 147 CONG. REC. S7724 (daily ed. July 17, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
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APPENDIX
EVIDENCE OF FRAUDULENT BANKRUPTCY, 1706–1820
This chart lists information about persons committing fraudulent
bankruptcy that can be gleaned from various sources, including the
Proceedings of the Old Bailey (OBP), manuscript material, such as
the indices to the Old Bailey indictment books found at the London
Metropolitan Archives (LMA), and newspaper advertisements giving
notice that bankrupts had concealed assets or failed to surrender to
the bankruptcy commissioners. Advertisements calling only on third
parties to turn over concealed assets and not specifically mentioning
that the bankrupt was concealing have been excluded.
Year

Name

Profession/
Location

Crime

Outcome
(as far as
known)

Source(s)

1707

Richard

Haberdasher/

Not

Unknown

LONDON GAZETTE,

Read

London

surrendering

John

Weaver/

Concealment

Acquitted: no

LONDON GAZETTE,

Sleorgin

London

1708

Dec. 8, 1707, at 2
notice

at 3

Slaorgan)
1710

Augustyn
Cloribus

London

surrendering

1711

John

Linen draper/

Concealment

Ristow

London

(a.k.a.
Restow)

Oct. 20, 1707, at 2
OBP, Oct. 13, 1708,

(a.k.a.
Merchant/

Not

Unknown

DAILY COURANT,

Guilty:

OBP, May 16, 1711,

Aug. 7, 1710, at 2
pardoned

at 3
LONDON GAZETTE,
Dec. 14, 1710, at 2
DAILY COURANT,
Sept. 12, 1711, at 2
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Richard

Tallow

Towne

chandler/

Concealment

(a.k.a.

London

[Vol. 59:1229

Guilty: hanged OBP, Dec. 10, 1712,
at 2
POST BOY, Dec. 16,

Town)

1712, at 1
A PARTICULAR
ACCOUNT OF THE
TRYAL OF
RICHARD TOWNE,
TALLOWCHANDLER, FOR
FELONY (1712)

1713

Unknown

Concealment

Tallow

Newgate

chandler/
London
1713

Committed to

431

BRITISH-MERCURY,
Jan. 21, 1713, at 7

Prison

William

Unknown:

Unknown:

19 H.L. JOUR. 568

Ellins

described as

petitioned

(June 9, 1713)

“guilty of

Parliament

Felony, as a
fraudulent
Bankrupt”
1715

WEEKLY JOURNAL

Balthazer

Not

Committed to

Cornet

surrendering

Newgate

WITH FRESH

Prison

ADVICES FOREIGN
& DOMESTICK,
August 20, 1715, at
195

1715

Robert

Vintner/

Dawson

London

Concealment

Acquitted: no
act

LONDON GAZETTE,
May 7, 1715, at 4
OBP, June 2, 1715, at
5

1726

Albertus

Brewer/

Burnaby

London

Concealment

Acquitted: no
act

LONDON GAZETTE,
Feb. 1, 1726 n.s., at
3
DAILY COURANT,
Feb. 28, 1726, at 2
LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/001
OBP, July 11, 1726,
at 2–3
EVENING POST, July
12, 1726, at 1

431. This could be Richard Towne, but, if not, it implies that a second tallow chandler
besides him was committed for concealing effects.
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John Elliott Warehousman/

Concealment

Unknown

DAILY COURANT,

Concealment

Unknown

WEEKLY J.; OR,

London
1726

John

Victualler/

Turner

London

1311

Mar. 5, 1726, at 2
BRITISH
GAZETTEER, Nov.
5, 1726, at 4

1727

Daniel

Bay-maker/

Peers

Great

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON GAZETTE,
Jan. 3, 1726 [o.s.],

Coggeshall,

at 2

Essex
1727

Robert

Chapman/

Not

Acquitted: no

Steel

London

surrendering

notice

LONDON GAZETTE,
July 12, 1726, at 2
EVENING POST, Dec.
1, 1726, at 1
LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/001
OBP, Jan. 13, 1727,
at 8

1729

James

Victualler/

Holden

London

1729

John

Merchant/

Essington

London

Concealment

Indicted

DAILY J., Mar. 3,

Concealment

Acquitted:

LONDON GAZETTE,

1729, at 1
malicious
prosecution

May 11, 1728, at 4
DAILY POST, July 20,
1728, at 2
LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/001
OBP, Feb. 26, 1729

1729

Thomas

Chapman/

Dawson

London

Concealment

Acquitted: no
evidence

OBP, Oct. 15, 1729,
at 8

offered
1730

Robert

Hosier/

Willan

London

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON EVENINGPOST, July 21, 1730,
at 3

1733

John Ward

London

Concealment

Unknown

DAILY J., Feb. 17,

1735

William

Currier/

Not

Affidavit

LMA

Mason

London

surrendering

sworn against

1733, at 1
CLA/040/07/026

him
1736

Edward

Frome,

Not

Halliday

Somerset

surrendering

Joseph

Merchant/

Concealment

Bezeley

London

Indicted

LONDON EVENINGPOST, Dec. 14,
1736, at 3

1736

Unknown

LONDON GAZETTE,
July 17, 1736, at 2
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Edward

Merchant/

Not

Acquitted:

Frith

London

surrendering

procedural
defect

[Vol. 59:1229
OBP, Oct. 11, 1738,
at 150-51
THOMAS LEACH,
CASES IN CROWN
LAW 11–13 (1789)

1738

John Baker Hawker of

Concealment

Unknown

COUNTRY J., July 1,
1738, at 3

Drapers/
Swansea
1739

George

Fellmonger/

Petty

Stratford, Essex

Henry

Tailor/

Ahelves

London

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON EVENINGPOST, June 9, 1739,
at 3

1739

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON EVENINGPOST, June 12,
1739, at 2

1742

John

Chapman/

Wright

Lewes, Sussex

Concealment

Unknown

Prior

Brasier/

Concealment

Acquitted:

Green

London

Perjury

procedural

LONDON EVENINGPOST, Sept. 9, 1742,
at 2

1742

OBP, Jan. 15, 1742,
at 35–37

defect

OBP, Apr. 28, 1742,

Concealment

Unknown

DAILY POST, Jan. 25,

Concealment

Unknown

DAILY

at 95–98
1742

Thomas

Laceman/

Hatton

London

1742

William

Linen draper &

Abram

mercer/ Exeter

1742, at 2
ADVERTISER, Dec.
23, 1742, at 1

1743

___ Brown

Newcastle

Concealment

Indicted

LONDON DAILY
POST, & GEN.
ADVERTISER, Apr.
22, 1743, at 1

1743

Isaac

Merchant/

Panchand

London

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON EVENINGPOST, Apr. 7, 1743,
at 3

1743

John

Shopkeeper/

Wilson

Kingston-upon-

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON GAZETTE,
June 25, 1743, at 2

Hull
1745
1749

John

Packer/

Upsdale

London

Aaron Hart Jeweler/
London

Concealment

Unknown

DAILY POST, June 7,

Not

Unknown

GEN. ADVERTISER,

1745, at 1
surrendering

Jan. 31, 1749, at 2
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Peter

Merchant/

Comerlan

London

Concealment

Confessed

1313
LONDON EVENINGPOST, Oct. 3, 1749,
at 2
LONDON GAZETTE,
July 16, 1751, at 4

1750

Robert

Scrivener/

Wright

London

Concealment

Indicted

LMA
CLA/047/LJ/13/175
0/005
LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/001

1752

George

London

Concealment

Indicted

LMA

London

Concealment

Indicted

LMA

London

Not

Acquitted: not LMA

surrendering

a bankrupt

Pope
1753

Benjamin

1754

Thomas

CLA/047/LJ/10/001

Bailey

CLA/047/LJ/10/001

Cardow
(a.k.a.
Tardow)
1755

CLA/047/LJ/10/001
OBP, Apr. 24, 1754,
at 173

John

Innholder/

Cropley

Newark-upon-

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON EVENINGPOST, Mar. 8, 1755,

Trent

at 2
LONDON GAZETTE,
Nov. 15, 1755, at 3

1756

Alexander

Embroiderer/

Thompson

London

Concealment

Guilty: hanged LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/002
OBP, Jan. 15, 1756,
at 85–87

1757

John Davis

Linen draper/

1757

Martin

Tailor/

Mocho

London

John

Norwich

Concealment

Unknown

PUB. ADVERTISER,

Concealment

Unknown

PUB. ADVERTISER,

Concealment

Confessed

LLOYD’S EVENING

London

1759

June 11, 1757, at 2
June 6, 1757, at 3

Britton

POST, Dec. 11,
1761, at 575

1759

Thomas

Chemist/

Townshend Haymarket,
Middlesex

Concealment

Unknown

WHITEHALL
EVENING POST;
OR, LONDON

INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 3, 1759, at 3
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John

Linen draper/

Perrott

London

Concealment

[Vol. 59:1229

Guilty: hanged OBP, Oct. 21, 1761,
at 393–404
AN AUTHENTIC
NARRATIVE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS

UNDER A
COMMISSION OF
BANKRUPTCY
AGAINST JOHN
PERROTT (London,
R. Griffiths 1761)
1761
1762

1765

Philip

Baker/

Woodham

London

John

Rope-maker/

Leopold

Limehouse,

Gosler

Middlesex

Frederick

Pressman/

Shepherd

Exon, Devon

Concealment

Indicted

LMA

Concealment

Unknown

PUB. ADVERTISER,

MJ/SP/1761/09/011
Jan. 29, 1762, at 4
Concealment

Unknown

GAZETTEER & NEW
DAILY
ADVERTISER, Aug.
2, 1765, at 3

1765

Richard

London

Concealment

Holmes

Acquitted:
failure to

LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/002

prove debt

OBP, Jan. 16, 1765,

Unknown

GAZETTEER & NEW

at 66
1765

William

Haberdashers/

Not

Steers &

London

surrendering

Thomas

DAILY
ADVERTISER, Oct.

Concealment

23, 1765, at 3

Russel
1766

Kinsey

Mercer/

Not

Tyrer

London

surrendering

Acquitted

LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/002

(a.k.a.

OBP, Jan. 16, 1766,

Kensey,

at 80

Rinsey)
1766

Philip

Victualler/

Brown

Portsmouth

Concealment

Unknown

GAZETTEER & NEW
DAILY
ADVERTISER, July
2, 1766, at 2

1768

John

Merchant/

Mantell

Plaistow, Essex

Concealment

Unknown

GAZETTEER & NEW
DAILY
ADVERTISER, May
3, 1768, at 2
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Samuel

Haberdasher/

Wilson

London

Concealment

Unknown

1315
LMA
OB/SP/1768/04/026
LMA
OB/SB/1768/05/14–
17

1769

William

Dealer in sugar/ Concealment

Bankruptcy

Lane

London

“enlarged”

PUB. ADVERTISER,
Nov. 6, 1769, at 3
LLOYD’S EVENING
POST, Dec. 22,
1769, at 608

1774

Derrick

London

Concealment

Indicted

LMA

London

Not

Acquitted: no

LMA

surrendering

evidence

Martin
1774

Thomas

CLA/047/LJ/10/002

Carter

CLA/047/LJ/10/002

offered

OBP, Feb. 16, 1774,

Not

Brought

GAZETTEER & NEW

surrendering

before London

at 126
1777

Benjamin

London

Pierce
(a.k.a.

magistrate

ADVERTISER, June
19, 1777, at 2

King)
1778

DAILY

___

Merchant/

Solomon

London

Absconding

Tried before

ST. JAMES CHRON.;

Common

OR, BRITISH

Pleas: found

EVENING POST,

not entitled to

May 16, 1778, at 3

discharge
1778

Robert

Haberdasher/

Jaques

London

Concealment

Prosecutors
put off suit at

GEN. ADVERTISER,
& MORNING

Old Bailey and

INTELLIGENCER,

judge ordered

May 30, 1778, at 4

Jaques
discharged

LONDON EVENINGPOST, July 25, 1778,
at 3

1779

Edmund
Francis
Calze

London

Concealment

Indicted

LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/002

KADENS IN FINAL

4/1/2010 1:07:40 PM

1316
1779

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Thomas

Watchmaker/

Tyler

London

Concealment

Acquitted

[Vol. 59:1229
LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/002
OBP, Oct. 20, 1779,
at 563–69
GAZETTEER & NEW
DAILY
ADVERTISER, Oct.
22, 1779, at 3
MORNING POST &
DAILY
ADVERTISER, Oct.
23, 1779, at 3

1779

Thomas

Banker/

Plumer

London

Concealment

Unknown

LONDON GAZETTE,
Dec. 18, 1779, at 5

Byde
1781

Joseph

Distiller/

George

Bristol

Concealment

Indicted

THE CASE OF THE
CREDITORS OF
JOSEPH GEORGE

Pedley

PEDLEY, A
BANKRUPT OF
BRISTOL (Bristol,
J. Lloyd 1783)
1784

Thomas

London

Not disclosing

Indicted

LMA

1786

James

Innholder/

Not

Unknown

MORNING POST &

Macartney

Epsom, Surrey

surrendering

Rawbone

CLA/047/LJ/10/002
DAILY
ADVERTISER, Aug.
11, 1786, at 3

1790

Thomas

London

Concealment

Evans

Acquitted: no
evidence

LMA
CLA/047/LJ/10/002

offered

OBP, Feb. 24, 1790,

Not

Captured in

ST. JAMES’S CHRON.;

surrendering

Nova Scotia

at 323
1791

___ Daniel

OR, BRITISH

EVENING POST,
Dec. 6, 1791, at 1
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George Pitt Haberdasher/

Concealment

London

Acquitted:

1317
LONDON PACKET:

procedural

OR, NEW LLOYD’S

defects

EVENING POST,
Dec. 27, 1793, at 1
LONDON CHRON.,
Sept. 14, 1793, at
265 (notice of
commission)
OBP, Jan. 15, 1794,
at 320–26
SUN, Jan. 21, 1794, at
4

1793

James

Soap-Boiler/

Nowlan

London

Concealment

Imprisoned:
released
without
revealing
assets

1793

Patrick

Soap-Boiler/

Brenan

London

1794

David

Merchant/

Valentine

London

MORNING CHRON.,
Aug. 1, 1793, at 1
WHITEHALL
EVENING POST,
Nov. 27, 1794, at 2

Concealment

Unknown

MORNING CHRON.,

Concealment

Unknown

ORACLE & PUB.

Aug. 14, 1793, at 1
ADVERTISER, Aug.
22, 1794, at 1

1796

John

Merchant/

Frayne

Dublin

Concealment

Guilty:

ST. JAMES’S CHRON.;

overturned on

OR, BRITISH

motion to

EVENING POST,

arrest
judgment

Dec. 24, 1795, at 3
STAR, Jan. 6, 1796, at
3
MORNING POST &
FASHIONABLE
WORLD, Jan. 8,
1796, at 4

1802

John

Carlisle

Not

No charges

surrendering

brought

London

Concealment

Indicted

LMA

London

Not

Acquitted: no

OBP, Apr. 16, 1806,

surrendering

evidence

Hatfield

CALEDONIAN
MERCURY, Dec. 6,
1802, at 3

1802

Thomas

1806

John

Shiver
Ibbetson

CLA/04/LJ/21/023

offered

at 221
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James

Wine merchant/ Concealment

Guilty:

Bullock

London

sentence
commuted

[Vol. 59:1229
DERBY MERCURY,
Aug. 20, 1807, at 1
OBP, Sept. 16, 1807,
at 392–402
King v. Bullock,
(1807) 1 Taunt. 71,
168 Eng. Rep. 595
(E.C.)
SELECT CASES FROM
THE TWELVE

JUDGES’
NOTEBOOKS 107–
08 (D.R. Bentley
ed. 1997)
1807

TREWMAN’S

William

Serge

Not

Acquitted:

Tucker

manufacturer/

surrendering

procedural

EXETER FLYING

defect

POST; OR,

Exeter &

PLYMOUTH &

London

CORNISH
ADVERTISER, July
2, 1807, at 1
OBP, Dec. 2, 1807, at
46–49
1811

Charles

Merchant/

Not

Acquitted:

Peter

London

surrendering

procedural

Whittaker
1812

OBP, Sept. 18, 1811,
at 389–90

defect

Edward

Stagecoach

Procter

master/

Concealment

Acquitted

OBP, Feb. 19, 1812,
at 158

London
1813

John Senior Clothier/

Concealment

Guilty: hanged HULL PACKET, Mar.

Alverthorpe,

30, 1813, at 4

Yorkshire

HULL PACKET, Apr.
6, 1813, at 4
LEEDS MERCURY,
Apr. 10, 1813, at 3

1814

Thomas

Draper/

Forsyth

Burslem,

judgment

(1814) Russ. & Ry.

Stafford

arrested on

274

Concealment

Guilty:

procedural
grounds

King v. Forsyth,
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4/1/2010 1:07:40 PM

THE LAST BANKRUPT HANGED

1319

William

Fairsley,

Not

Guilty:

Roberts

Yorkshire

surrendering

sentence

MERCURY; OR,

commuted by

COM. LITERARY &

Prince regent

POL. HERALD,

to two years’

Mar. 31, 1815, at

imprisonment

LIVERPOOL

319
LEEDS MERCURY,
July 8, 1815, at 3

1818

Thomas

Linen draper/

Hughes

London

Concealment

Imprisoned

MORNING CHRON.,

ten months,

Feb. 5, 1818, at 3

allegations
could not be
proved,
released
1819

George

Silk mercer/

Not

Guilty:

Page

London

surrendering

judgment
arrested

OBP, Feb. 17, 1819,
at 145–50
King v Page, (1819)
Russ. & Ry. 392

